☢ test - Í

counsel failed to advise defendant of maximum sentence he faced, defendant “was pretty adamant that he wasn't guilty of the charges and wanted a trial.”). Floyd v. State, 293 Ga.App. 235, 666 S.E.2d 611 (August 5, 2008). 1. No ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to advise defendant of “right” to withdraw guilty plea, as defendant had no such right. “Floyd's claim to the contrary notwithstanding, there is no evidence that he was pressured to enter his pleas of guilty. Rather, at the hearing on his motion to withdraw guilty plea, Floyd testified that he felt pressure to enter his pleas only in the sense that he had seen a letter which indicated that he had until a date certain to accept or reject the same. Under these circumstances, there was no right of plea withdrawal about which Floyd should have been made aware. Accordingly, Floyd failed to meet his burden of showing deficient performance by his trial counsel on this basis. [ State v. Heath, 277 Ga. 337, 338, 588 S.E.2d 738 (2003)].” 2. Counsel’s incorrect advice on parole eligibility was deficient, but no prejudice because “it is undisputed that the defense strategy in seeking the plea agreement was not to ensure eligibility for parole, but to minimize Floyd's exposure to sentencing as a recidivist” Garrett v. State, 284 Ga. 31, 663 S.E.2d 153 (June 30, 2008). Denial of habeas petition reversed; only evidence at habeas hearing indicated that defendant entered guilty plea based on erroneous advice from counsel (that defendant’s mere presence in car with drugs was sufficient to convict for possession with intent to distribute). “[I]f Garrett accepted the plea and decided not to go to trial only because of the erroneous legal advice of his attorney, Garrett has satisfied his burden of showing both deficient performance of his counsel and a reasonable probability that he would have insisted upon going to trial but for counsel's errors. See Heyward v. Humphrey, 277 Ga. 565, 592 S.E.2d 660 (2004).” Burroughs v. State, 292 Ga.App. 580, 665 S.E.2d 4 (June 17, 2008). Trial court properly found no ineffective assistance of counsel in advice on entering guilty plea, even though counsel testified that he was appointed to defendant’s case one day before trial, was not prepared for trial, only consulted with defendant “for a few minutes,” and “only had time to read the police reports and the indictment.” After being served with the State’s recidivist notice, counsel “decided to discuss the possibility and consequences of a non-negotiated plea with Burroughs because he believed a plea was in Burroughs’s best interest. He testified in the motion for new trial hearing that he was not informed of anything subsequent to the guilty plea that would change his impression that the State had a strong case. Not only has Burroughs failed to show how further consultation with counsel somehow would have impacted his decision to enter a plea, see Rios v. State, 281 Ga. 181, 181-182(2) (637 S.E.2d 20) (2006), he has failed to show any information that would or should have changed counsel’s recommendation to enter a plea. Moreover, we do not have the police reports and witness statements that counsel reviewed in making his decision that a plea was in Burroughs’s best interest. As a result, we must assume that the information was sufficient for counsel to make that determination. Under these particular facts and circumstances, we cannot say that counsel’s performance in advising Burroughs to plead guilty was inadequate. See Brantley v. State, 290 Ga.App. 764, 660 S.E.2d 846 (April 4, 2008) (record shows that prior to entering the guilty plea, defendant’s counsel explained to him the nature of the non-negotiated plea and the consequences).” Franklin v. State, 291 Ga.App. 267, 661 S.E.2d 870 (April 23, 2008). No ineffective assistance shown such as would call into question the voluntariness of defendant’s guilty plea. “[I]n order to withdraw a guilty plea based on counsel’s ineffectiveness, Franklin must show that, had it not been for his attorney’s deficient representation, a reasonable probability exists that he would have insisted on a trial. See Whitesides v. State, 266 Ga.App. 181, 188-189(4) (596 S.E.2d 706) (2004) (record showed that the defendant sufficiently understood the plea agreement despite his protestations that counsel did not give him adequate advice). Even if we were to assume that trial counsel’s performance was in some manner deficient, Franklin cannot prove that he would have insisted on a trial. Franklin testified at the hearing that he informed his trial counsel that he would take a plea if the trafficking charge were reduced. Franklin achieved the result he sought; i.e., the reduction of the trafficking charge. Therefore, Franklin’s ineffectiveness claim fails.” Brown v. State, 280 Ga.App. 767, 634 S.E.2d 875 (July 27, 2006). “ Brown has not cited any authority to the effect that advising a client to enter a nonnegotiated plea without a recommendation from the state constitutes deficient performance. Such advice cannot constitute error because even when the state makes a recommendation, the sentencing judge is not bound by it in imposing sentence. Shakur v. State, 239 Ga. 548, 550 (238 S.E.2d 85) (1977). See also Norris [ v. State, 277 Ga.App. 289, 289-290, 626 S.E.2d 220 (2006)] (state recommended a sentence of 30 years in prison, but judge sentenced defendant to serve 60 years). Nor is a court required to inform a defendant that the state has made no recommendation. See Uniform Superior Court Rule 33.8(C), which requires the court to inform the defendant of the terms of any negotiated plea, of the maximum possible sentence, and of the mandatory minimum sentence, if any.”