☢ test - Í

Jones v. State, 265 Ga.App. 251, 593 S.E.2d 720 (January 22, 2004). Fact that defense counsel was not aware that fleeing and eluding charge was a felony, not a misdemeanor, did not establish ineffective assistance of counsel; defendant fails to “show that the outcome of his trial would have been different if his attorney had been aware of this fact” or that he would have changed his plea if he had known this. Zinnamon v. State, 261 Ga.App. 170, 582 S.E.2d 146 (May 6, 2003). Trial counsel’s representation was not per se ineffective merely because he was at that time suspended from practice for “failure to comply with state bar administrative regulations.” Jividen v. State, 256 Ga.App. 642, 569 S.E.2d 589 (July 22, 2002). In hearing on effectiveness of trial counsel, court properly excluded evidence that local public defenders are “overworked, underpaid, and do not have time to develop their clients’ cases.” Defendant was, however, allowed to present evidence on his own attorney’s caseload and time to prepare for defendant’s case. 49. GUILTY PLEAS, GENERALLY, See also subheading ADVICE ON COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF PLEA, above Seminal case: Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 106 S.Ct. 366, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985). Harris v. State, 330 Ga.App. 165, 767 S.E.2d 747 (October 2, 2014). No ineffective assistance in defendant’s guilty plea to child molestation. Evidence at hearing on motion for new trial established that counsel properly investigated and advised defendant. “‘[P]rior to trial an accused is entitled to rely upon his counsel to make an independent examination of the facts, circumstances, pleadings and laws involved and then to offer his informed opinion as to what plea should be entered. An attorney ordinarily may satisfy the duty to provide informed legal advice regarding a plea offer by discussing with the accused the risks of going to trial, the evidence against him or her, and differences in possible sentences that would be imposed following a guilty plea and following a conviction at trial.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Id.; see Lloyd v. State, 258 Ga. 645, 648(2)(a), 373 S.E.2d 1 (1988) (defendant ‘is entitled to be told that an offer to plead guilty has been made and to be advised of the consequences of the choices confronting him’).” Owens v. State, 324 Ga.App. 198, 749 S.E.2d 783 (October 9, 2013). Armed robbery conviction affirmed; no ineffective assistance “for allowing Commander Alfonzo Cook of the Moultrie Police Department to speak with Owens about accepting the State's plea offer. … Although Owen's counsel's decision to allow him to speak with his brother and a police officer outside of his presence is somewhat unorthodox, he believed [defendant’s brother] Stringer would do most of the talking, and counsel hoped that he might be able to persuade Owens to accept the plea outside of counsel's presence. It is apparent that Owens's counsel believed that accepting the State's plea offer would have been in Owens's best interest and that his approval of Owens's conversation with Cook and Stringer was a last-ditch attempt to obtain the recommended result. Accordingly, under the peculiar circumstances of this case, we find that Owens has failed to overcome the strong presumption that his attorney's performance falls within ‘the broad range of reasonable professional conduct or [to] affirmatively [show that his counsel's approval of the conversation] was not a conscious, deliberate trial strategy.’ (Citation omitted.) Hall v. State, 292 Ga. 701, 703(4)(a), 743 S.E.2d 6 (2013). Moreover, Owens presented no evidence of the content of that conversation other than Stringer's testimony that Cook did not convey the exact terms of the plea offer in Stringer's presence. Thus, Owens failed to demonstrate that Cook misrepresented the plea, improperly interrogated Owens outside the presence of his counsel, or engaged in any other improper conduct during the conference. As a result, Owens failed to show any prejudice resulting from his counsel's decision to allow him to meet with Cook and Stringer.” Johnson v. Roberts, 287 Ga. 112, 694 S.E.2d 661 (April 19, 2010). Habeas court erred in holding that defendant “was not affirmatively misinformed regarding his parole eligibility;” both trial counsel and trial court erroneously advised defendant that he might be eligible for parole sooner than the 20-year sentence of incarceration imposed on his guilty plea to armed robbery. “[A]rmed robbery is one of the serious violent felonies, OCGA § 17-10-6.1(a)(2), and subsection (c)(4) of that statute mandates that the full sentence imposed for a first conviction of armed robbery be served without reduction by parole or any other sentence-reducing measures.” Thus, “both the trial court and counsel should have known that Johnson was categorically ineligible for any parole and would have to serve the entire 20 year sentence.” Remanded for consideration of prejudice, i.e., whether any evidence exists that defendant wouldn’t have pled guilty had he not been advised incorrectly. Frazier v. Mathis, 286 Ga. 647, 690 S.E.2d 840 (March 15, 2010). Grant of habeas petition reversed; habeas court’s finding that defendant received ineffective assistance at entry of guilty plea was not supported by the evidence. “During