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(602 S.E.2d 597) (2004). (Footnote omitted.) In O'Donnell v. State, 200 Ga.App. 829 (409 S.E.2d 579) (1991), this Court found no abuse of discretion where the trial court allowed a district attorney's investigator to be qualified as an expert witness in drug distribution, where the investigator ‘had collected and viewed evidence found in the possession of people involved in drug transactions in dozens if not hundreds of occasions.’ Id. at 834(2). Here, Officer Howard testified to making 35 to 40 drug-related arrests, about half of which were for possession with intent to distribute. As in O'Donnell, the witness in question had experience in dozens of drug transactions. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in qualifying Officer Howard as an expert witness in drug possession and distribution.” Accord, Boone v. State , 293 Ga.App. 654, 667 S.E.2d 880 (September 23, 2008) (officer properly qualified “as an expert in the street level narcotics trade, the characteristics of a methamphetamine lab, and the identification of a substance as possible methamphetamine.”). Schlanger v. State, 290 Ga.App. 407, 659 S.E.2d 823 (March 21, 2008). Physical precedent only. Trial court properly “excluded testimony from [defendant’s] expert witness relating to the reliability of the blood sample analysis.” Defendant contended that State’s analysis of his blood sample was unreliable because it had taken the blood sample nine days to travel by mail from the local police to the GBI, during which time it was presumably unrefrigerated. Witness was a medical doctor who “testified that he had no specific training or expertise in the area of the reliability of blood samples when storage and handling conditions were unknown and admitted that he could not cite any specific authoritative references or studies to support Schlanger’s contention that the blood sample was unreliable because it had not been refrigerated while in transit to the GBI.” Nelson v. State, 279 Ga.App. 859, 632 S.E.2d 749 (June 16, 2006). “[Witness] Millette was tendered without objection as an expert in the evaluation of sexually abused children, but Nelson contends that she should have been prohibited from testifying to the results of her clinical interview and evaluation of C.W. because she was not actually licensed as a psychologist. Georgia law carves out an exception to the licensing requirements of professional counselors for those persons who, like Millette, have obtained the requisite education for licensure but are practicing under supervision in order to obtain a license. OCGA § 43-10A-7 (b)(5), (6). See also Ga. Comp. R. & Regs. r.510-10-.01 (citing OCGA § 43-39-7). The trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing Millette’s testimony.” Attaway v. State, 279 Ga.App. 781, 632 S.E.2d 397 (May 12, 2006). Trial court did not err in qualifying expert witness. “‘ Generally, nothing more is required to qualify an expert than that [she] has been educated in a particular trade or profession. This special knowledge may be derived from experience as well as study. ’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Cranford v. State, 275 Ga.App. 474, 476(2) (621 S.E.2d 470) (2005). In the instant case, Dr. Battle testified that she is an assistant professor of psychology at Brenau University. She has a doctorate in clinical psychology and is licensed as a psychologist in Georgia. She has received specialized training in forensic interviewing, and over five years has conducted approximately 350 forensic interviews of children alleging sexual abuse. On 12 to 15 prior occasions, Battle has been qualified by courts to testify as an expert in psychology and forensic interviewing.” Accord, Boone v. State , 293 Ga.App. 654, 667 S.E.2d 880 (September 23, 2008); Carter v. State , 320 Ga.App. 454, 740 S.E.2d 195 (March 18, 2013) (experienced and trained child forensic interviewer properly qualified as expert on child forensic interviews, despite lack of college degree). Nichols v. State, 278 Ga.App. 46, 628 S.E.2d 131 (March 7, 2006). 1. Trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing witness, a “medical social worker,” to testify that victim’s “injuries were inconsistent with the history of events given by Nichols …. Nichols argues that Luster, who is not a medical doctor, did not have the expertise to determine whether Taylor’s injuries were caused in the way Nichols described. ‘An expert is one whose habits and profession endow that person with the particular skill needed in forming an opinion on the subject matter at inquiry.’ (Punctuation omitted.) Stevenson v. State, 272 Ga.App. 335, 339(2) (612 S.E.2d 521) (2005). Luster is trained and employed as a medical social worker, and his daily duties require him to consider medical evidence provided to him along with his own observations to determine whether factors are present which could indicate child abuse. As such, Luster’s testimony – that the version of events related to him by Nichols was not consistent with Taylor’s injuries as reported by the medical staff – was well within his purview as a medical social worker. See, e.g., Adams v. State, 275 Ga. 867, 868(3) (572 S.E.2d 545) (2002) (licensed clinical social worker could give expert testimony as to whether defendant had a mental disorder; fact that she did not have a medical degree went to the weight the jury gave her testimony). And persons other than medical doctors may testify about medical issues within the scope of their expertise. See Cromer v. Mulkey Enterprises, 254 Ga.App. 388, 392(2) (562 S.E.2d 783) (2002); Hyde v. State, 189 Ga.App. 727, 728(1) (377 S.E.2d 187) (1988).” Accord, Waits v. State , 282 Ga. 1, 644 S.E.2d 127 (April 24, 2007) (DFCS employee with “extensive experience and training with respect to fatal child abuse and specifically Shaken Baby Syndrome” but no medical degree was