☢ test - Í

the habeas hearing, evidence was produced that trial counsel's only meeting with Mathis was on the day on which he entered his guilty plea. … Although Mathis challenged actions that he characterized as counsel's failure to investigate the case, no evidence was introduced during the habeas hearing as to what the arresting officers or Mathis's co-indictees would have told counsel if they had been interviewed; no other potential witnesses were identified. From the bench, the habeas court articulated that it did not believe that the two hours that passed between the time counsel first met Mathis and Mathis's entry of his guilty plea could result in effective representation. Of course, the amount of time counsel spent conferring with Mathis ‘“is not dispositive, as there exists no magic amount of time which counsel must spend in actual conference with his client. [Cit.]” [Cit.]’ Harris v. State, 279 Ga. 304, 307(3)(b) (612 S.E.2d 789) (2005). And, Mathis did not demonstrate how any additional communication with counsel would have changed his decision to enter a guilty plea. See Rios v. State, 281 Ga. 181, 182(2) (637 S.E.2d 20) (2006). Indeed, Mathis presented no evidence from which the habeas court could conclude that the results of the challenged plea hearing would have been more beneficial to him had counsel spent more time with him, or investigated the case further; the only evidence placed before the habeas court was that the information available to counsel would have been the same, there would have been no change in the circumstances surrounding the State's prosecution of Mathis, and hence no change in counsel's advice. Accordingly, the habeas court erred in granting the petition. Zant v. Means, 271 Ga. 711 (522 S.E.2d 449) (1999).” Accord, Powers v. State , 303 Ga.App. 326, 693 S.E.2d 592 (April 1, 2010); Wood v. State , 304 Ga.App. 52, 695 S.E.2d 391 (May 12, 2010); Jones v. State , 287 Ga. 270, 695 S.E.2d 271 (June 7, 2010); Patillo v. State , 304 Ga.App. 344, 696 S.E.2d 370 (June 7, 2010); Johnson v. State , 307 Ga.App. 853, 706 S.E.2d 201 (February 15, 2011); Funes v. State , 289 Ga. 793, 716 S.E.2d 183 (October 3, 2011); Hendricks v. State , S11A0833, 290 Ga. 238, 719 S.E.2d 466 (November 29, 2011); Turnbull v. State , 317 Ga.App. 719, 732 S.E.2d 786 (September 28, 2012). Carleton v. State, 302 Ga.App. 29, 690 S.E.2d 426 (January 13, 2010). “‘A defendant who seeks to appeal a guilty plea on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel must develop those issues in a post-plea hearing and may not file a direct appeal if the only evidence in the record is the transcript of the guilty plea hearing. The proper remedy is to move to withdraw the plea or, if the term of court in which the plea was entered has expired, to petition for a writ of habeas corpus.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Duffey v. State, 289 Ga.App. 141, 142(2) (656 S.E.2d 167) (2007). Carleton having failed to move to withdraw his guilty plea before the term of court expired, he may not obtain a hearing on remand and must petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Id.” Gresham v. State, 300 Ga.App. 158, 684 S.E.2d 336 (September 22, 2009). Trial court could find no ineffective assistance despite counsel’s lack of preparation, failure to communicate and failures to attend court. Defendant sought to withdraw guilty plea, contending that it was entered because counsel was unprepared for trial and failed to communicate with him. Counsel’s testimony acknowledged that he refused defendant’s collect calls from jail, and that conflicts prevented him from attending some court dates, but that he interviewed some witnesses and had prior counsel’s file, and that he met with defendant three or four times. “[A]lthough Mizerak may have been overly busy, may not have spent much time with Gresham, may not have communicated with him regularly, may not clearly recall some aspects of the case, and may not have prepared for the trial very far in advance, the evidence supports the trial court's findings and its conclusion that Gresham made a knowing, voluntary and intelligent waiver of his rights and knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently entered his plea of guilty.” Cleveland v. State, 285 Ga. 142, 674 S.E.2d 289 (March 9, 2009). Affirming 290 Ga.App. 835, 660 S.E.2d 777 (March 20, 2008). Trial court properly denied defendant’s motion for new trial, based on ineffective assistance; despite defendant’s contention to the contrary, he failed to demonstrate “that, but for counsel's deficient performance, there is a reasonable probability that he would have accepted the State's plea offer.” Although Court of Appeals correctly found that “counsel’s performance was objectively unreasonable,” because counsel failed to review the prosecutor’s file when made available, and thus was unaware of important evidence in the case, defendant shows no prejudice because the record demonstrates that he adamantly protested his innocence both before trial and after conviction, refusing to consider any plea offer. Rejects defendant’s misinterpretation of Lloyd v. State , 258 Ga. 645 (373 S.E.2d 1) (1988), which “merely noted that the evidence presented to show ineffective assistance of counsel failed to support even an ‘inference’ that the defendant would have accepted the plea offer, much less amounted to the affirmative demonstration of prejudice required by the second prong of the Strickland test. We did not intend by this statement to lower the evidentiary burden for establishing Strickland prejudice in the plea bargain context.” Note the contention here is not that counsel performed deficiently at trial; rather, that if counsel had informed defendant of the additional evidence in the prosecutor’s file, defendant would have accepted the plea bargain. Accord, Arnold v. State , 315 Ga.App. 831, 728 S.E.2d 342 (May 10, 2012) (no evidence that defendant was amenable to plea offer, regardless of counsel’s alleged deficient performance); Davis v. State, 325 Ga.App. 572, 754 S.E.2d 151 (January 16, 2014) (no showing of prejudice; even if