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dissimilar to defendant’s case. Further, “the knowledge that a false confession can be obtained from a suspect by police is not beyond the ken of the average juror; this knowledge is implicit in the jury charges on the voluntariness, credibility, and corroboration of a defendant’s statement to the police. [Cits.]” Accord, Lyons v. State , 282 Ga. 588, 652 S.E.2d 525 (October 29, 2007). Robles v. State, 277 Ga. 415, 589 S.E.2d 566 (November 26, 2003). Felony murder and related convictions affirmed. “[E]xpert testimony on the cause of death is proper.” Caldwell v. State, 245 Ga.App. 630, 538 S.E.2d 531 (August 22, 2000). False imprisonment and aggravated assault convictions affirmed; trial court properly allowed police officer with paramedic experience and “training on trauma, suicidal behavior, and determining whether injuries were self-inflicted” to testify that victim’s wounds were defensive wounds, “a conclusion that is beyond the ken of the average layman.” Brown v. State , 243 Ga.App. 632, 534 S.E.2d 98 (April 17, 2000). Conviction for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute affirmed; no error in allowing “officer's testimony regarding the manner of conducting drug transactions . … Noting that he found no money on Brown, the officer had explained that often one person receives the money and then directs the buyer to the holder of the drugs. So-called conclusory opinion testimony about the illegal drug industry from expertly qualified officers is admissible to explain the circumstances surrounding the defendant's actions. O'Donnell v. State, 200 Ga.App. 829, 834(2), 409 S.E.2d 579 (1991).” Accord, Thomas v. State , 321 Ga.App. 214, 741 S.E.2d 298 (April 3, 2013) (officer qualified as expert on defendant’s “intent to distribute crack cocaine” based on his familiarity with crack cocaine packaging and sales, over 900 hours of training as a narcotics officer, at least 50 crack cocaine arrests, and other drug-related arrests). Porter v. State , 243 Ga.App. 498, 532 S.E.2d 407 (March 24, 2000). Convictions for child cruelty and contributing to deprivation of a minor reversed; trial court erred in excluding defendant’s expert evidence that defendant had a psychological condition that caused her to “‘to be able to block out things that she doesn't want to see’ and that ‘her whole psychological makeup is almost designed to not see things that are too painful to see.’” “Porter's counsel then argued that Porter's defense was that she had no knowledge of the abuse her husband was inflicting on her son. He argued that the psychologist's testimony and report were admissible to show that in her expert opinion Porter was not aware of the signs and symptoms of the abuse, even though a normally perceptive person would have been aware.” 1. The defense presented was not an insanity defense. Rather, the defense went to the defendant’s knowledge, not her intent or ability to form the intent to commit the offenses. 2. Witness’s observation that such conditions “usually happens when one is subjected to some type of abuse or severe emotional distress as a child,” and acknowledgment that she had no knowledge of defendant having experienced such abuse, didn’t make evidence inadmissible. Witness’s testimony that defendant exhibited the condition was based on scientific training plus testing of defendant; she “did not testify she concluded that Porter's condition was the result of childhood trauma.” 3. “ Neither was Dr. Speyer's testimony inadmissible as going to the ultimate issue of whether Porter did have knowledge of her husband's abuse. ‘ It is well settled that an expert may give an opinion or conclusion even on the ultimate issue when that conclusion is beyond the ken of the average layman. [Cit.]’ Beecher v. State, 240 Ga.App. 457, 458(2), 523 S.E.2d 54 (1999). In this case, it is clear that the jury would have no way of reaching a conclusion on this issue without the testimony of the expert.” 4. Distinguishing cases where defendant sought to present expert testimony of his own state of mind where issue was based on a “reasonable man” standard: justification, Selman v. State, 267 Ga. 198, 475 S.E.2d 892 (1996) (“justification is based upon the fears of a reasonable person, not upon the reasonable fears of the defendant”) and voluntary manslaughter, Lewandowski v. State, 267 Ga. 831, 483 S.E.2d 582 (1997) (“voluntary manslaughter required the jury to decide whether the provocation was sufficient to excite deadly passion in a reasonable person, not in this particular defendant”). “In this case, no ‘reasonable man’ standard is involved. Instead, to prove that Porter was a party to causing her son unnecessary pain and depriving him of medical treatment, it was necessary that the State show that she knew her son suffered such pain and required medical treatment.” Turtle v. State, 271 Ga. 440, 520 S.E.2d 211 (September 13, 1999). Trial court properly ruled out defense expert witness relating to his alleged tendency “to be grandiose, and thus, to exaggerate and to fabricate. Turtle did not assert the alleged mental condition as a defense to the crimes; he denied he was the perpetrator and claimed an alibi. The apparent purpose was to explain Turtle's accusations against [an acquaintance] and Turtle's varied and incredible accountings of his own commission of the crimes. … [T]he veracity of a defendant's statements is not an issue whose resolution requires the assistance of expert opinion. It is a question of credibility which is peculiarly within the jury's province. Berry v. State, 268 Ga. 437, 438(1), 490 S.E.2d 389 (1997). The jury heard the strangeness of the details of some of Turtle's