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versions of events, and could determine for itself whether his accounts of the crimes were complete or partial fabrications.” Pyron v. State, 237 Ga.App. 198, 514 S.E.2d 51 (March 8, 1999). In defendant’s prosecution for child cruelty, trial court erred by prohibiting defendant from presenting expert testimony on child interview techniques. “In a case of first impression, the Supreme Court recently addressed the propriety of admitting expert testimony regarding interviewing techniques in a child sexual abuse case. Barlow v. State, 270 Ga. 54, 507 S.E.2d 416 (1998). The Supreme Court noted that ‘[t]estimony intended to show that an investigating officer’s questions of the child victim were inappropriate represents evidence only an expert could give on matters not within the knowledge of a juror. It would assist the jury directly in evaluating the weight given to that testimony.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Id. at 54, 507 S.E.2d 416.” Held, such testimony should also be admitted in cases of child cruelty. “Here, as in Barlow, 270 Ga. 54, 507 S.E.2d 416, the expert witness clarified that he was not commenting on whether the victim was telling the truth. Rather, he offered his testimony for the limited purpose of addressing the interviewing techniques employed by the State and the dangers involved in using such techniques. Dr. Shaffer was competent to testify on this issue, and his testimony was both relevant and necessary to Pyron’s defense. Accordingly, the trial court abused its discretion by excluding his testimony.” 9. QUALIFICATIONS Newman v. State, 334 Ga.App. 439, 779 S.E.2d 678 (November 12, 2015). DUI, vehicular homicide and related convictions affirmed ; no error where trial court prohibited defendant “from introducing evidence that his expert witness on blood alcohol testing helped end the use of the Intoximeter 3000. As the State argues in response, however, the toxicologist tested Newman’s blood using gas chromatography, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion by preventing potentially confusing testimony regarding another testing method, which the State did not employ in this case.” Goggins v. State, 330 Ga.App. 350, 767 S.E.2d 753 (October 8, 2014). Child molestation conviction affirmed; no ineffective assistance “in failing to object to the lead investigator's testimony at trial that suggested that Goggins had been ‘grooming’ L.G. in order to facilitate the sexual abuse.” Such testimony wasn’t outside officer’s expertise. “Here, the investigator testified that during the past six years he had investigated over 200 child molestation cases, and that he has had the opportunity to speak with a multitude of individuals who had confessed to sexually abusing children. He further testified that, based on his knowledge and experience, many of these individuals would employ certain techniques to ‘groom’ their child victims, such as purchasing intimate items of clothing for the child or kissing the child intimately to see what his or her response would be. ‘[O]nce a proper foundation is laid, an officer may testify about elements of a crime with which he is familiar based upon his experience[.]’ (Citation omitted.) McDaniel v. State, 263 Ga.App. 625, 629(2), 588 S.E.2d 812 (2003).” Vanstavern v. State, 293 Ga. 123, 744 S.E.2d 42 (June 3, 2013). Murder and related convictions affirmed; no ineffective assistance from failing to object to crime scene investigator’s testimony about the victim’s probable position when shot. “[I]n criminal case, based on experience and training in the field of criminal investigation and crime scene reconstruction, an expert is authorized to render an opinion about the consistency of the physical evidence with a hypothetical sequence of events surrounding the shooting. Almond v. State, 274 Ga. 348, 349(2), 553 S.E.2d 803 (2001).” Burgess v. State, 292 Ga. 821, 742 S.E.2d 464 (April 29, 2013). Felony murder and related convictions affirmed; no error in qualifying police investigator as expert in “gang identity and investigation. “A witness need not be formally educated in the field at issue to be qualified as an expert. [Cit.] In this case, the evidence at trial showed that Officer Ricks was a state certified gang investigator; that he was trained by other officers in gang identity and investigation; that he trained new hires about gangs at the police academy; that he regularly made himself aware of current legal updates through the Georgia Gang Investigators Association; that he regularly monitored approximately six Clayton County-based gangs including 220 and Murk Mob, and was knowledgeable about the neighborhoods and zip codes in which the gangs operated; that he attended monthly meetings with other law enforcement agencies and jurisdictions to discuss gang activity; and that he regularly spoke with gang members. Officer Ricks also testified that he knew the colors associated with Murk Mob and had seen photographs of their gang signs.” Ashley v. State, 316 Ga.App. 28, 728 S.E.2d 706 (May 18, 2012). Conviction for drug distribution affirmed; no error in qualifying Crime Lab chemist as expert witness. “The requirements for qualification as an expert witness are minimal; generally, nothing more is required to qualify an expert than evidence that the person has been educated in a particular trade, science, or profession. Formal education or training in an area of expertise is not necessary, provided the witness