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properly allowed to testify that child’s injuries were consistent with that syndrome.) 2. Diagnostic opinions and conclusions contained in medical records are generally inadmissable as hearsay unless the person who made them testifies as to their factual basis. See Cannon v. Jeffries, 250 Ga.App. 371, 376(2) (551 S.E.2d 777) (2001). However, an expert may express an opinion based on knowledge gained from hearsay during the practice of his profession . See Joiner v. Lane, 235 Ga.App. 121, 126(4) (508 S.E.2d 203) (1998). An example of this would be a doctor relying on information contained in a patient’s medical record as one of the bases for his opinion. See id. at 125-126. In such circumstances, ‘[e]ven if some of the physician’s expert testimony was based upon records which were hearsay because they had not been introduced in evidence, this would go to the weight of the evidence and not its admissibility.’ (Punctuation omitted.) Id. at 126. See also Doctors Hosp. of Augusta v. Bonner, 195 Ga.App. 152, 160(3) (392 S.E.2d 897) (1990). Here, Dr. Dunton based his opinion of Taylor’s injuries on both his own examination of her and information contained in her medical records. He personally observed some ‘jitteriness’ which suggested possible seizure activity to him. We therefore conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing Dr. Dunton’s testimony relating to seizures noted in Taylor’s medical records. 3. “ A doctor ‘may not base his expert opinion solely on the hearsay opinion of another doctor, thereby acting as a mere conduit for the opinion of the first, ’” quoting Doctors Hosp., above. “Here, however, Dr. Dunton was able to make his own diagnosis of a skull fracture and bleeding on the brain, which were indicators of a brain injury. He relied on a radiologist to evaluate the severity of that injury, specifically whether there had been a lack of oxygen to the brain. Dr. Dunton’s opinion that Taylor had suffered a brain injury was not based solely on the radiologist’s report; the report merely confirmed the extent of an injury that Dr. Dunton already suspected, based on his own observations and other information. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing Dr. Dunton to testify that Taylor had suffered a brain injury,” citing Joiner, above. Williams v. State, 279 Ga. 731, 620 S.E.2d 816 (October 11, 2005). No error in qualifying police major as expert witness in blood pattern analysis: “The State presented evidence that Major Cribbs had been in law enforcement for over 33 years. He had received FBI and GBI training in investigation and crime scene evaluation, had attended numerous courses in crime scene reconstruction, including instruction on blood pattern analysis and characteristics of blood patterns, and over the course of his career had investigated hundreds of bloody crime scenes. At the time of trial, Cribbs was in charge of the investigation division of the Hinesville Police Department, where he was involved in crime scene investigations and personally oversaw the work of seven other investigators. From this evidence, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s determination that Cribbs was a qualified expert in the area of blood pattern analysis.” Riley v. State, 278 Ga. 677, 604 S.E.2d 488, (October 25, 2004). Trial court did not err in excluding proffered testimony on “false confession theory,” as proffered witness acknowledged that the theory had not “reached a verifiable stage of scientific theory,” that articles supporting it had been “professionally criticized,” and that more research was needed; that witness’s “expertise” was drawn from five articles he had read , which were placed into evidence; that at least one of the articles acknowledged that the theory “needs further study and refinement. Consequently, the admission of expert testimony based on this theory is premature and unreliable;” and most of the examples cited in the articles were dissimilar to defendant’s case. Further, “the knowledge that a false confession can be obtained from a suspect by police is not beyond the ken of the average juror; this knowledge is implicit in the jury charges on the voluntariness, credibility, and corroboration of a defendant’s statement to the police. [Cits.]” Accord, Lyons v. State , 282 Ga. 588, 652 S.E.2d 525 (October 29, 2007). Fox v. State, 266 Ga.App. 307, 596 S.E.2d 773 (March 17, 2004). “[K]nowledge in the area of expertise can be derived from study as well as experience.” Trial court did not abuse its discretion in qualifying “State’s expert on hair and fiber analysis” who had a bachelor’s degree in forensic science and two years’ experience as a micro-analyst for GBI, but whose prior testimony had been limited to “hair analysis and physical evidence,” not fibers. Evans v. State, 259 Ga.App. 9, 576 S.E.2d 27 (December 17, 2002). “Battered person syndrome is a complex area of human behavior and response. Therefore, expert testimony must be admitted because it supplies an interpretation of the facts which differs from the ordinary lay perception.” Here, the witness “testified that she had worked with over 75 battered women at a battered women’s shelter and that she had worked with other victims on an outreach basis. She testified that she regularly attended conferences sponsored by the Georgia Department of Human Resources in order to maintain licensing for the women’s shelter where she worked. [The witness] also attended training sessions on abuse and counseling and advising battered women sponsored by the Georgia Legal Services Program and the Florida Department of Corrections. Based on this experience and training, the court determined that [the witness] was an expert in her field, and was qualified to testify about battered person syndrome. Given her background, [the witness] was in a position to draw inferences that could not be drawn by the average layperson.” Accord, Moorer v. State , 290 Ga.App. 216, 659 S.E.2d 422