☢ test - Í

stated that her stepfather had put his hand down the back of her pants in an effort to retrieve a cigarette he had dropped, and that he would often touch or rub his private area in front of her.” At its core, Morgan’s argument is that the victim lied because she attached an incorrect legal term to the true facts she alleged. But … a victim’s imprecise use of legal terminology does not render truthful allegations false.” Brown v. State, 318 Ga.App. 334, 733 S.E.2d 863 (November 2, 2012). Child molestation and related convictions affirmed; trial court properly excluded evidence that victim’s aunt had made a prior false accusation of rape against her own boyfriend. “The trial court made a preliminary determination that the aunt's accusation against her boyfriend and the victim's against Brown had no connection. … Moreover, although there was evidence that the aunt confronted Brown about his suspicious appearance at the movie theater and accompanied the girls to the sheriff's office, there was no evidence that the aunt reported the actual attack at the motel to authorities. See Lane v. State, 223 Ga.App. 740, 743(5) (479 S.E.2d 350) (1996) (trial court did not abuse its discretion when it limited examination regarding a victim's relative's prior false accusation when the relative was not the person to report the crime charged in the case-in-chief); compare Wand v. State, 230 Ga.App. 460, 466 (496 S.E.2d 771) (1998) (physical precedent only; Smith, J., concurring specially) (where victim's mother reported a sexual attack to the police, evidence of ‘prior similar false allegations could impact on her credibility and propensity for making such allegations’).” Puckett v. State, 310 Ga.App. 153, 712 S.E.2d 579 (June 20, 2011). Child molestation conviction affirmed; trial court properly excluded grandmother’s “false allegation of physical child abuse” of the victim by the child’s mother, as irrelevant. Defendant sought to show that the grandmother had falsely accused the child’s mother of pushing the child down stairs. State objected, noting that the stairs incident occurred some six months after defendant’s crime, and didn’t involve sexual abuse. Trial court thus properly concluded that the allegation was not relevant. Although defendant contended that the evidence shed light on the state of feelings between the witness and the parties, “‘if that particular feeling would have no relevance to the questions being tried by the jury, then such evidence may be excluded in the sound discretion of the trial court,’” quoting Lockett v. State, 217 Ga.App. 328, 330(2) (457 S.E.2d 579) (1995) (physical precedent only). Birkbeck v. State, 292 Ga.App. 424, 665 S.E.2d 354 (June 18, 2008). Fact that defendant was acquitted of same victim’s prior attempted rape accusation did not make that charge a “false accusation” absent such a finding by the trial court. “Although the jury found Birkbeck not guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the attempted rape charge at his first trial, that is a different standard from the one the trial court uses to determine the admissibility of evidence of prior false allegations. In light of H.L.’s detailed testimony at the first trial concerning the March 30 incident, Birkbeck has not made the requisite ‘strong showing’ that he would have prevailed had trial counsel sought to admit the evidence in question.” Trial counsel was thus not ineffective for failing to admit evidence of the prior accusation. Roberts v. State, 286 Ga.App. 346, 648 S.E.2d 783 (July 5, 2007). No abuse of discretion where trial court found that defendant had met his burden of proving “a reasonable probability” that one of victim’s prior allegations of child abuse was false, but not a second one. Victim had made both allegations in a letter to her therapist – one that defendant had forced the entire family to go streaking, and the other that victim had been molested by her cousin. Defendant’s son testified, denying the streaking incident; the cousin testified, denying that he molested victim. Trial court found “a reasonable probability” that the streaking allegation was false, but not the incident involving the cousin. “‘ Of course, the fact that an accused states that the accusation against him is false is hardly evidence sufficient to raise a reasonable probability of falsity.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Williams v. State, 266 Ga.App. 578, 580(1) (597 S.E.2d 621) (2004).” Although the testimony was supported by the finding of falsity of the other accusation, the trial court did not abuse its discretion. Menard v. State, 281 Ga.App. 698, 637 S.E.2d 105 (September 27, 2006). Trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to admit evidence of prior alleged false accusation of child molestation by victim. “‘ [E]vidence of prior false accusations is admissible to attack the credibility of the prosecutrix and as substantive evidence tending to prove that the instant offense did not occur. [Cits.]’ Smith v. State, 259 Ga. 135, 137 (377 S.E.2d 158) (1989). But ‘before such evidence can be admitted, the trial court must make a “threshold determination (outside the presence of the jury) that a reasonable probability of falsity exists.”’ Id. The defendant has the burden of coming forward with appropriate evidence. Holmes v. State, 263 Ga.App. 644(1) (588 S.E.2d 825) (2003). The trial court’s ruling will not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion. Strickland v. State, 205 Ga.App. 473, 474 (422 S.E.2d 312) (1992).” “We have consistently held that a denial by the accused that is not supported by other evidence is insufficient to meet the required standard. See, e.g., Williams v. State, 266 Ga.App. 578, 580-581 (597 S.E.2d 621) (2004); Gilmer v. State, 234 Ga.App.