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subjected, or alter any substantive rights conferred on him by law. See State v. Martin, 266 Ga. 244, 245-246(3) (466 S.E.2d 216) (1996) (statute altering evidence presented in a DUI prosecution); Livingston v. State, 264 Ga. 402(1)(e) (444 S.E.2d 748) (1994) (statute altering that which could be presented in capital sentencing trial); Eades v. State, 232 Ga. 735, 737-738(3) (208 S.E.2d 791) (1974) (statute eliminating defendant’s ability to give an unsworn statement at trial).” Manning v. State, 237 Ga.App. 520, 515 S.E.2d 663 (April 7, 1999). “When a defendant chooses to place his character in issue by offering the testimony of a witness as to his general good reputation in the community, the State may prove the defendant’s general bad reputation and may also show specific instances of bad character by presenting competent evidence that the defendant has been convicted of prior offenses. Jones v. State, 257 Ga. 753, 758, 363 S.E.2d 529 (1988).” Offering evidence of prior arrest as impeachment was error, however, as a mere arrest is not admissible as impeachment. Bledsoe v. State, 236 Ga.App. 796, 513 S.E.2d 768 (March 8, 1999). State’s attempt to impeach defendant with a false statement, not relevant to the charges on trial, was improper. “Several months after the offenses for which he was charged in this case, Bledsoe applied for a probationary driver’s license under the habitual violator statute. The notarized application form, which was signed by Bledsoe, affirmed that ‘in the two years preceding date of this application, I have received no traffic citations of any type.’” In fact, defendant had been charged with DUI and driving after being declared habitual violator – the charges on trial. “In Georgia, the State may impeach a witness in the following ways: ‘(1) disproving facts testified to by the witness, (2) previous contradictory statements, (3) bias, interest or corruption on the part of the witness, (4) bad character evidence by reputation or conviction of crime, (5) incapacity or lack of knowledge or opportunity to observe, and (6) absence of religious belief.’ Haynes v. State, 180 Ga.App. 202, 203-204(3), 349 S.E.2d 208 (1986). The State may not make ‘a collateral attack upon the [witness’] credibility, impeaching in nature.’ Id. at 203, 349 S.E.2d 208.” The impeachment attempt here fit none of the enumerated categories, but was collateral. 5. DISPROVING FACTS Harris v. State, 333 Ga.App. 118, 775 S.E.2d 602 (July 13, 2015). Convictions for child molestation and enticing a child affirmed; under 2013 Evidence Code, trial court properly allowed rebuttal testimony from another molestation victim. When State presented similar transaction evidence of defendant’s prior guilty plea to child molestation, defendant testified that it “had been an isolated incident and that he had never done anything like that before. On rebuttal, the state introduced testimony from the aunt of that nine-year-old victim. She testified that on several occasions when she was 14 years old, Harris had taken her to a hotel room and had sex with her.” Held, defendant opened the door to this rebuttal testimony. “‘A witness may be impeached by disproving the facts testified to by the witness.’ OCGA § 24–6–621. Here, the state was properly allowed to impeach Harris by calling the rebuttal witness to give testimony disproving Harris' testimony by showing that he had in fact engaged in improper sexual contact with another minor girl prior to the child molestation incident to which he pled guilty.” Wright v. State, 296 Ga. 276, 766 S.E.2d 439 (November 24, 2014). Malice murder and related convictions affirmed; under pre-2013 Evidence Code, trial court properly admitted evidence of co-defendant’s guilty plea hearing, including prosecutor’s recitation of factual basis “and the portions of the plea transcript addressing [co-defendant] Stokes's attorney's representation of him at the hearing.” Evidence was admitted to rebut co-defendant’s “Stokes's trial testimony that he did not know the facts underlying the charges against him when he entered his guilty pleas, and that his pleas were coerced. As such, the evidence was admissible … under former OCGA § 24–9–82.” No confrontation objection was made. Wilkins v. State, 291 Ga. 483, 731 S.E.2d 346 (September 10, 2012). Murder and related convictions affirmed; where defendant’s mother “twice testified that no one from the State called her,” trial court properly allowed State to impeach her with “evidence, including a recorded phone call, showing that an investigator called Ms. Wilkins but she refused to speak with him. This evidence was properly admitted pursuant to § 24–9–82 because it disproved Ms. Wilkins' testimony and was relevant to the issue of her credibility. Contrary to appellant's argument, the fact that the evidence may have shown Ms. Wilkins was not cooperative with investigators did not unconstitutionally shift to appellant the burden of proving his innocence.” Coleman v. State, 286 Ga. 291, 687 S.E.2d 427 (November 9, 2009). At defendant’s trial for murder and related charges, trial court erred in admitting “a photograph of [defendant’s] girlfriend showing facial injuries purportedly inflicted by Coleman.” Girlfriend was not the victim in the case on trial; evidence was introduced to impeach defendant’s testimony that he “respected women.” Defendant denied striking his girlfriend, and no evidence was tendered showing that he did it.