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video recorder he was accused of shoplifting, because he knew he had a long-term job starting the following week, State was properly allowed to impeach him by showing that he was, in fact scheduled to begin serving a 90-day jail sentence the following week. Daniel v. State, 271 Ga.App. 539, 610 S.E.2d 90 (January 19, 2005). Trial court did not err in prohibiting defense counsel from cross-examining the robbery victim about whether he sold drugs. “[T]o the extent that Daniel sought to impugn the victim’s character through testimony concerning illegal drug sales, a ‘victim’s character is rarely relevant for any purpose in a criminal proceeding. [Cits]’” quoting Kolokouris v. State , 271 Ga. 597, 523 S.E.2d 311 (1999). “Whether the victim had taken drugs on the night of the incident certainly may have been relevant to show his ability – or inability – to identify his assailant. But whether the victim had sold drugs was simply irrelevant to the issues at trial” (emphasis in original). McNeil v. State, 268 Ga.App. 10, 601 S.E.2d 390 (June 17, 2004). Where defendant testified that he was attending college on the day of the shooting, trial court properly admitted letter from college “stating that he was being suspended for the spring 2001 semester because he made ‘vulgar and threatening’ statements to a teacher.” Defendant failed to argue for redaction of the letter at trial court. Lockaby v. State, 265 Ga.App. 527, 594 S.E.2d 729 (February 11, 2004). Prosecutor properly allowed to question defendant about prior positive drug screens where he offered “his unsolicited assertion that the drug screen that was the basis of his prosecution was his only positive drug screen.” Callahan v. State, 256 Ga.App. 482, 568 S.E.2d 780 (July 11, 2002). Witness’s testimony that child makes up stories when he gets in trouble did not conform to the requirements for impeachment by evidence of general bad character provided in “OCGA § 24-9-84. The stepmother’s testimony did not meet the requirements of the statute. She did not testify to the victim's general reputation for truthfulness in the community or whether she would believe him under oath. The victim’s credibility therefore was not impeached, and the trial court did not err in declining to give this requested charge.” King v. State, 273 Ga. 258, 539 S.E.2d 783 (November 30, 2000). 1. Impeaching a witness with specific acts of bad character is not permissible . Here, the state questioned the expert witness about whether he had a “complaint for having sex with one of [his] patients ... presently pending against [him.]” “The State urged that it was entitled to question the witness about the complaint in order to show the weakness of his professional credentials, but the witness’s professional license was valid and the complaint against the witness bore no relation to the scientific issues about which he testified at trial.” Accord, Frazier v. State , 278 Ga.App. 685, 629 S.E.2d 568 (April 7, 2006) (witness properly precluded “from testifying regarding specific instances of [victim’s] dishonesty.”). See also Pruitt (March 19, 1999), below. 2. “ The trial court did not err by sustaining the State’s objection when King attempted to ask Walter Smith, King’s co-indictee, why he had left high school in the tenth grade. A defendant’s right to a ‘thorough and sifting cross examination’ is not violated by a trial court’s confining questioning to relevant, material matters, and ‘the trial court, in determining the scope of relevant cross-examination, has a broad discretion.’ Kolokouris v. State, 271 Ga. 597, 600(4), 523 S.E.2d 311 (1999) (applying both constitutional and statutory requirements); OCGA § 24-9-64.” Curry v. State , 243 Ga.App. 712, 534 S.E.2d 168 (April 27, 2000). Rape and kidnapping convictions affirmed; trial court erred, but harmless, in prohibiting defendant from “calling witnesses to show that [victim] had used crack cocaine on the day of the incident, before she encountered Curry.” “[T]he victim's consumption of drugs shortly before the incident occurred is not immaterial, inasmuch as it may affect her recollection of events. [fn] Moreover, in this case it may be relevant considering Curry's testimony that the victim accepted $10 as payment for sex and then asked him to take her to buy crack cocaine. Under the circumstances of this case, the trial court erred in excluding the evidence.” Harmless, however, inasmuch as “[t]he victim admitted at trial that she had used alcohol and illegal drugs on the day she met Curry. And Curry testified, without objection, that after the two had sex, the victim asked him to take her to get crack cocaine. Thus, evidence of her illegal drug use was already before the jury.” Distinguishing cases prohibiting evidence of victim’s drug use generally, e.g., “ Parrish v. State, 237 Ga.App. 274, 282(6), 514 S.E.2d 458 (1999) (whether the victim used drugs in the past or was generally knowledgeable about illegal drugs is irrelevant to the issue of whether she was raped, as rape is no more lawful when committed against a drug addict than it is against a nondrug addict); Dukes, supra (victim's past use of cocaine not admissible because no conviction of crime involving moral turpitude and because victim's past use of drugs was unrelated to the issue of whether defendant committed aggravated assault upon him); Harris v. State, 196 Ga.App. 304, 306(3), 396 S.E.2d 288 (1990) (defendant cannot introduce evidence of victim's past