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day, at which time defense counsel recalled McCoon and attempted to ask him how many shoe-print comparisons he had performed. The juvenile court indicated to counsel that she would not rehash the same evidence. Given McCoon's testimony on the first day of the hearing that he had handled other cases involving shoe-print matching and the fact that the court already had qualified him as an expert witness, we find no error in the court's ruling. See, e.g., Craft v. State, 254 Ga.App. 511, 513(3) (563 S.E.2d 472) (2002) (‘[w]hile the right to a cross-examination, thorough and sifting, shall belong to every party as to the witnesses called against him (OCGA § 24-9-64), ... the scope of the cross-examination rests largely within the discretion of the trial judge, to control this right within reasonable bounds, and his discretion will not be controlled by a reviewing court unless it is abused’) (citation and footnote omitted).” Pearce v. State, 300 Ga.App. 777, 686 S.E.2d 392 (November 5, 2009). At defendant’s trial for child molestation and related offenses, nurse practitioner with advanced training in sexual assault and child sexual abuse was properly allowed to testify as an expert in child sexual abuse syndrome (the “cycle of abuse”). “A licensed registered nurse may be qualified to testify as an expert witness as to matters with the scope of her expertise. See Hyde [ v. State, 189 Ga.App. 727, 728(1) (377 S.E.2d 187) (1988)].” Accord, Griffin v. State, 243 Ga.App. 282, 531 S.E.2d 175 (March 14, 2000); Ottley v. State , 325 Ga.App. 15, 752 S.E.2d 92 (November 20, 2013). Mathis v. State, 298 Ga.App. 817, 681 S.E.2d 179 (June 18, 2009). No error where trial court prohibited defense witness “from testifying about the general unreliability of Intoxilyzer 5000 breath testing devices. While there was evidence that the retired officer had extensive experience operating the machine, there was no evidence that he was an expert in the area of the reliability of the Intoxilyzer 5000. Therefore, the court did not abuse its discretion by limiting testimony on that topic. See generally Muir v. State, 256 Ga.App. 381, 382 (568 S.E.2d 515) (2002); Yount v. State, 249 Ga.App. 563, 564-565(1) (548 S.E.2d 674) (2001). Furthermore, the evidence was not relevant. The witness' experiences with similar machines over the years would not prove that the machine used in this case gave an inaccurate reading for Mathis. See Walters v. State, 195 Ga.App. 434, 436(4)(b) (394 S.E.2d 105) (1990) (an expert's testing of the Intoxilyzer 3000 device used to test defendant five months after the charged incident was not relevant, as it would not prove that the machine gave an inaccurate reading for defendant). Indeed, the officer who conducted the test on Mathis testified that the machine was working properly at the time of Mathis' test. Again, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in disallowing the evidence. See id.” Cotton v. State, 297 Ga.App. 664, 678 S.E.2d 128 (May 1, 2009). Deputy was properly qualified as expert in “drug investigations, drug use, and drug paraphernalia” where he “had been employed in law enforcement in Coweta County for seven years; that he had previously worked for the Warner-Robbins Police Department in its Narcotics Intelligence Unit; that he had received ‘close to 400 hours’ in training related to drug activity, identification, distribution, and sales; that he had made approximately 350 felony drug arrests in the preceding two years; and that he had spoken with more than 300 people engaged in the sale of illegal drugs.” Hubert v. State, 297 Ga.App. 71, 676 S.E.2d 436 (March 26, 2009). Trial court properly admitted detective’s testimony that child molestation victim “appeared to be emotionally traumatized” during her interview. “The detective in this case testified that he was a member of the Crimes Against Children Unit of the police department at the time that he interviewed the victims. His training included two special courses designed specifically to teach techniques in interviewing children of sexual abuse. The detective testified that he had investigated between 75 and 100 cases involving children of sex crimes and that he had conducted at least 50 interviews of alleged sexually abused children. Given the detective's training and experience, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in holding that the detective possessed a greater knowledge and experience in the area of forensic child interviews than that of the average juror and therefore did not err in qualifying the detective as an expert witness. See Thomas v. State, 239 Ga.App. 460, 462-463(3) (521 S.E.2d 397) (1999); Askew v. State, 185 Ga.App. 282, 283-284(5) (363 S.E.2d 844) (1987).” Fowler v. State, 294 Ga.App. 864, 670 S.E.2d 448 (November 4, 2008). Forensic toxicologist was properly allowed to testify to blood test results from tests performed by her, over objection from defendant that she lacked the expertise to render an opinion on the subject. Hight v. State, 293 Ga.App. 254, 666 S.E.2d 678 (July 10, 2008). Trial court properly qualified officer “as expert witness in street-level drug use and distribution. A trial court's decision as to a witness' qualifications to testify as an expert will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. Yount v. State, 249 Ga.App. 563, 565(1) (548 S.E.2d 674) (2001). ‘An expert witness is anyone who, through training, education, skill, or experience, has particular knowledge that the average juror would not possess concerning questions of science, skill, trade, or the like.’ Fielding v. State, 278 Ga. 309, 311(3)