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protection extends only to witnesses who have ‘reasonable cause to apprehend danger from a direct answer.’ Id., at 486, 71 S.Ct. 814. That inquiry is for the court; the witness' assertion does not by itself establish the risk of incrimination. Ibid. A danger of ‘imaginary and unsubstantial character’ will not suffice. Mason v. United States, 244 U.S. 362, 366, 37 S.Ct. 621, 61 L.Ed. 1198 (1917). But we have never held, as the Supreme Court of Ohio did, that the privilege is unavailable to those who claim innocence. To the contrary, we have emphasized that one of the Fifth Amendment's ‘basic functions ... is to protect innocent men ... “who otherwise might be ensnared by ambiguous circumstances.” Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391, 421, 77 S.Ct. 963, 1 L.Ed.2d 931 (1957) (quoting Slochower v. Board of Higher Ed. of New York City, 350 U.S. 551, 557-558, 76 S.Ct. 637, 100 L.Ed. 692 (1956)) (emphasis in original). In Grunewald, we recognized that truthful responses of an innocent witness, as well as those of a wrongdoer, may provide the government with incriminating evidence from the speaker's own mouth. 353 U.S., at 421-422, 77 S.Ct. 963.” King v. State, 273 Ga. 258, 539 S.E.2d 783 (November 30, 2000). “King contends that the trial court acted improperly by conducting a brief hearing outside his presence concerning the State’s request for an order compelling Walter Smith to testify in King’s trial and confirming the use and derivative use immunity that would apply to that compelled testimony. See OCGA § 24-9-28. … The hearing in question, however, appears not to have been a part of the proceedings against King. While King might have preferred that a key witness not be ordered to testify truthfully in his trial, there is nothing in Georgia law that would have permitted him to object to the State’s request for the order or that would suggest that King’s rights were the subject matter under consideration. See Williams v. State, 234 Ga.App. 191, 193- 194(2) (b), 506 S.E.2d 237 (1998). On the contrary, the trial court was obliged to consider whether the testimony was ‘necessary to the public interest,’ a matter which King had no standing to address. OCGA § 24-9-28(a). King was placed on sufficient notice that Smith had been ordered to testify and that his testimony could not later be used against him. Any alleged bias on the witness’s part was the proper subject of cross-examination, not grounds for denying the State’s request for the order. [Cit.]” Accord, Gilbert v. State , 306 Ga.App. 776, 703 S.E.2d 374 (November 15, 2010); Allen v. State , A15A2317, 336 Ga.App. 80, ___ S.E.2d ___, 2016 WL 833955 (March 4, 2016). Willard v. State, 244 Ga.App. 469, 535 S.E.2d 820 (June 13, 2000). Arson convictions affirmed. No error in allowing State to place co-defendant who had pled guilty on the stand and have him invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege before the jury, as he had previously been granted immunity, and no substantive questions were asked of him. 1. Proper procedure was followed. “The trial court immediately conducted a hearing outside the presence of the jury as required by Parrott v. State, 206 Ga.App. 829, 832(2), 427 S.E.2d 276 (1992), and Willard expressed his intention to refuse to testify. After hearing his testimony, the trial court granted immunity to Willard but cautioned the State that if Willard nevertheless refused to testify, ‘the court would not allow any cross-examination of the witness and the witness would be dismissed from the witness stand because the defendant would not have ... an effective cross-examination.’” After witness invoked privilege before the jury, prosecutor asked if he had pled guilty to the same charges, but defense counsel objected and the question was never answered. 2. Trial court properly allowed witness to be called to the stand, as “‘[t]he trial court's grant of an order of immunity pursuant to OCGA § 24-9-28(a) removed ... any right to invoke the privilege against self-incrimination. [Cit.]’ Hawkins v. State, 175 Ga.App. 606, 609(1), 333 S.E.2d 870 (1985).” The potential for the witness to be charged with perjury committed during his trial doesn’t entitle him to refuse to testify; nor does “a remote possibility” of federal prosecution overcome the trial court’s power to force the witness to testify upon a grant of immunity. 3 . Defendants’ right to confront and cross-examine the witness wasn’t violated, since the witness didn’t testify. “‘Indeed, a witness' in-court invocation of his Fifth Amendment rights is not necessarily harmful. What is harmful is for the trial court to allow the State, once a witness has invoked his Fifth Amendment rights, in effect, to testify for the witness and circumvent meaningful cross-examination as to obvious inferences.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) McIntyre v. State, 266 Ga. 7, 11(5), 463 S.E.2d 476 (1995). … Moreover, Willard never responded in any fashion to the single question, and ‘an unanswered question does not furnish grounds for a mistrial. [Cits.]’ Berry v. State, 210 Ga.App. 789, 791(4), 437 S.E.2d 630 (1993). Appellants were not deprived of their right to an effective cross- examination, because the witness never answered or refused to answer the single question directed to him by the State.” L. IMPEACHMENT 1. BIAS/PREJUDICE Walker v. State, 322 Ga.App. 158, 744 S.E.2d 349 (June 11, 2013). Child molestation and related convictions affirmed; trial court properly allowed prosecutor to impeach defendant’s expert witness by demonstrating the witness’s bias against the State, based on charges against the witness for failure to report sexual abuse of a child. “Walker argues that the question about the charge for failing to report child sexual abuse amounted to improper impeachment because former OCGA § 24–9–84.1 only allowed impeachment with a criminal conviction. (OCGA § 24–6–609 of the new evidence code