☢ test - Í

McCroskey v. State, 280 Ga.App. 638, 634 S.E.2d 824 (July 25, 2006). Trial court erred in failing to rule on defendant’s ineffective assistance claim, based on alleged affirmative incorrect advice about defendant’s rights at sentencing. Defendant entered non-negotiated guilty pleas. “Certainly an attorney who has told his client that he can withdraw his non-negotiated guilty plea if he is dissatisfied with his sentence has given erroneous legal advice and thus has rendered assistance falling below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Remanded for findings on whether counsel gave such advice, and if so whether there is a reasonable probability that it caused defendant to plead guilty where he otherwise might not have. Hollman v. State, 280 Ga.App. 53, 633 S.E.2d 395 (June 21, 2006). Charged with aggravated assault in two different cases, defendant was convicted at trial on the first set of charges. On advice of counsel, he then pled guilty to the second set of charges in order to get a concurrent sentence. The conviction in the first case was then overturned on motion for new trial. Defendant now contends that his counsel was ineffective in recommending that he plead in the second case instead of recognizing the “clear error” that would result in the first conviction being overturned. Held, counsel was not ineffective. “It is well established that ‘[e]ffectiveness is not judged by hindsight or by the result. Although another lawyer may have conducted the defense in a different manner and taken another course of action, the fact that defendant and his present counsel disagree with the decisions made by trial counsel does not require a finding that defendant’s original representation was inadequate.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Botelho v. State, 268 Ga.App. 129, 133(3)(a) (601 S.E.2d 494) (2004). See also Hart v. State, 272 Ga.App. 754, 757 (613 S.E.2d 107) (2005).” Counsel’s recommendation to plead was part of sound strategy, given his determination that the second case was worse than the first one and might likely result in a longer sentence. Trimble v. State, 274 Ga.App. 536, 618 S.E.2d 163 (July 21, 2005) (disapproved on other grounds, Miller v. State , 285 Ga. 285, 676 S.E.2d 173 (April 28, 2009)). “‘When a person indicates a desire to enter a guilty plea, the duty of counsel is limited to ascertaining whether the decision so to plead is voluntarily and knowingly made.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Walker v. Hopper, 234 Ga. 123, 125(1) (214 S.E.2d 553) (1975); see also David v. State, 261 Ga.App. 468, 470(1) (583 S.E.2d 135) (2003). Trimble has presented no evidence to show that trial counsel breached this duty. On the contrary, before entering his plea, Trimble affirmed that his attorney had explained the consequences of entering a plea to him, and responded affirmatively to the trial court’s inquiry as to whether he was satisfied with his attorney’s representation. Since … Trimble’s guilty plea was knowing and voluntary, his claims that counsel was ineffective in the course of obtaining or contesting that plea are without merit. Thompson v. State, 208 Ga.App. 825 (432 S.E.2d 250) (1993).” Curtis v. State, 271 Ga.App. 239, 609 S.E.2d 171 (January 6, 2005). Trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to withdraw guilty plea. “The length of time that plea counsel spent in consultation with Curtis is not in itself sufficient to establish ineffective assistance of counsel. See Swantner v. State, 244 Ga.App. 372, 374-375(2)(a) (535 S.E.2d 343) (2000) (two-and-a-half hour consultation alone not inadequate); Tahamtani v. State, 177 Ga.App. 52, 53 (338 S.E.2d 488) (1985) (half-hour meeting immediately prior to guilty plea hearing, without more, does not establish ineffective assistance of counsel). And because Curtis has not alleged, let alone established, any other specific way in which his plea counsel was deficient, he has failed to carry his burden of showing that the trial court erred in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea.” Hill v. State, 267 Ga.App. 357, 599 S.E.2d 307 (May 11, 2004). “When the validity of a guilty plea is challenged, the state bears the burden of showing affirmatively from the record that the defendant offered his plea knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily. [Cit.] However, if the motion to withdraw is based on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the defendant bears the burden of showing that, had it not been for his attorney’s deficient representation, a reasonable probability exists that he would have insisted on a trial. [Cit.]” Accord, Terrell v. State , 274 Ga.App. 539, 618 S.E.2d 175 (July 21, 2005); Muckle v. State , 283 Ga.App. 395, 641 S.E.2d 603 (February 1, 2007); Hammett v. State , 288 Ga.App. 255, 653 S.E.2d 852 (November 6, 2007). Jones v. State, 265 Ga.App. 584, 594 S.E.2d 761 (February 12, 2004). “‘To challenge a guilty plea based on ineffectiveness of trial counsel, [Jones] must show that, but for his counsel’s deficiency, he would have insisted on going to trial and would not have pled guilty.’” Trial court’s finding to the contrary was not clearly erroneous. Record reflects excellent and thorough showing of knowing and voluntary waiver of rights. Accord, Bennett v. State , 292 Ga.App. 382, 665 S.E.2d 365 (June 18, 2008). Turley v. State, 265 Ga.App. 385, 593 S.E.2d 916 (February 2, 2004). Not ineffective assistance where counsel fails to