☢ test - Í

“‘In the impeachment situation, the State may introduce evidence reflecting negatively on the defendant's character only insofar as that evidence proves the falsity of specific testimony of the defendant.’ Porter v. State, 254 Ga. 388(2) (330 S.E.2d 94) (1985). … In the absence of evidence connecting Coleman to the injuries depicted in the photo, the photo was not appropriate impeachment evidence and the trial court erred in admitting it.” Harmless, however, in light of overwhelming evidence of guilt. Hardy v. State, 293 Ga.App. 265, 666 S.E.2d 730 (July 24, 2008). Trial court properly denied defendant’s motion for new trial; victim’s testimony was not susceptible to being stricken based on an inconsistency between the testimony and her divorce petition against defendant, filed nine months later. At trial, victim “testified that she was leaving Hardy for personal reasons and not because of any alleged affair of his with another woman. At the motion-for-new-trial hearing, Hardy presented evidence that in her verified divorce petition (filed after the incident at issue but before trial), the victim had listed adultery as one of the grounds for divorce.” “OCGA § 24-9-85(b) provides: ‘If a witness shall willfully and knowingly swear falsely, his testimony shall be disregarded entirely, unless corroborated by circumstances or other unimpeached evidence.’ Interpreting this statute, the Georgia Supreme Court held that ‘the testimony which must be disregarded in its entirety is only that testimony which is wilfully and knowingly false.’ (Emphasis omitted.) Fugitt v. State, 251 Ga. 451, 452-453(1) (307 S.E.2d 471) (1983). There must be a ‘showing that the victim's testimony was wilfully and knowingly false or that the testimony was such as to render the purpose to falsify manifest.’ (Punctuation omitted.) Turner v. State, 245 Ga.App. 294, 297(4)(d) (536 S.E.2d 814) (2000).” “[E]ven if this testimony were inconsistent, inconsistent testimony alone does not rise to the level of false swearing. See Turner, supra, 245 Ga.App. at 297(4)(d). Moreover, assuming this portion of her testimony were a knowing and wilful false swearing, we hold that only that portion of the testimony, not her entire testimony, would be disregarded. See Fugitt, supra, 251 Ga. at 452-453(1). The portion setting forth Hardy's aggravated assault and possession of a firearm would remain intact.” McKnight v. State, 283 Ga. 56, 656 S.E.2d 830 (January 28, 2008). Where defendant testified that “he had never associated with [State’s witness] Gerardo Daniels and had no dealings with him,” State was properly allowed to cross- examine defendant about the rape and robbery in which defendant and Daniels had been involved, one month before the murder on trial. “The trial court properly allowed the state to question McKnight about this issue to show that he did have a relationship with Daniels.” Lindsey v. State, 282 Ga. 447, 651 S.E.2d 66 (September 24, 2007). Defendant’s murder conviction reversed; trial court erred when it allowed cross-examination of defendant about some two dozen prior misdemeanor arrests when he testified on direct that “he had never been convicted of a felony or any crimes of violence. His remark that he is not a violent person is at best an inadvertent statement of his good character. [fn5: We will not consider defense counsel’s purported remarks in opening statement as injecting character or as a basis to impeach Lindsey. First, there is no record of any such statement, but even if there were, it is axiomatic that opening statement is not evidence and has no probative value. See Suggested Pattern Jury Instructions, Vol. II: Criminal Cases, Third Ed., § 1.30.10. The jury in this case was so instructed. ] … [ T]he law is clear that where ‘a defendant testifies he has no prior convictions, his testimony is not subject to rebuttal by proof of prior arrests. ’ Jones [ v. State, 257 Ga. 753, 759(1)(a) (363 S.E.2d 529) (1988)].” “Here, Lindsey did not testify untruthfully about his criminal record and he did not testify that he had no prior arrests. [Cits.]” Based on pre-2005 version of OCGA § 24-9-20(b). Vonhagel v. State, 287 Ga.App. 507, 651 S.E.2d 793 (September 11, 2007). After defendant testified that he had not pointed his gun at victim and “would never ever do anything like that,” State was properly allowed to impeach this statement with evidence of another incident where defendant pointed his gun at another motorist during a traffic incident. Doyal v. State, 287 Ga.App. 667, 653 S.E.2d 52 (August 7, 2007). “Doyal asserts that the trial court erred by granting the State’s motion to exclude evidence that she had passed random drug tests administered by her employers. … To the extent that the trial court excluded the tests on the grounds of relevance, it erred. For the reasons stated in Division Four [“this evidence was admissible to rebut or impeach the police officers’ testimony that she admitted to them that she used drugs”], the test results were admissible to rebut the police officer’s testimony that Doyal was an admitted drug user and not improper character evidence. See Lockaby v. State, 265 Ga.App. 527, 529-530(2) (594 S.E.2d 729) (2004) (trial court did not err by allowing state to question defendant about any prior positive drug screens to impeach his unsolicited assertion that the drug screen that was the basis of his prosecution was his only positive drug screen).” Walsh v. State, 283 Ga.App. 817, 642 S.E.2d 879 (March 1, 2007). “Under OCGA § 24-9-82, a witness ‘may be