☢ test - Í

Ward v. State, 292 Ga. 637, 740 S.E.2d 112 (March 18, 2013). Murder and related convictions affirmed; no ineffective assistance where defense counsel failed to ask court to grant use immunity to defense witness who invoked his right not to incriminate himself. “As Ward correctly concedes, this Court has never directly held that a defendant, as opposed to the State, may properly request a trial court to extend use immunity to a defense witness. See, e.g., Dampier v. State, 249 Ga. 299, 301, 290 S.E.2d 431 (1982); Goodman v. State, 255 Ga. 226(11), 336 S.E.2d 757 (1985). While there may be some precedent for such an action in other jurisdictions, see Government of the Virgin Islands v. Smith, 615 F.2d 964, 974(III)(B) (3 rd Cir., 1980), there is none here in Georgia. Under such circumstances, it cannot be said that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to demand that the trial court take an action for which there is no current Georgia authority.” See Brown (October 6, 2014), above (trial court has no power to grant immunity to defense witnesses). Dennard v. State, 313 Ga.App. 419, 721 S.E.2d 610 (December 8, 2011). Conviction for attempted armed robbery affirmed. “Dennard claims that the trial court should have granted immunity to a jail inmate so he could testify as a defense witness without compromising his right against self-incrimination. However, ‘[u]nder Georgia law, the district attorney has discretion to grant immunity to witnesses for the state. [OCGA § 24–9–28(a)]. Our statutes provide no such discretion to the court and, further, make no provision for a grant of immunity to defense witnesses.’ Dampier v. State, 249 Ga. 299, 300 (290 S.E.2d 431) (1982). Accordingly, we find no error. See House v. State, 203 Ga.App. 55(1) (416 S.E.2d 108 (1992) (no error in refusing to grant use immunity to defense witness).” Accord, Brown (October 6, 2014), above. In re: Long, 276 Ga.App. 306, 623 S.E.2d 181 (November 9, 2005). Trial court erred in finding witness in contempt for refusing to testify; alleged grant of immunity (made by another court) was improperly made without written application from state, or hearing to determine that witness’s testimony was “necessary to the public interest” pursuant to OCGA § 24-9-28. While it’s unclear in the statute whether witness himself has right to be present at this hearing, Court of Appeals suggests that such a right is implicit in the Supreme Court’s decision in King v. State, 273 Ga. 258, 264-265(15), 539 S.E.2d 783 (2000), and in In re: S.U. , 269 Ga.App. 306, 603 S.E.2d 790 (2004). In re: S.U., 269 Ga.App. 306, 603 S.E.2d 790 (August 27, 2004). “S.U. and a co-defendant were charged with criminal attempt to commit burglary, cruelty to animals, criminal damage to property, loitering and prowling, and curfew violation. S.U.’s co-defendant’s trial was held first, and S.U. was subpoenaed to testify at the trial. On the morning of the trial, the State moved for a grant of testimonial immunity for S.U., which the trial court granted. When he was called to testify, however, S.U. asserted his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, and refused to testify. The trial court instructed him to testify, or that he would be held in contempt of court. S.U. refused to do so, and the trial court found him in contempt.” Held, 1. trial court was not required to conduct evidentiary hearing before granting State’s motion; defendant had prior notice and was adequately represented on oral argument before the trial court on the motion. 2. “The purpose of use immunity is to overcome a criminal defendant’s Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination by granting that defendant immunity from any criminal misconduct disclosed by compelled testimony. Hayes v. State, 168 Ga.App. 94(2), 308 S.E.2d 227 (1983). ‘[T]he trial court’s grant of an order of immunity pursuant to OCGA § 24-9-28(a) removed any right to invoke the privilege against self-incrimination.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted) Willard v. State, 244 Ga.App. 469, 470- 471(1)(a), 535 S.E.2d 820 (2000). ‘[T]o hold otherwise would render the immunity statute meaningless, because any witness would be able to continue to assert the privilege against self-incrimination regardless of a grant of immunity.’ Id. at 471, 535 S.E.2d 820.” See also Kastigar v. United States , 406 U.S. 441, 92 S.Ct. 1653, 32 L.Ed.2d 212 (1972). Ohio v. Reiner, 532 U.S. 17, 121 S. Ct. 1252, 149 L.Ed.2d 158 (March 19, 2001). Reversing Ohio Supreme Court, which erroneously “held that a witness who denies all culpability does not have a valid Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Because our precedents dictate that the privilege protects the innocent as well as the guilty, and that the facts here are sufficient to sustain a claim of privilege, we grant the petition for certiorari and reverse.” Ohio reversed Reiner’s involuntary manslaughter conviction because trial court granted witness Batt transactional immunity when she asserted her Fifth Amendment privilege. Reiner was charged with killing his infant son; he cast blame on the babysitter, Batt. “The Fifth Amendment provides that ‘[n]o person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.’ U.S. Const., Amdt. 5. As the Supreme Court of Ohio acknowledged, this privilege not only extends ‘to answers that would in themselves support a conviction ... but likewise embraces those which would furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute the claimant.’ Hoffman [ v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486, 71 S.Ct. 814, 95 L.Ed. 1118 (1951)]. ‘[I]t need only be evident from the implications of the question, in the setting in which it is asked, that a responsive answer to the question or an explanation of why it cannot be answered might be dangerous because injurious disclosure could result.’ Id., at 486-487, 71 S.Ct. 814. We have held that the privilege's