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impeached by disproving the facts testified to by him,’ and no foundation (other than the witness’s own testimony) is required in order to do so. Deaton v. Swanson, 196 Ga. 833, 837(2) (28 S.E.2d 126) (1943). Here, while his true name was still in issue, Walsh testified that he had never held a Georgia driver’s license, and then denied that he had ever had such a license suspended or been convicted of driving with a suspended license. The court did not abuse its discretion when it allowed the state to introduce evidence disproving the facts to which Walsh had testified. See Renn v. State, 234 Ga.App. 790, 791(1) (508 S.E.2d 174) (1998) ( state could impeach defendant’s testimony that he had never taken a breath alcohol test by questioning him about his prior DUI conviction).” Thus, driver history showing that defendant had been issued a Georgia driver’s license was properly admitted. Likewise, prior criminal convictions were properly admitted to show the name used by defendant, where defendant was charged with giving a false name and his correct name was in issue. Vehaun v. State , 244 Ga.App. 136, 534 S.E.2d 873 (May 22, 2000). Aggravated child molestation and related offenses affirmed; impeachment of defendant was proper. On direct, defendant explained that he had been found carrying two sets of ID, using two different names, “to protect himself because of continuing problems he had in North Carolina with a girlfriend's ex-husband. Subsequently, the prosecutor questioned him, over his objection, about whether he changed his name because the authorities in North Carolina were looking for him because he had been accused of rape in that state. [fn: Although not introduced in evidence, the prosecutor had evidence of the charge. ] Vehaun denied that he left North Carolina for this reason and denied that any such charge was made against him. We find no error. A defendant, like any other witness, may be impeached ‘by disproving the facts testified to by him.’ OCGA § 24–9–82. Here, the State was entitled to question Vehaun whether the reason he gave in his direct examination to explain changing his name and leaving North Carolina was untruthful. Smith v. State, 237 Ga.App. 582, 585(4), 516 S.E.2d 92 (1999).” Fortson v. State, 242 Ga.App. 304, 529 S.E.2d 429 (February 9, 2000). Burglary conviction affirmed; trial court properly admitted evidence of another offense without similar transaction notice to impeach defendant’s testimony. Defendant testified that he only committed the burglary, and forged a check taken from the victim, because his co-defendant forced him to do those things at gunpoint. “Over objection, the State was allowed to impeach Fortson by showing that about six days after the robbery, without coercion, he forged an endorsement on another check taken from [victim]. … We find no error. The procedural requirements of USCR 31.1 and 31.3 do not apply either to impeachment evidence or to evidence of similar transactions or occurrences which are immediately related in time and place to the charge being tried so as to be part of a single, continuous transaction. USCR 31.3(E). Evidence that Fortson had forged the check at issue without coercion was admissible to impeach his testimony that he had committed the earlier forgery only because he was coerced into doing so. A witness may be impeached by proving that statements made by him in his testimony are not the truth. Middle Ga. &c. R. Co. v. Barnett, 104 Ga. 582, 584(1), 30 S.E. 771 (1898). Moreover, Fortson's forgery of a check taken in the robbery several days after its occurrence was sufficiently connected in time and event to the robbery so that both offenses were part of a single transaction. See Baird v. State, 207 Ga.App. 44, 45(2), 427 S.E.2d 37 (1993); Branam v. State, 204 Ga.App. 205, 208(5), 419 S.E.2d 86 (1992).” Hernandez v. State, 238 Ga.App. 796, 520 S.E.2d 798 (June 30, 1999). At defendant’s DUI trial, trial court properly admitted evidence of defendant’s prior DUI arrests to impeach defendant’s claim that he didn’t understand the implied consent warning. The arrests “established that he had been given his implied consent warnings on these two prior occasions, because such tests may be administered only after the accused has been given the warnings. OCGA § 40- 5-67.1(b); Long v. State, 185 Ga.App. 277, 278(1), 363 S.E.2d 807 (1987). The trial court was authorized to find that Hernandez opened the door to being questioned on this subject, that the fact that he had submitted to chemical tests after having been given the warnings twice before increased the likelihood that he understood the warnings on this occasion, and that the probative value of the elicited testimony outweighed its prejudicial effect. We find no abuse of discretion. There is no merit in Hernandez's complaint that certified copies of his DUI convictions should have been admitted. This amounts to a best evidence objection, which was not raised at trial and was therefore waived. Moret v. State, 246 Ga. 5, 6(3), 268 S.E.2d 635 (1980). Moreover, the State was seeking to impeach Hernandez with evidence concerning the circumstances of his arrest, not his criminal conviction. Therefore, the State was not required to prove the conviction, by introducing a certified copy or otherwise. See Wadsworth v. State, 209 Ga.App. 333, 334(5), 433 S.E.2d 419 (1993); compare Hood v. State, 179 Ga.App. 387, 389(1), 346 S.E.2d 867 (1986). 6. FALSE ACCUSATIONS Morgan v. State, A16A0531, ___ Ga.App. ___, ___ S.E.2d ___, 2016 WL 1726137 (May 2, 2016). Child molestation conviction affirmed; trial court properly excluded evidence of child’s prior accusation against step-father. Evidence showed that the accusation was true, but didn’t meet the legal definition of child molestation where “the victim