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POST certification.” “[A]ppellant failed to demonstrate that Nollinger's testimony was influenced in any way by the charge pending against him in South Carolina. In fact, the South Carolina prosecutor testified that Nollinger did not seek any concessions for his cooperation and that she had no interest whatsoever in Nollinger's trial testimony. Moreover, Nollinger's testimony was consistent with his police report, the dashboard videotape he made at the scene, and the testimony of other officers. Thus, it would be highly speculative to suggest a connection between Nollinger's testimony and the troubles stemming from the South Carolina prosecution, and it cannot be said that the trial court abused its discretion in limiting appellant's cross-examination of Nollinger.” Davis v. State, 312 Ga.App. 328, 718 S.E.2d 559 (November 1, 2011). Burglary and related convictions affirmed; defense counsel was deficient in failing to impeach State informant “about the probation revocation charges that were pending at the time he went to the police with Davis's jailhouse confession,” but no prejudice shown considering “the overwhelming evidence against Davis.” Instead of impeaching informant by showing “that the pending probation revocation was admissible to show [informant’s] bias,” counsel only sought to use the witness’s first offender guilty plea and probation revocation for general impeachment, which was properly ruled out by the trial court. Hampton v. State, 289 Ga. 621, 713 S.E.2d 851 (July 8, 2011). Malice murder and related convictions affirmed; no error in “refusing to allow [defendant] to question Robert Jones, a co-indictee who testified for the State, about the amount of the bond that Jones received following his arrest on a murder charge in this case.” “The amount of Jones' bond would not, by itself, indicate that he had any reason to testify “in an effort to please the prosecution.” [ State v. Vogleson, 275 Ga. 637, 639, 571 S.E.2d 752 (2002)]. Hampton did not try to ask Jones whether the State had agreed not to oppose his request for a bond or had sought a reduced bond for him. Hampton had already denied any deals with or promises from the State, so if bias for the State was the ground on which Hampton contended his question was relevant, he needed to so advise the trial court and establish a foundation for the question.” “Had there been evidence that Hampton believed that his bond amount was a ‘“result of his cooperation”’ or was related to ‘“decisions made by the district attorney in exchange for the witness's cooperation and testimony for the State,”’ Manley [ v. State, 287 Ga. 338, 340-341, 698 S.E.2d 301 (2010)] (citation omitted), then the trial court's ruling might have been erroneous. See also id. at 343, 698 S.E.2d 301 (explaining that, at a minimum, ‘“the witness would need to understand the parole disparity and its connection to the district attorney's charging decisions for the issue to be open to cross-examination, as witnesses cannot be influenced by matters about which they are unaware.”’ (citation omitted)).” Accord, Brockman (March 4, 2013), above. Riley v. State, 309 Ga.App. 509, 710 S.E.2d 690 (May 6, 2011). Armed robbery and firearms convictions affirmed; no error in limiting cross-examination of State’s witness on pending charges where no evidence of any deal shown. “Here, defense counsel sought to cross-examine the witness concerning possible bias as a result of any deals the witness had with the State. But the record reveals that no deal was made and there was no evidence presented of any pending charges against the witness. Moreover, defense counsel was allowed to ask about the bus token. Riley cannot demonstrate any improper limitation of his rights under the Confrontation Clause. Under these circumstances, the trial court did not err in limiting cross-examination on this issue. See Hewitt [ v. State, 277 Ga. 327, 332(2) (588 S.E.2d 722) (2003)] (no violation of right to confrontation in trial court's limit on cross-examination on issue of parole when no evidence of deal between defendant and State regarding parole).” Note Hewitt overruled “[t]o the extent that [it] can be read to state that a witness may never be cross-examined regarding eligibility for parole in order to show bias in favor of the State,” see Manley (March 1, 2010), below. Younger v. State, 288 Ga. 195, 702 S.E.2d 183 (November 8, 2010). Felony murder and firearm conviction affirmed; no error where trial court sustained objection to cross-examination of co-indictee on whether he was granted bond in return for his statement implicating defendant. “The jury was informed that: Washington had received testimonial immunity; at the time he gave his statement to police, he was charged only with criminal attempt to commit armed robbery; the detective told him then that other charges might be added, or he may be offered a plea agreement; he was jailed after he gave his statement; and he was later charged with felony murder and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Younger's proffer of evidence showed that: at the time of Washington's statement, Washington was told that he would not be charged with murder because he was being truthful and cooperating in the investigation; he was not promised anything in exchange for his statement; at the time of his statement he believed that he would have no bond; and he was confined for two or three weeks after giving his statement. We therefore conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that further cross-examination regarding the circumstances surrounding Washington's being granted bond would not have influenced the jury.” Martinez v. State, 306 Ga.App. 512, 702 S.E.2d 747 (October 19, 2010). At defendants’ trial for numerous home invasion