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constitute prejudicial error.” “‘ Georgia law forbids expert opinion testimony that ... implicitly goes to the ultimate issue to be decided by the jury, when such issue ... is not beyond the ken of the average juror.’ Bruce v. State, 268 Ga.App. 677, 681(1)(b) (603 S.E.2d 33) (2004). See also Odom v. State, 243 Ga.App. 227, 228(1) (531 S.E.2d 207) (2000). Dr. Gordon’s testimony – that it is a common misconception that people make up rape allegations for the purpose of revenge – implicitly went to the ultimate issue to be decided by the jury, namely, whether the victim had fabricated the rape allegation against Harris. And, it is simply not beyond the ken of the average juror to determine whether and under what circumstances a rape allegation has been fabricated. ‘[W]here (a) the path from evidence to conclusion is not shrouded in the mystery of professional skill or knowledge, and (b) the conclusion determines the ultimate issues of fact in a case, the jury must make the journey from evidence to conclusion without the aid of expert testimony.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Jennette v. State, 197 Ga.App. 580, 582(3) (398 S.E.2d 734) (1990). Accordingly, Dr. Gordon’s testimony should not have been allowed. Cf. Bruce, 268 Ga.App. at 681(1)(a) (expert testimony opining ‘that children sometime have difficulty distinguishing nightmares from reality’ was inadmissible because not beyond the ken of the average juror); Jennette, 197 Ga.App. at 581-582(3) (expert testimony on ‘lying child syndrome’ was inadmissible because jury could determine whether child victim was lying without aid of an expert). [ footnote: We note that Dr. Gordon’s testimony was inadmissible on an additional ground. The testimony could be construed as implying that Harris, by suggesting that the victim accused him of rape out of revenge, fit the common profile of a rapist. As such, Dr. Gordon’s testimony was similar to testimony that a defendant fits the common profile of a spousal abuser, which we have held is not admissible, absent a situation where the defendant has put his character in issue or has raised some defense, such as accident, which the profile is relevant to rebut. See Jones v. State, 276 Ga. 253, 255(2) (577 S.E.2d 560) (2003); Parrish v. State, 237 Ga.App. 274, 277(2)(ii) (514 S.E.2d 458) (1999). ] ” Harmless error, however, given overwhelming evidence of guilt. Accord, Al-Attawy v. State , 289 Ga.App. 570, 657 S.E.2d 552 (January 25, 2008) (psychiatrist’s testimony – that he found child molesting victim’s outcry to be credible – was inadmissible); Dority v. State , 335 Ga.App. 83, 780 S.E.2d 129 (November 20, 2015). Chauncey v. State, 283 Ga.App. 217, 641 S.E.2d 229 (January 8, 2007). “ [T]he pediatrician’s testimony concerning the children’s eye contact and the consistency of their statements with the sexual abuse exam did not constitute improper bolstering. See Harris v. State, 279 Ga.App. 570, 572(1) (631 S.E.2d 772) (2006) (holding that it is not improper bolstering for a witness to ‘express an opinion as to whether medical or other objective evidence in the case is consistent with the victim’s story’) (punctuation and footnote omitted); Morris v. State, 268 Ga.App. 325, 328(2) (601 S.E.2d 804) (2004) (‘[T]estimony regarding the victim’s demeanor [does] not express an impermissible opinion on an ultimate issue of whether the victim was sexually abused.’). It is a closer question whether the pediatrician’s testimony that P.H. was ‘consistent with what he was saying’ and that J.H. was ‘very consistent all the time’ constituted improper bolstering” – but that question is not answered here. Accord, Noe v. State , 287 Ga.App. 728, 652 S.E.2d 620 (October 3, 2007); Hill v. State , 290 Ga.App. 140, 658 S.E.2d 863 (March 7, 2008) ; Hubert v. State , 297 Ga.App. 71, 676 S.E.2d 436 (March 26, 2009); Ledford v. State , 313 Ga.App. 389, 721 S.E.2d 585 (December 1, 2011); Reinhard v. State , 331 Ga.App. 235, 770 S.E.2d 314 (March 18, 2015). Patterson v. State, 278 Ga.App. 168, 628 S.E.2d 618 (March 10, 2006). Unanimous full court opinion overrules Smith v. State, 257 Ga.App. 88, 92(4) & (5) (570 S.E.2d 400) (2002), which held that expert testimony could be admitted to rehabilitate the credibility of a witness’s testimony. “‘ An expert witness may not testify as to his opinion of the victim’s truthfulness. An expert witness may testify generally about the ability of children of a certain age to distinguish truth from falsity. The witness may also express an opinion as to whether medical or other objective evidence in the case is consistent with the victim’s story. However, an expert witness may not put his or her stamp of believability on the victim’s story. ’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) State v. Oliver, 188 Ga.App. 47, 50(2) (372 S.E.2d 256) (1988).” Accord, Jackson v. State , 288 Ga.App. 432, 654 S.E.2d 232 (November 15, 2007) (officer tendered as expert in “how victims and suspects behave at domestic violence investigations.”); Hughes v. State , 302 Ga.App. 251, 690 S.E.2d 898 (February 10, 2010). Distinguished in Harris v. State , 279 Ga.App. 570, 631 S.E.2d 772 (May 25, 2006) (doctor’s testimony that physical evidence was consistent with victim’s allegation of molestation was properly admissible). Davenport v. State, 278 Ga.App. 16, 628 S.E.2d 120 (February 22, 2006). “‘Although an expert witness may not testify as to his opinion of the victim’s truthfulness, the witness may express an opinion as to whether medical or other objective evidence in the case is consistent with the victim’s story.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Satterwhite v. State, 212 Ga.App. 543, 543-544(2) (442 S.E.2d 5) (1994).” Maddox v. State, 275 Ga.App. 869, 622 S.E.2d 80 (October 14, 2005). “Improper bolstering occurs when an expert witness is allowed to give his or her opinion as to whether the complaining witness is telling the truth, because that is an