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regarding his first offender treatment to show bias without being required to introduce documents of the witness’ first offender status. It follows that (1) the trial court erred in requiring Smith to introduce the witness' first offender record and (2) Smith should not have lost the right to open and conclude argument.” Accord, Scott v. State , 242 Ga.App. 850, 527 S.E.2d 210 (December 6, 1999); Melson v. State , 263 Ga.App. 647, 588 S.E.2d 822 (October 16, 2003) (“‘[T]he defendant is entitled to attack the credibility of the witness by showing that the pending charges reveal a possible bias , prejudice or ulterior motive on the part of the witness to give untruthful or shaded testimony in an effort to please the State,’” but error here was harmless due to overwhelming evidence of guilt); Johnson v. State , 284 Ga.App. 724, 644 S.E.2d 544 (March 30, 2007) (trial court erred in requiring defendant to tender certified copy of victim’s prior conviction in order to impeach based on probationary status, but harmless error in light of overwhelming evidence of guilt.); Cline v. State , 300 Ga.App. 615, 685 S.E.2d 501 (October 27, 2009) (trial court properly prohibited impeachment by first offender sentence where no evidence of deal with State, and “offense and arrest occurred after [witness] had already given a statement to police about the evening's events, so the disposition of the drug offense could not have served as a motive for aiding police in their investigation.”). 2. CHARACTER/REPUTATION See new OCGA § 24-6-608 Williams v. State, 332 Ga.App. 546, 774 S.E.2d 126 (June 17, 2015). Various drug convictions affirmed. Under new OCGA § 24-1-103(1)(b), trial court properly excluded evidence of deputy’s affiliation with a website (“Uncle Wiggy”) which stated, among other things, that “the police will try to trick you. The police can and will lie to you.” “Williams argued that this Statement went directly to the issue of [Deputy] Brock's credibility, which he contends was crucial to proof of identity, as Brock was only one of two witnesses who had identified Williams as a participant in the three drug transactions. The record provides no express context for the Statement within the Publication, but the trial court said that he was ‘a little bit familiar’ with the Uncle Wiggy website, and he drew the distinction between a police officer's credibility under oath and an officer's tactics during an investigation into a crime.” “[E]ven assuming that Brock's undefined ‘affiliation’ with the Uncle Wiggy website and Publication somehow equates with his adoption or authorship of the Statement, we find that such a generalized statement about police conduct is not probative of Brock's own credibility in testifying under oath.” Bryant v. State, 288 Ga. 876, 708 S.E.2d 362 (March 18, 2011). Capital murder conviction affirmed (but sentence reversed); defendant’s statement in telephone call to his aunt, expressing ill will toward his sister for testifying for the State (“sorry b-----, I’ll see you in hell”) was properly admitted to impeach defendant’s own testimony. Defendant claimed that his animosity toward his sister “was ‘over two years ago,’” but State showed the statement was made only one year before – introduced to show that defendant was still pressuring sister not to testify against him. “See Cooper v. State, 272 Ga.App. 209, 210 (612 S.E.2d 42) (2005) (‘[T]he State may impeach the defendant with evidence reflecting badly on his character, as long as that evidence proves the defendant's specific testimony false’); OCGA § 24-9-82.” Coleman v. State, 286 Ga. 291, 687 S.E.2d 427 (November 9, 2009). At defendant’s trial for murder and related charges, trial court erred in admitting “a photograph of [defendant’s] girlfriend showing facial injuries purportedly inflicted by Coleman.” Girlfriend was not the victim in the case on trial; evidence was introduced to impeach defendant’s testimony that he “respected women.” Defendant denied striking his girlfriend, and no evidence was tendered showing that he did it. “‘In the impeachment situation, the State may introduce evidence reflecting negatively on the defendant's character only insofar as that evidence proves the falsity of specific testimony of the defendant.’ Porter v. State, 254 Ga. 388(2) (330 S.E.2d 94) (1985). … In the absence of evidence connecting Coleman to the injuries depicted in the photo, the photo was not appropriate impeachment evidence and the trial court erred in admitting it.” Harmless, however, in light of overwhelming evidence of guilt. Allen v. State, 292 Ga.App. 133, 663 S.E.2d 370 (May 12, 2008). “At the time of his trial for escape, OCGA § 24-9-20(b) provided that ‘no evidence of [a defendant’s] general bad character or prior convictions shall be admissible unless and until the defendant shall have first put his character in issue.’ We find that Allen’s testimony describing himself as being ‘the type of guy’ who tries not to ‘hurt[ ] anybody[,]’ put his character into issue for purposes of that statute. See Carswell v. State, 263 Ga.App. 833, 834(2) (589 S.E.2d 605) (2003) (defendant’s testimony that he always walked away from violent situations opened the door to evidence that tended to show otherwise). As a result, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by permitting the State to introduce evidence of Allen’s prior convictions.” Cooper v. State, 272 Ga.App. 209, 612 S.E.2d 42 (March 15, 2005). After defendant testified that he could afford the