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partial fabrications.” Buice v. State, 239 Ga.App. 52, 520 S.E.2d 258 (June 29, 1999). At defendant’s child molestation trial, trial court erred in asking DFCS caseworker “whether the victim had exhibited ‘a general attitude of credibility’ during the interview process. Howell responded that she ‘had a very strong conviction in her heart’ that the victim was telling the truth.” “It is well settled that ‘[i]n no circumstances may a witness' credibility be bolstered by the opinion of another, even an expert, as to whether the witness is telling the truth.” Price v. State, 220 Ga.App. 176, 177(2)(b), 469 S.E.2d 333 (1996); Roberson v. State, 214 Ga.App. 208, 210(4), 447 S.E.2d 640 (1994); Guest v. State, 201 Ga.App. 506, 507(1), 411 S.E.2d 364 (1991). The credibility of a witness is a matter exclusively for determination by the jury. OCGA § 24-9-80. Testimony that another witness believes the victim impermissibly bolsters the credibility of the victim. Roberson, supra. Accordingly, Howell's statement regarding the victim's truthfulness constituted impermissible bolstering. Cline v. State, 224 Ga.App. 235, 237(2), 480 S.E.2d 269 (1997).” Accord, Roberson v. State , 241 Ga.App. 226, 526 S.E.2d 428 (December 2, 1999) (physical precedent only) (improper to ask child’s mother to comment on child’s truthfulness); Godbey v. State , 241 Ga.App. 529, 526 S.E.2d 415 (December 2, 1999) (physical precedent only). Brooks v. State, 236 Ga.App. 604, 512 S.E.2d 693 (February 22, 1999). At defendant’s trial for child molestation, counsel was not ineffective for failing to subpoena child victim’s teacher to authenticate school records, which “indicated that the victim ‘stretches the truth,’ and ‘copies others to know what she [is] suppose[d] to be doing.’” “It is questionable whether the information concerning the victim’s credibility contained in the school records was even admissible or whether the victim’s teacher could properly have testified as to this information, as such testimony could amount to the teacher’s expert opinion on ‘the truthfulness or credibility of the victim.... [T]he question of a particular child’s credibility is not properly the subject of expert testimony as it is reserved for the jury . [Cits.]’ (Punctuation omitted.) Gorski v. State, 201 Ga.App. 122, 123(2), 410 S.E.2d 338 (1991). See also Jennette v. State, 197 Ga.App. 580, 582, 398 S.E.2d 734 (1990).” I. HOSTILE WITNESS Lopez-Vasquez v. State, 331 Ga.App. 570, 771 S.E.2d 218 (March 26, 2015). Methamphetamine trafficking and related convictions affirmed; no error in allowing State to treat co-defendant as hostile. “[D]uring the trial, Munoz–Olveda decided to plead guilty. As part of the plea agreement, Munoz–Olveda agreed to testify truthfully about the methamphetamine operation and testify against Lopez–Vasquez, but his testimony was not consistent with the proffer the State was given.[fn] Instead, Munoz–Olveda professed ignorance about any of the items discovered during the search, and was evasive and unresponsive in his testimony. As a result, at the State's request, the trial court permitted Munoz–Olveda to be treated as a hostile witness. Lopez–Vasquez did not object to the ruling, and ‘[a] defendant cannot acquiesce in a trial court's ruling below and then complain about that ruling on appeal. Acquiescence deprives him of the right to complain further[;] thus, the issue is waived for purposes of appeal.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) McNabb v. State, 292 Ga.App. 395, 399(2), 664 S.E.2d 800 (2008). Moreover, when a witness demonstrates reluctance to testify about a crime, a trial court has ‘great latitude to permit the [prosecutor] to treat [the witness] as a hostile witness and propound leading questions.’ Knight v. State, 266 Ga. 47, 49(4)(b), 464 S.E.2d 201 (1995).” Spencer v. State, 328 Ga.App. 1, 761 S.E.2d 464 (July 8, 2014). Armed robbery and aggravated assault convictions affirmed; no abuse of discretion in “allowing the State to treat [co-conspirator] Denham as a hostile witness. … During her plea, Denham agreed to testify on behalf of the State at Spencer's trial. Prior to her testimony, the State called Denham before the trial court to determine whether she would testify pursuant to the plea agreement, to which she responded affirmatively. Nevertheless, upon being questioned before the jury, Denham attempted to invoke the Fifth Amendment right to remain silent, and the State reminded Denham that she had waived her right, but instead of responding, she stated she did not remember where she was on the night in question. At that point, the State requested that it be allowed to treat Denham as a hostile witness. Spencer did not object to the request. ‘A trial court has discretion to permit leading questions on direct examination when a witness is reluctant, hostile, or overly nervous.’ Culler v. State, 277 Ga. 717, 721(5), 594 S.E.2d 631 (2004), citing Hayes v. State, 268 Ga. 809, 812–813(6), 493 S.E.2d 169 (1997). See also former OCGA § 24–9–63 (2012), which is now codified in OCGA § 24–6–611(c), enacted by Ga. L.2011, p. 99, § 2/HB 24. ‘It would be a rare case in which the trial court's exercise of discretion on this issue would warrant reversal.’ Fugate v. State, 263 Ga. 260, 265(10), 431 S.E.2d 104 (1993). Although Spencer cites Hill v. State, 250 Ga.App. 897, 553 S.E.2d 289 (2001), in support of his contention that the State should have been required to refresh Denham's recollection prior to treating her as a hostile witness, See id. at 902(1), 553 S.E.2d 289, that case was addressing impeachment of a witness with prior statements, and it is not directly on point. Moreover, Denham did not simply state that she could not remember, she first sought protection from testifying from the Fifth Amendment, which she was