☢ test - Í

Works intended to do what he did. However, at trial she testified that ‘Travis’ [an otherwise unidentified third party] was the individual who beat and stabbed her. Given the circumstances in this case, the expert's testimony on the cycle of domestic violence was admissible to explain the victim's contradictory statements. The trial court did not err in permitting the expert's testimony.” Perry v. State, 295 Ga.App. 264, 671 S.E.2d 290 (December 15, 2008). No abuse of discretion where trial court excluded defendant’s proffered expert testimony on “the justified use of deadly force” and the “dynamics of the confrontation.” “[A]s previously found by our Supreme Court, an average juror generally can determine, without the aid of expert testimony, whether conduct allegedly taken by an individual in self defense was necessary to protect against death or great bodily injury. Weems v. State, 268 Ga. 142, 144(3) (485 S.E.2d 767) (1997) (‘Whether, under the circumstances then existing, it was reasonable for Weems to believe that firing his gun was necessary to prevent his death or great bodily injury was not beyond the ken of the average juror.’).” Jackson v. State, 291 Ga.App. 287, 661 S.E.2d 665 (April 24, 2008). “‘Expert opinion testimony on issues to be decided by the jury, even the ultimate issue, is admissible where the conclusion of the expert is one which the jurors would not ordinarily be able to draw for themselves; i.e., the conclusion is beyond the ken of the average layman.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Caldwell v. State, 245 Ga.App. 630, 633(4) (538 S.E.2d 531) (2000). Under the circumstances here, it was permissible for the investigator to testify that based on his experience, persons who suffer from cuts or stab wounds often do not remember being stabbed – a conclusion that is beyond the ken of the average layman . [fn: Even if the investigator’s testimony was somewhat based upon hearsay, his opinion was mainly derived from his many years of professional experience. See Velazquez v. State, 282 Ga. 871, 875(3) (655 S.E.2d 806) (2008); Brewer v. State, 280 Ga. 18, 20(2) (622 S.E.2d 348) (2005) (‘an expert may base his opinion on hearsay; the presence of the hearsay does not mandate the exclusion of the testimony, but rather goes to the weight the testimony is to be given, which is a question for the jury.’ (Citation omitted.); compare Cobb [(March 17, 2008), below ] (expert testimony inadmissible where opinion was based entirely upon hearsay). ] See Caldwell, supra. We find no abuse of discretion in the admission of this testimony.” Accord, Walton v. State , 291 Ga.App. 736, 662 S.E.2d 820 (May 30, 2008) (expert may testify to opinion on ultimate issue where matter is beyond the ken of the average layman – here, fact that defendant’s behavior was typical of a shoplifter). Gaines v. State, 285 Ga.App. 684, 647 S.E.2d 357 (June 4, 2007). “[E]xpert testimony is admissible on the issue of why a child might delay in reporting abuse. Hicks v. State, 196 Ga.App. 311, 313(2) (396 S.E.2d 60) (1990).” State v. A 24 Bail Bonding, 280 Ga.App. 463, 634 S.E.2d 99 (June 28, 2006). At bond forfeiture hearing, trial court erred in admitting investigators’ “expert opinion” testimony of (missing) defendant’s true name. “Determination of the principal’s true name did not require the drawing of a conclusion beyond the ken of the average layman. Under the circumstances present here, A 24 was attempting to use the expert opinion as nothing more than a conduit for admission of the hearsay on which the opinion was based. That is not permissible. Cf. Hall County v. Merritt, 233 Ga.App. 526, 528(2), 504 S.E.2d 754 (1998).” Glidewell v. State, 279 Ga.App. 114, 630 S.E.2d 621 (April 27, 2006). Full court opinion. Overruled on other grounds, Reynolds v. State , 285 Ga. 70, 673 S.E.2d 854 (February 23, 2009). Trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting expert testimony on “state dependent memory flashback syndrome” after hearing. “[I]n determining whether a scientific principle or technique is competent evidence, our Supreme Court has held that ‘“counting heads” in the scientific community is not an appropriate way to determine the admissibility.’ Harper v. State, 249 Ga. 519, 525(1) (292 S.E.2d 389) (1982). Accordingly, the trial court was not required to inquire into the number of jurisdictions recognizing the scientific principles on which Dr. Schenck’s testimony was based. See id. at 525-526(1) (admissibility of scientific procedure or technique should be based on evidence available to the trial court). The trial court admitted Dr. Schenck’s testimony based on the evidence presented at the hearing, and we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in doing so.” Riley v. State, 278 Ga. 677, 604 S.E.2d 488, (October 25, 2004). Trial court did not err in excluding proffered testimony on “false confession theory,” as proffered witness acknowledged that the theory had not “reached a verifiable stage of scientific theory,” that articles supporting it had been “professionally criticized,” and that more research was needed; that witness’s “expertise” was drawn from five articles he had read, which were placed into evidence; that at least one of the articles acknowledged that the theory “needs further study and refinement. Consequently, the admission of expert testimony based on this theory is premature and unreliable;” and most of the examples cited in the articles were