☢ test - Í

possesses the qualifications of such area of expertise through skill and experience. It is the possession of special knowledge derived either from experience, study, or both in a field of expertise that makes one an expert. Thus, an expert witness can express an opinion on a matter which comes within the person's qualifications. The possession of a license in Georgia does not go to qualification as an expert witness but may go to the weight and credibility that a jury gives to such expert's opinion. In re: C.W.D., 232 Ga.App. 200, 206–207(3)(a) (501 S.E.2d 232) (1998) (citations and punctuation omitted). … In this case, the chemist was qualified by education, training, and experience and was properly accepted as an expert in the area of forensic chemistry by the trial court when tendered as an expert witness. The chemist testified that she had earned an associate degree in science, a professional degree in chemistry, and had begun work on a Master's degree in science education.” Witness also had twelve months of GBI training, including lab procedures and testing of some 800 samples. Thomas v. State, 290 Ga. 653, 723 S.E.2d 885 (March 5, 2012). Malice murder, armed robbery, and related convictions affirmed; no abuse of discretion in qualifying GBI sketch artist “as an expert in forensic artistry” despite “her lack of formal art training, current membership in professional organizations, and peer review. ‘“To qualify as an expert ... [,] generally all that is required is that a person must have been educated in a particular skill or profession; his special knowledge may be derived from experience as well as study. Formal education in the subject at hand is not a prerequisite for expert status.”’ Williams v. State, 279 Ga. 731, 732, 620 S.E.2d 816 (2005) (citation omitted). The trial court's ruling on this issue is also reviewed only for abuse of discretion. See id. The State presented evidence that Lawson had been working as a forensic artist for over 30 years; had drawn thousands of composite sketches for police investigations, including many high profile cases; had testified as an expert witness in dozens of cases; and had been a member of the professional organization for forensic artists in the past, during which time she helped draft the ‘standards and guidelines for forensic art.’ Although she has not had her work formally peer reviewed, she testified that her professional colleagues have told her that her work is the best they have ever seen. Based on this evidence, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's determination that Lawson qualified as an expert witness.” Jones v. State, 287 Ga. 770, 700 S.E.2d 350 (September 20, 2010). Defendant’s murder conviction affirmed; no error in “allowing investigator Chris Robinson to testify as an expert in blood spatter and arterial spurting because he had only taken a few brief introductory courses on these subjects and had testified as an expert in these matters only twice before.” “[A] trial court has broad discretion in accepting or rejecting the qualifications of an expert, Williams v. State, 279 Ga. 731(2) (620 S.E.2d 816) (2005), and we find no abuse of such discretion here.” Accord, Hester v. State, 272 Ga. 197, 528 S.E.2d 501 (March 13, 2000) (blood spatter evidence properly received); Watson v. State , 289 Ga. 39, 709 S.E.2d 2 (March 25, 2011) (blood spatter is appropriate subject for expert testimony); Allen v. State , 296 Ga. 785, 770 S.E.2d 824 (March 27, 2015) (crime scene investigator with 18 years’ experience and training in blood pattern analysis properly qualified as expert). Pelowski v. State, 306 Ga.App. 41, 701 S.E.2d 529 (September 13, 2010). Defendant’s aggravated assault conviction reversed on other grounds, but trial court didn’t err by allowing doctor to testify about path of bullet and where gun might have been located at time it was fired. “While Pelowski claims that the question sought testimony that required an expertise in ballistics, the state explicitly informed the witness that it was merely ‘asking about the path of the bullet in [Zucker's] body.’ Given that the surgeon was qualified to give an opinion on the location and angle of Zucker's wound, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the testimony.” Rushing v. State, 305 Ga.App. 629, 700 S.E.2d 620 (August 19, 2010). Defendant’s conviction for theft by taking of a six- car hauling trailer affirmed; trial court properly qualified expert in valuation of trailer. “Here, Gunn testified that he had been in the repossession business 22 years, with another 6 or 8 years dealing specifically with equipment repossession, that he was qualified to estimate the value and condition of transportation equipment, and that he had been qualified as an expert 15-20 times in other court proceedings. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in qualifying Gunn as an expert witness in the valuation of transportation equipment.” In re: J.D., 305 Ga.App. 519, 699 S.E.2d 827 (August 4, 2010). Juvenile’s adjudication of delinquency affirmed; 1. trial court properly allowed officer to testify as an expert in shoe-print matching, though “he admittedly had no specialized training in forensics or shoe-print comparison.” “The evidence showed that McCoon was an experienced officer, had investigated thousands of crimes, was trained in crime scene observation, and had handled other cases involving shoe-print matching.” 2. “Additionally, we find no merit in J.D.'s contention that the juvenile court erred in prohibiting defense counsel from asking [Officer] McCoon how many shoe print comparisons he had actually performed. McCoon was qualified as an expert on the first day of the adjudication hearing. The adjudication hearing was continued to a second