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ultimate issue of fact and the inference to be drawn is not beyond the ken of the average juror. Roberson v. State, 214 Ga.App. 208, 210(4) (447 S.E.2d 640) (1994). Here, the witness testified on the basis of her experience in forensic interviewing as to the ability of interviewees to recall certain things in certain situations. That was in no way a comment on an ultimate issue of fact. And the court was authorized to find that the conclusion drawn by the expert was beyond the ken of the jurors. Therefore, counsel was not ineffective in failing to object.” Hunt v. State, 268 Ga.App. 568, 602 S.E.2d 312 (July 16, 2004). Error where expert witness “was asked how likely it was that [victim] would disclose this kind of sexual abuse to please his mother. [Expert witness] responded that it was remotely possible. That line of questioning was improper because it was simply another way for the witness to express her opinion that the victim was telling the truth.” Morris v. State, 268 Ga.App. 325, 601 S.E.2d 804 (July 2, 2004). In child sex abuse cases, State was properly allowed to ask psychotherapist “Was there anything in the demeanor of [the victim] that allowed you to rule out abuse in this case?” “‘What is forbidden is expert opinion testimony that directly addresses the credibility of the victim, i.e., “I believe the victim; I think the victim is telling the truth,” or expert opinion testimony that implicitly goes to the ultimate issue to be decided by the jury, when such issue is not beyond the ken of the average juror, i.e., “In my opinion, the victim was sexually abused.” Although the distinction may seem fine to a layman, there is a world of legal difference between expert testimony that “in my opinion, the victim’s psychological exam was consistent with sexual abuse,” and expert testimony that “in my opinion, the victim was sexually abused.” In the first situation, the expert leaves the ultimate issue/conclusion for the jury to decide; in the second, the weight of the expert is put behind a factual conclusion which invades the province of the jury by providing a direct answer to the ultimate issue: was the victim sexually abused?’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Brownlow v. State, 248 Ga.App. 366, 368(2)(a) (544 S.E.2d 472) (2001).” Williams v. State, 266 Ga.App. 578, 597 S.E.2d 621 (March 25, 2004). “The testimony of experts that certain medical or scientific tests resulted in findings consistent with molestation does not violate OCGA § 24-9-80; it is admissible and proper,” and does not constitute improper bolstering of the victim’s credibility. Likewise, DFCS caseworker’s testimony that her investigation “was closed ‘with determination of substantiated sexual abuse,” was not an expression of opinion about the victim’s truthfulness; rather, “[s]he was testifying as to why her investigation was closed and why she did not continue to follow the family.” By contrast, caseworker’s testimony that victim, in interview, “seemed very truthful and honest about this,” was improper under OCGA § 24-9-80, but trial court’s immediate curative instruction was sufficient remedy. Accord, Harris v. State , 279 Ga.App. 570, 631 S.E.2d 772 (May 25, 2006) (doctor’s testimony that physical evidence was consistent with victim’s allegation of molestation was properly admissible); Freeman v. State , 282 Ga.App. 185, 638 S.E.2d 358 (November 1, 2006) (properly admitted: “the forensic interviewer … gave her opinion, based on her training and experience, that K.F.’s reactions to certain questions were consistent with his having been abused”). Long v. State, 241 Ga.App. 370, 526 S.E.2d 875 (December 8, 1999). Convictions for child molestation and related offenses affirmed; no improper bolstering of victim by counselor. “After the State's attorney finished questioning Mary Claire Brannon, a child and adolescent counselor to whom S.O. confided that defendant had molested her, Brannon added a statement, ‘I think [S.O.] had built some trust.’ Defendant objected to this as impermissible opinion and asked that it be stricken. … But this opinion by the counselor, that the victim had built up some trust, simply does not put an expert's imprimatur on the truthfulness of the victim's statements. The trial court did not err in failing to strike this statement.” Castro v. State, 241 Ga.App. 546, 527 S.E.2d 12 (December 3, 1999). Defendant’s conviction for aggravated child molestation and child molestation affirmed; psychologist’s statement “I believe [victim is] telling the truth” was not responsive to prosecutor’s question and constituted improper bolstering, but no mistrial required where trial court immediately gave “strongly worded” curative instruction to jury. Turtle v. State, 271 Ga. 440, 520 S.E.2d 211 (September 13, 1999). Trial court properly ruled out defense expert witness relating to defendant’s alleged tendency “to be grandiose, and thus, to exaggerate and to fabricate. Turtle did not assert the alleged mental condition as a defense to the crimes; he denied he was the perpetrator and claimed an alibi. The apparent purpose was to explain Turtle's accusations against [an acquaintance] and Turtle's varied and incredible accountings of his own commission of the crimes. … [T]he veracity of a defendant's statements is not an issue whose resolution requires the assistance of expert opinion. It is a question of credibility which is peculiarly within the jury's province. Berry v. State, 268 Ga. 437, 438(1), 490 S.E.2d 389 (1997). The jury heard the strangeness of the details of some of Turtle's versions of events, and could determine for itself whether his accounts of the crimes were complete or