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drug use in order to impeach her testimony that he forced her to use drugs, as question of whether victim was addicted to cocaine was irrelevant to whether defendant assaulted and imprisoned her).” Pruitt v. State, 270 Ga. 745, 514 S.E.2d 639 (March 19, 1999). No error where trial court excluded defendant’s impeachment of officer about an unrelated incident in which he falsified evidence to help a DUI defendant. “Hawk was not convicted of any crime in the DUI incident, and impeaching a witness with specific acts of bad character is not permissible. OCGA § 24-9-84; Henry v. State, 269 Ga. 851, 856(5), 507 S.E.2d 419 (1998); Wetta v. State, 217 Ga.App. 128, 130(3), 456 S.E.2d 696 (1995).” 3. DEAL WITH STATE/POTENTIAL SENTENCE Nwakanma v. State, 296 Ga. 493, 768 S.E.2d 503 (January 20, 2015). Felony murder and related convictions affirmed; no evidence that State’s witness or State lied about a deal for witness’s testimony. Rather, all evidence showed that witness testified in hopes of, but without a promise of, getting a reduced sentence. “Nwakanma points to the prosecutor's testimony at the hearing on the motion for new trial that the lawyer for Abdus–Salaam continually asked for reduced charges and a lesser sentence in exchange for his testimony and that the prosecutor said he would keep an open mind toward future discussions. But this testimony did not suggest the existence of even an informal agreement. See Klinect v. State, 269 Ga. 570, 572(2) (501 S.E.2d 810) (1998). And the prosecutor indicated that there was no specific agreement to discuss a possible plea after completion of the codefendants' trial. See id. ‘[N]ot everything said to a witness or to his lawyer must be disclosed.... Some promises, agreements, or understandings do not need to be disclosed, because they are too ambiguous, or too loose or are of too marginal a benefit to the witness to count.’ Tarver v. Hopper, 169 F.3d 710, 717(C) (11 th Cir., 1999).” “That Abdus–Salaam ‘or his counsel held a hope that testifying in [the co-defendants'] trial would benefit him later does not show an agreement.’ Klinect, 269 Ga. at 572(2) (citation omitted). See also Tarver, 169 F3d at 717(C) (‘The simple belief by a defense attorney that his client may be in a better position to negotiate a reduced penalty should he testify against a codefendant is not an agreement within the purview of Giglio. ’ (Citation omitted.)); Hudson v. State, 277 Ga. 581, 586(5) (591 S.E.2d 807) (2004) (‘That [the witness] may have expected help for his cooperation does not establish that a deal or agreement was made between him and the State.’ (Citation omitted.)). And ‘there is no evidence that the prosecutor encouraged [Abdus–Salaam] or [his] counsel to believe that [he] would, in fact, benefit from testifying against [Nwakanma].’ Varner v. State, 297 Ga.App. 799, 802(1)(a) (678 S.E.2d 515) (2009). The fact that after the codefendants' trial Abdus–Salaam entered a plea agreement does not itself establish the existence of a deal. See Wimes [ v. State, 293 Ga. 361, 363(2) (744 S.E.2d 787) (2013)].” Williams v. State, 292 Ga. 844, 742 S.E.2d 445 (April 29, 2013). Murder and related convictions affirmed; trial court properly prohibited cross-examination of state witness on potential sentence for dismissed charge, absent evidence of any deal, potential deal or promise. “[Witness] Cheru originally had been charged with armed robbery and had faced a mandatory sentence of life without parole, but in which Cheru ultimately was allowed to plead guilty to aggravated assault instead. The trial court admitted the conviction for aggravated assault but would not allow Williams to cross-examine Cheru about the sentence he might have received for armed robbery.” No charges were pending against Cheru either when he gave a statement or when he testified, and there was no evidence of any deal, potential deal or promises made to Cheru for his testimony. “The trial court did not cut off all inquiry into the potential bias of Cheru, but rather allowed the cross- examination to proceed unfettered with the exception of an inquiry into the penalty that Cheru might have received for armed robbery.” Brockman v. State, 292 Ga. 707, 739 S.E.2d 332 (March 4, 2013). Felony murder and related convictions, and death penalty, affirmed; no error in ruling out questioning of co-indictee/State’s witness about “the disposition of two criminal indictments against his brother. “Brockman has not shown that Lewis had any knowledge of the disposition of his brother's indictments or that there was any evidence that Lewis believed that his brother received favorable treatment as a ‘“result of [Lewis's] cooperation”’ or due to ‘“decisions made by the district attorney in exchange for [Lewis]'s cooperation and testimony for the State.”’ Manley v. State, 287 Ga. 338, 340–341 (698 S.E.2d 301) (2010) (citation omitted). See Hampton v. State, 289 Ga. 621, 626–627(5) (713 S.E.2d 851) (2011). Brockman also declined the opportunity presented by the trial court to ask Lewis in the jury's presence whether he received any promises of lenience for his brother if he cooperated in Brockman's case. Moreover, Lewis had already testified that he received a plea agreement with the State in exchange for his testimony against Brockman.” Young v. State, 290 Ga. 441, 721 S.E.2d 839 (January 9, 2012). Felony murder and related convictions affirmed; trial court could prohibit cross-examination of officer about pending disciplinary action, absent showing that he “felt pressured to testify favorably for the State in order to gain concessions from the South Carolina prosecutor or keep his Georgia