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inadmissible under [OCGA § 24–9–84.1(a)(3)], as it is not in the nature of crimen falsi, involving some element of dishonesty or false statement.” Damerow v. State, 310 Ga.App. 530, 714 S.E.2d 82 (July 6, 2011). Child molestation conviction affirmed; trial court properly admitted defendant’s prior convictions for felony forgery, theft by deception, and giving a false name as impeachment. “[T]he prior convictions were admissible under OCGA § 24–9–84.1(a)(3) since they each involved dishonesty or making a false statement, and bore directly upon Damerow's truthfulness and veracity. See Whatley v. State, 296 Ga.App. 72,, 673 S.E.2d 510 (2009) (concluding that a witness's prior convictions for forgery and giving a false name to a police officer were admissible under OCGA § 24–9–84.1(a)(3)); Habersham v. State, 289 Ga.App. 718, 720–721(4)(a), 658 S.E.2d 253 (2008) (concluding that a defendant's prior conviction for giving a false name to a police officer was admissible for purposes of impeachment); Scott v. State, 277 Ga.App. 876, 878(1), 627 S.E.2d 904 (2006) (‘A person commits the offense of theft by deception when he obtains property by any deceitful means or artful practice with the intention of depriving the owner of the property.’); Hall v. State, 180 Ga.App. 210, 212, 348 S.E.2d 736 (1986) (concluding that a defendant's prior conviction of forgery was ‘a crime of moral turpitude which [went] directly to the defendant's truthfulness and veracity.’).” Gibbs v. State, 288 Ga. 638, 706 S.E.2d 428 (February 28, 2011). Malice murder and firearms convictions affirmed; defendant’s prior convictions for giving false name and date of birth to an officer were properly admitted as impeachment. “[T]he trial court expressly admitted the evidence pursuant to OCGA § 24-9-84.1(a)(3), which provides, ‘For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, or of the defendant, if the defendant testifies: ... [e]vidence that any witness or the defendant has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if it involved dishonesty or making a false statement, regardless of the punishment that could be imposed for such offense.’ And, that is precisely the situation in this case. Gibbs testified that he had not lied to police regarding his whereabouts on the day of the shooting, so the State, for the purpose of attacking his credibility, was authorized under the statutory provision to introduce evidence that Gibbs was previously convicted of making false statements to law enforcement.” Allen v. State, 286 Ga. 392, 687 S.E.2d 799 (January 25, 2010). Trial court properly excluded proffered impeachment by felony convictions more than 10 years old. “[S]uch evidence is not admissible if ‘more than ten years has elapsed since the date of the conviction or the release of the witness ... from the confinement imposed for that conviction, whichever is the later date, unless the court determines, in the interest of justice, that the probative value of the conviction supported by specific facts and circumstances substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect.’” Defendant contends that “confinement” includes probation, but Supreme Court disagrees. “[P]robation does not qualify as confinement under OCGA § 24-9- 84.1(b). Accordingly, the trial court did not err when it declined to permit defense counsel to use the prior convictions at issue after determining that more than ten years had elapsed since the witness was released from the confinement resulting from the convictions, and that defense counsel had not provided specific facts and circumstances demonstrating that the probative value of the convictions outweighed their prejudicial effect.” Conn v. State, 300 Ga.App. 193, 685 S.E.2d 745 (September 23, 2009). At defendant’s 2004 child molestation trial, trial court properly gave charge on impeachment by conviction involving moral turpitude, based on defendant’s prior conviction for public indecency. “The parties cite to no Georgia authority addressing whether a public indecency conviction involves moral turpitude for the purpose of witness impeachment, and we have found none. But the Supreme Court of Georgia has treated misdemeanor public indecency as a crime involving moral turpitude in the context of attorney discipline. See In re: Threlkeld, 273 Ga. 331 (539 S.E.2d 823) (2001) . We find that the trial court did not err in giving the impeachment charge.” Jacobs v. State, 299 Ga.App. 368, 683 S.E.2d 64 (July 24, 2009). Use of theft convictions for impeachment was improper under OCGA § 24-9-84.1(a), “absent evidence which demonstrates that the theft conviction at issue was a felony or involved fraud or deceit, which the State failed to produce in this case.” “Under OCGA § 24-9-84.1(a), when used for the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that the witness has been convicted of a felony or of a crime which involved dishonesty or making a false statement shall be admissible. Theft by taking is not a crime which necessarily involves dishonesty or making a false statement. Adams v. State, 284 Ga.App. 534, 540(3) (644 S.E.2d 426) (2007) (physical precedent only).” Accord, Clements v. State , 299 Ga.App. 561, 683 S.E.2d 127 (August 5, 2009); Martin v. State , 300 Ga.App. 39, 684 S.E.2d 111 (September 3, 2009); McClain v. State , 301 Ga.App. 844, 689 S.E.2d 126 (January 5, 2010) (no ineffective assistance for failure to use misdemeanor theft by taking charge as impeachment, absent evidence of fraud or deceit as part of the offense); Parks v. State , 304 Ga.App. 175, 695 S.E.2d 704 (May 25, 2010) (same as McClain ); Boatright v. State , 308 Ga.App. 266, 707 S.E.2d 158 (March 8, 2011) (same as McClain ); Ellis