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concerns impeachment by evidence of conviction of a crime.) But ‘the prosecutor's cross-examination of this witness did not constitute impeachment of the witness by proof of a criminal conviction; rather, the prosecutor was cross-examining the witness concerning the criminal charge[ ] ... in order to reveal possible biases, prejudices, or ulterior motives of the witness as they might relate to his testimony on direct examination.’ (Citations and footnote omitted.) Harrison v. State, 259 Ga. 486, 489(3), 384 S.E.2d 643 (1989). See also Smith v. State, 276 Ga. 263, 265(2), 577 S.E.2d 548 (2003). (‘But [defendant] was not trying to impeach the witness on general credibility grounds; he was attempting to show the witness' [s] bias.’) Consequently, the prosecutor could question the expert about the charge even though it did not result in an adjudication of guilt. See Smith, 276 Ga. at 265(2), 577 S.E.2d 548.” Williams v. State, 303 Ga.App. 222, 692 S.E.2d 820 (March 29, 2010). Defendant’s conviction for possession of marijuana with intent to distribute affirmed; trial court didn’t improperly restrict defendant’s cross-examination of officer on his alleged racial bias. “At trial, Williams's counsel attempted to question the officer as to racist statements that he had allegedly made in prior unrelated cases. The state objected to Williams's line of questioning on the ground that it constituted an improper method of impeachment. The trial court overruled the state's objection, in part, and allowed Williams to question the officer regarding his alleged racist bias to the extent that such evidence bore upon his credibility in this case. The trial court noted, however, that alleged misconduct from the officer's personnel file was over 15 years old, and ruled that the questioning would be limited to more recent cases. Williams's counsel was then allowed a brief recess to obtain court transcripts and a witness that she claimed was available in support of her impeachment claim. When the trial resumed, however, Williams failed to present any impeachment evidence. In response to Williams's counsel's questioning, the officer denied that he had ever used any racial slurs during the course of his duties as a police officer.” “It is true that ‘[t]he state of a witness's feelings toward the parties ... may always be proved for the consideration of the jury.’ OCGA § 24-8-68. The credibility of a witness may be attacked by ‘cross-examination directed toward revealing possible biases, prejudices, or ulterior motives of the witness as they relate directly to issues or personalities in the case.’ (Citation omitted; emphasis in original.) Farley [ v. State, 225 Ga.App. 687, 690, 484 S.E.2d 711 (1997) (physical precedent only)]. But, the scope of cross-examination is not unlimited.” No abuse of discretion here. Arnold v. State, 284 Ga.App. 598, 645 S.E.2d 68 (March 28, 2007). Defendant was not entitled to examine his own witness about pending criminal charges. “Our law is clear, that a defendant is entitled to cross-examine a State’s witness about pending criminal charges to show the witness’s bias. Lines v. State, 249 Ga. 257, 260(2) (290 S.E.2d 911) (1982). It is not clear, however, that a defendant is entitled to impeach his own witness in that manner, and we refuse to extend that rule to the witness in this case in which Arnold did not show that he was surprised or ‘entrapped by the witness’s previous contradictory statement.’ OCGA § 24-9-81; Paradise v. State, 212 Ga.App. 166, 169(3) (441 S.E.2d 497) (1994). The cases on which Arnold relies are all cases in which the witness was called by the State, not the defense. Accordingly, this enumeration of error is without merit.” Leeks v. State, 281 Ga.App. 274, 635 S.E.2d 878 (August 24, 2006). Trial court properly excluded certified copy of witness’s first offender plea, offered as impeachment. “In Matthews [ v. State,268 Ga. 798, 493 S.E.2d 136 (1997) ] , the Supreme Court held that a witness cannot be impeached on general credibility grounds with a first offender record. Id. A party can, however, cross-examine a witness to show that bias might result from her first offender status. See Melson v. State , 263 Ga.App. 647, 648(2), 588 S.E.2d 822 (2003). But, even when cross-examination to show bias is permissible, certified copies of court documents relating to the witness’s first offender treatment are not admissible. See Smith v. State , 276 Ga. 263, 265 (2), 577 S.E.2d 548 (2003). The only circumstance in which documents pertaining to a First Offender record might be admissible for purposes of impeachment is ‘to disprove or contradict the testimony of the witness.’ Matthews, supra, 268 Ga. At 802, n. 2, 493 S.E.2d 136. See also Hernandez v. State , 244 Ga.App. 874, 877 (1)(c), 537 S.E.2d 149 (2000). Leeks did not argue below that this was the purpose for which she sought admission of the first offender document and she makes no such argument on appeal.” Smith v. State, 276 Ga. 263, 577 S.E.2d 548 (February 24, 2003). “‘[T]he first offender record of one who is currently serving a first offender sentence or of one who has successfully completed the first offender sentence may not be used to impeach the first offender on general credibility grounds (i.e., by establishing that the first offender has been convicted of a felony or crime of moral turpitude) because no adjudication of guilt has been entered.’” However, “[t]he Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant in a criminal case the right to show the possible bias of a witness by cross-examining him concerning pending criminal charges or a pending probation revocation. However, certified copies of court documents relating to such matters are not admissible. These same rules logically apply to first offender probation status because in that situation there has not been an adjudication of guilt and the matter remains pending. See OCGA § 42-8-60. Thus, Smith should have been permitted to cross-examine the witness