☢ test - Í

309, 310(2) (506 S.E.2d 452) (1998). Also, the fact that the accused is never prosecuted is also insufficient to meet the standard. Williams, 266 Ga.App. at 580-581, and cases cited therein.” Accord, Osborne v. State , 291 Ga.App. 711, 662 S.E.2d 792 (May 29, 2008) (defendant “failed to establish with reasonable probability” that the child’s prior allegations were false); Rayner v. State , 307 Ga.App. 861, 706 S.E.2d 205 (February 15, 2011) (same as Osborne ); Walker v. State , 308 Ga.App. 176, 707 S.E.2d 122 (March 3, 2011) (same as Osborne ); Mauldin v. State , 313 Ga.App. 228, 721 S.E.2d 182 (December 7, 2011) (same as Osborne ). Williams v. State, 266 Ga.App. 578, 597 S.E.2d 621 (March 25, 2004). “Williams … asserts that the accusation must have been false because even though the victim reported it, [the other alleged molester] was never prosecuted. But this indicates only that insufficient evidence existed at the time for a charge to be brought; it does not address the truth or falsity of the accusation. This court has held a number of times that the fact that an accusation is not prosecuted is insufficient to establish its falsity. See, e.g., Banks v. State, supra, 250 Ga.App. at 729(1); Mann v. State, 244 Ga.App. 756, 759(2) (536 S.E.2d 608) (2000); Ingram v. State, 211 Ga.App. 252, 255(5) (438 S.E.2d 708) (1993).” Accord, Walker v. State , 308 Ga.App. 176, 707 S.E.2d 122 (March 3, 2011). Eley v. State, 266 Ga.App. 45, 596 S.E.2d 660 (March 3, 2004). Trial court did not err in disallowing defendant’s proffered evidence of prior false allegation of sexual abuse by victim : “According to Eley’s proffer, in 1998, Eley, not the victim, contacted police to report that she had told him that her boyfriend ‘had gotten her drunk and had sex with her,’ but she recanted the accusation when she talked to her mother. The State proferred that the victim told Eley she was sexually active with her boyfriend because Eley, who was molesting her at the time, kept telling her that he was preparing her for adulthood and ‘kept badgering her, are you having sex with anyone, are you having sex with anyone?’ The State explained that the girl thought that Eley would finally leave her alone if she told him that she was involved in a relationship and was sexually active. After considering the context and circumstances of the allegation, the trial court determined that the victim’s prior accusation was the result of ‘coercion and duress from her alleged abuser.’ Under these circumstances, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in excluding such testimony . [Cit.]” Cheek v. State, 265 Ga.App. 15, 593 S.E.2d 55 (December 30, 2003). “Evidence that an alleged molestation victim has made prior false accusations of sexual misconduct against others is admissible. [Cit.] ‘Before admitting such evidence, however, the trial court must make a threshold determination outside the presence of the jury that there is a reasonable probability the prior accusations were false.’ [Cit.] The defendant bears the burden of establishing this ‘reasonable probability,’ which has been defined as ‘one “sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.”’ [Cit.]” Trial court could find that defendant did not bear this burden despite prior accused’s testimony that the allegations were untrue. “An accused’s assertion that the accusations against him are false does not necessarily raise a reasonable probability of falsity.” Accord, Frazier v. State , 278 Ga.App. 685, 629 S.E.2d 568 (April 7, 2006); Pollio v. State , 278 Ga.App. 729, 629 S.E.2d 583 (April 11, 2006). Mann v. State, 244 Ga.App. 756, 536 S.E.2d 608 (June 30, 2000). Child molestation and related convictions affirmed; no error in excluding victim’s prior allegations of molestation. “The defendant has the burden of coming forward with evidence establishing a reasonable probability that the victim made a prior false allegation of molestation. See Kelley v. State, 233 Ga.App. 244, 251(5), 503 S.E.2d 881 (1998). The trial court heard Mann's proffer outside the presence of the jury and determined that no reasonable probability of falsity existed. The only evidence tending to show that V.E.'s prior allegations of molestation were false is the fact that the officer investigating the matter had failed to seek an arrest warrant for the alleged molester for more than one year after the complaint was made. That fact is not sufficient to establish that the allegations were false. Id.” Long v. State, 241 Ga.App. 370, 526 S.E.2d 875 (December 8, 1999). Convictions for child molestation and related offenses affirmed; trial court properly ruled out prior report of non-sexual abuse made by victim against a third party. Victim alleged that the other perpetrator “‘was trying to hit me in the face’ by slinging a belt.” “ The evidence proffered in this case did not involve prior false accusations of sexual misconduct and so fell within the general rule that proof of bad character cannot be proven by specific bad acts. Postell v. State, 261 Ga. 842, 843(2), 412 S.E.2d 831 (1992). The trial court correctly excluded the proffered evidence as legally irrelevant.” Accord, Dean v. State , 321 Ga.App. 731, 742 S.E.2d 758 (May 7, 2013) (molestation victim’s prior false allegation of murder properly excluded). Trusty v. State, 237 Ga.App. 839, 517 S.E.2d 91 (April 29, 1999). “‘Evidence of prior false accusations of sexual misconduct made by the prosecutrix is admissible to attack the credibility of the prosecutrix and as substantive evidence