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inform defendant “of the possibility of entering an Alford plea” because “a defendant has no constitutional right to enter a guilty plea, [cit.] and Turley points to no evidence that the trial court was willing to accept such a plea.” “Indeed, we find this situation analogous to an attorney’s failure to inform his client of parole eligibility, which provides no basis for an ineffective assistance claim. See Argot v. State , 261 Ga.App. 569, 569-571 (583 S.E.2d 246 (2003).” Heyward v. Humphrey, 277 Ga. 565, 592 S.E.2d 660 (February 2, 2004). Defendant’s habeas petition should have been granted as record discloses that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. From his testimony at the habeas hearing, counsel’s pretrial investigation was so deficient that he was unaware of a witness who said that the victim drew his gun first. “What is more, it is plain that counsel failed to react to the information about this witness provided by the prosecutor at the plea hearing.” Further, counsel’s habeas testimony indicates he failed to consider the prosecutor’s admissions at the plea hearing that the state’s witnesses were largely uncooperative or could not be located. Finally, the transcript of the plea hearing includes colloquy between the court, counsel and defendant which “plainly calls into question whether Heyward would have pled guilty if his counsel had not intervened. In fact, the colloquy reveals counsel’s apparent anger at Heyward for initially denying his guilt and thwarting the plea proceedings, which raises additional questions about the voluntariness of the decision to enter the pleas.” Accord, Garrett (June 30, 2008), above (plea entered because of erroneous legal advice; habeas petition should have been granted). David v. State, 261 Ga.App. 468, 583 S.E.2d 135 (May 15, 2003). “The two-prong test established in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674) (1984) to address claims that trial counsel was ineffective also applies to claims that a guilty plea attorney was ineffective. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (106 S.Ct. 366, 88 L.Ed.2d 203) (1985). Accordingly, David was required to show that his counsel’s performance was deficient and that, but for the deficiency, there was a reasonable probability he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. Hill, 474 U.S. at 59; Williams v. Duffy, 270 Ga. 580, 581 (513 S.E.2d 212) (1999). In addressing claims that counsel’s performance was deficient, a court must determine whether counsel’s advice was reasonable under the circumstances, and must apply the strong presumption that counsel’s conduct fell within the wide range of reasonable professional conduct and that all of counsel’s significant decisions were made in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment.” Accord, Vazquez-Vargas v. State , 265 Ga.App. 852, 595 S.E.2d 668 (February 25, 2004); Trimble v. State , 274 Ga.App. 536, 618 S.E.2d 163 (July 21, 2005) (disapproved on other grounds, Miller v. State , 285 Ga. 285, 676 S.E.2d 173 (April 28, 2009)); Moon v. State , 286 Ga.App. 360, 649 S.E.2d 355 (July 6, 2007); Leary v. State , 291 Ga.App. 754, 662 S.E.2d 733 (May 7, 2008). Shabazz v. State, 259 Ga.App. 339, 577 S.E.2d 45 (January 29, 2003). “[A]dvising and aiding Shabazz in the entry of a guilty plea to an offense for which as a matter of law there was no factual basis, falls outside the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases” (emphasis in original). Although there was an adequate factual basis as to the second count, fact that ineffective assistance of counsel was shown “undermines the voluntariness and the validity of the plea as to both counts of the indictment.” Overruled on other grounds, Adams v. State, 285 Ga. 744, 683 S.E.2d 586 (September 28, 2009). Woody v. State, 254 Ga.App. 766, 563 S.E.2d 903 (April 8, 2002). “Counsel’s alleged failure to advise defendant of probable sentence if convicted after trial did not amount to ineffective assistance” entitling defendant to withdraw guilty plea. Mann v. State, 240 Ga.App. 809, 524 S.E.2d 763 (November 5, 1999). Defendant’s conviction for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute affirmed; “[d]efense counsel did not provide ineffective assistance by failing to inform Mann of his ineligibility for parole from any authorized sentence.” Defendant contends that, if he’d known of his parole ineligibility, he would have accepted the State’s plea offer. “But eligibility or ineligibility for parole is not a consequence of a plea of guilty, but rather is a matter of legislative grace or a consequence of the withholding of legislative grace. Williams v. Duffy, 270 Ga. 580, 581, 513 S.E.2d 212. Thus, the requirement of OCGA § 17-10-7(c), that Mann serve the maximum time provided in the sentence of the judge for this conviction, would have only a collateral effect on Mann's sentence for possessing cocaine with the intent to distribute, in no way lengthening the sentence itself, but merely conditioning satisfaction of that sentence upon Mann's incarceration for the rest of his natural life as designated in that sentence. Williams v. Duffy, 270 Ga. at 581, 513 S.E.2d 212, supra. There is no constitutional requirement that a defendant be advised of such collateral consequences for his decision to reject or accept a plea bargain to be valid. Id.” Cert. granted on whether Williams v. Duffy is still good law in light of Padilla v. Kentucky (see subheading ADVICE ON IMMIGRATION CONSEQUENCES, above, Alexander v. State, case no. S14G1762, September 22, 2014.