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under its ruling in Lamar v. Pearre, 90 Ga. 377 (17 S.E. 92) (1892), “statements contained in a petition, plea or answer filed in a civil case, and signed by counsel, though not verified or signed by the person apparently represented by such counsel, would be admissible against him in the trial of another civil case to which such person was a party. That ruling, however, is not applicable to criminal cases. Admissions by agents or attorneys are not admissible in criminal cases in the sense in which they are admissible in civil cases. (Cits.) They should not be treated as evidence against the accused unless shown to have been authorized by him.” Farmer v. State, 100 Ga. 41, 45-46 (28 S.E. 26) (1896).’” Although Carter involves a motion, not a pleading, and a witness, not the defendant, Court of Appeals holds that same rule should apply: “the pertinent inquiry is whether the statement in the document sought to be used against the witness has been shown to be authorized by the witness. In this case, the motion was prepared and signed by [witness] Alonso's attorney; the motion was not signed by Alonso, and there was no affidavit or verification attached to the motion. Alonso did not testify at the motion to suppress hearing. And although she testified at Carter's trial that her attorney ‘reviewed’ the motion with her prior to filing, it is not clear whether this meant Alonso read the entire motion or the attorney just went over some or parts of it with her. Moreover, although she was asked generally whether the statements in the motion were true, and she responded ‘to the best of [her] knowledge’ she was not specifically asked about any particular statement contained in the motion such that it can be said that she authorized the specific statement in question. Under these circumstances, and applying the appropriate standard of review, [fn] we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to allow the statement in the motion to suppress to be admitted at trial. Cf. Snell v. State, 158 Ga.App. 860, 861(2) (282 S.E.2d 408) (1981) (stipulation between prosecutor and defense counsel as to certain facts which was made in defendant's presence held to be binding on defendant at trial); Beckworth v. State, 183 Ga. 871, 873(4) (190 S.E. 184, 185) (1937) (letter written by the witness admissible to impeach her contradictory testimony at trial).” 14. PRIOR MISCONDUCT – ADJUDICATION OF DELINQUENCY IN JUVENILE COURT Kurtz v State, 287 Ga.App. 823, 652 S.E.2d 858 (October 12, 2007). “Under Georgia law, an adjudication of delinquency in a juvenile court is presumed to be inadmissible to impeach a witness in a criminal case. OCGA § 24-9-84.1(d).” 15. PRIOR MISCONDUCT – CRIMES OF MORAL TURPITUDE/CRIME INVOLVING DISHONESTY Hites v. State, 296 Ga. 528, 769 S.E.2d 364 (February 16, 2015). Felony murder conviction affirmed; under pre-2013 evidence code, evidence of defendant’s prior conviction for mail fraud properly admitted. Defendant waived any objection based on lack of notice required by OCGA § 24–9–84.1(b), by failing to raise the objection when the evidence was offered. “See Young v. State, 290 Ga. 392, 400(9), 721 S.E.2d 855 (2012) (alleged error of deficient notice that prior convictions would be entered into evidence during presentence hearing deemed waived when no objection made at hearing).” Warbington v. State, 316 Ga.App. 614, 730 S.E.2d 90 (July 5, 2012). Convictions for aggravated assault and related offenses affirmed; where defendant chose not to testify at trial, he couldn’t challenge pretrial ruling allowing admission of his prior convictions for impeachment purposes. Based on Luce v. United States , 469 U.S. 38, 43(III) (105 S.Ct. 460, 83 L.Ed.2d 443) (1984): ““to raise and preserve for review the claim of improper impeachment with a prior conviction [under FRE 609], a defendant must testify.” “We are guided by Linares v. State, 266 Ga. 812 (471 S.E.2d 208) (1996) (albeit decided prior to the enactment of OCGA § 24–9–84.1 [fn: Ga. L.2005, p. 20, § 16. ] ), wherein the Supreme Court of Georgia cited Luce precisely for its holding that ‘[a] defendant must testify to obtain review of [a] trial court's in limine ruling on the admissibility of a prior conviction for impeachment under Fed.R.Evid. 609.’ Linares, supra at 815(3) n. 16. Similar to the ruling contested here, the ruling at issue in Linares was the trial court's decision that the state could use for impeachment purposes the defendant's involuntary police statement, if he took the stand. Id. at 815(3). Like the circumstances here, the defendant in Linares did not take the stand and the state did not introduce the ‘impeachment’ evidence. Id. at 814(3). And, like the argument posited in this case, the contention in Linares was that the trial court's evidentiary ruling had effectively deprived him of his constitutional right to testify. Id. The Linares Court cited the Luce holding in declining to reach the merits because, given the state of the record, ‘any review of his constitutional claim would be speculative.’ Id. at 814–815(3). We conclude that the rationale underlying Luce and Linares controls here, where Warbington did not testify. The record consequently is not amenable to meaningful appellate review. [Cits.] Because Warbington declined to testify, we will not speculate on the substantive merits of his contention that the trial court's pretrial ruling was prejudicial error. [fn].” Green v. State, 291 Ga. 287, 728 S.E.2d 668 (June 25, 2012). Malice murder and related convictions affirmed; trial court properly ruled out impeachment of rape victim with her prior conviction for prostitution. “A prostitution conviction is