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prevented from invoking under her plea agreement.” Culler v. State, 277 Ga. 717, 594 S.E.2d 631 (March 29, 2004). Trial court properly allowed “the State to treat its witness … as hostile by asking leading questions” where on the stand he “said he feared for his safety and was very nervous about testifying,…. attempted to evade the State’s questions about matters such as whether the signature on his statement actually was his, and was extremely reticent about answering a number of questions on other topics,” and finally answered “no comment” when asked about his own involvement in the assault. “A trial court has discretion to permit leading questions on direct examination when a witness is reluctant, hostile, or overly nervous. Hayes v. State , 268 Ga. 809, 812-13, 493 S.E.2d 169 (1997).” Smith v. State , 243 Ga.App. 331, 533 S.E.2d 431 (March 31, 2000). Armed robbery and firearms convictions affirmed; trial court properly allowed prosecutor to cross-examine its own hostile witness. “It appears from the transcript that Ebony Smith had pled guilty and had given a statement implicating Adrian Smith in the crime. The State called Ebony Smith as a witness, but he refused to cooperate and denied his earlier statements. The prosecutor then used leading questions to examine him, and defense counsel objected. The trial court overruled the objection on the grounds that Ebony Smith was a hostile witness. Although leading questions are generally allowed only on cross-examination, the trial court has discretion to allow leading questions on direct examination where the witness is nervous, ignorant or hostile. OCGA § 24–9–63; Fugate v. State, 263 Ga. 260, 265, 431 S.E.2d 104 (1993). ‘It would be a rare case in which the trial court's exercise of discretion on this issue would warrant reversal.’ Id. There was no error.” J. HYPNOSIS Watson v. State, 278 Ga. 763, 604 S.E.2d 804 (November 8, 2004). “‘[S]tatements made by a subject under hypnosis are not admissible to show the truth of the statement made. [Cits.]’” quoting Walraven v. State, 255 Ga. 276, 280, 336 S.E.2d 798 (1985). However, “‘hypnosis does not inevitably corrupt the memory of every potential witness who undergoes the process. [Cit.] Henceforth, in Georgia, the testimony of a previously hypnotized witness will not be considered corrupt and inadmissible, as it is in California. That testimony will simply be considered frozen, for the purposes of the party subjecting the witness to hypnosis, as of the date of the hypnosis. That witness subsequently, may only testify, for the party subjecting the witness to hypnosis, as to the specific content of recorded statements that he has made prior to hypnosis, or as to events occurring after the hypnosis session.’ … [Witness’s] testimony was not rendered inadmissible simply because the recording of the hypnotic session was unavailable or because her pre-hypnotic oral statement was not reduced contemporaneously to a writing.” K. IMMUNITY Brown v. State, 295 Ga. 804, 764 S.E.2d 376 (October 6, 2014). Murder and firearms convictions affirmed; trial court had no power to grant use immunity to a proposed defense witness. Defendants Brown and McKinney sought to call co- indictee Richardson to the stand “to introduce evidence of Richardson's prior acts of violence in support of their justification defense.” Brown and McKinney contended that they were merely defending themselves from Richardson in the gun battle which killed a child bystander; Richardson faced his own trial in the incident the following month. Richardson’s attorney announced Richardson’s intention to “invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege against self- incrimination as to any questions about those prior acts.” “We now squarely hold that Georgia law does not authorize a trial court to grant use immunity to a witness at the request of a defendant. See Dennard v. State, 313 Ga.App. 419, 421 (721 S.E.2d 610) (2011) (adopting the same holding).” Tanksley v. State, 323 Ga.App. 299, 743 S.E.2d 585 (May 29, 2013). Burglary and related convictions affirmed; no error where trial court cautioned witness granted immunity that the immunity didn’t extend to perjury. “During proceedings outside the presence of the jury, the prosecutor informed the trial court of its intention to call [co-defendant] McNair as a witness for the State and that she anticipated eliciting the same responses from McNair that McNair had given in his previous trial. … After the prosecutor confirmed that she had requested immunity, the trial court ordered that McNair testify, but that he be granted immunity for his testimony. The trial court then warned McNair that if he gave testimony ‘that's not true to the transcript from the last trial, if you say something opposite and the district attorney shows it to you so you can read it and refresh your memory—if you lie—that's what we're talking about—if you lie today in your testimony, you'll be in trouble.’ As the trial court further explained, ‘[t]his immunity does not mean you can come in here and lie and say anything you want.’” Distinguishing Webb v. Texas, 409 U.S. 95 (93 S.Ct. 351, 34 L.Ed.2d 330) (1972), where the trial court threatened a defense witness and dissuaded him from testifying.