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v. State , 316 Ga.App. 352, 729 S.E.2d 492 (June 25, 2012) (same as McClain , citing Boatright ). Blanch v. State, 293 Ga.App. 750, 667 S.E.2d 925 (September 30, 2008). “Blanch was convicted of possessing soap, a non-controlled substance, with the intent to distribute it as crack cocaine, a controlled substance. See OCGA § 16-13- 30.1(a)(1). As the trial court noted, this was a crime of fraud involving the knowing misrepresentation that soap was cocaine. It follows that the trial court did not err when it admitted this conviction under OCGA § 24-9-84.1(a)(3).” Allen v. State, 292 Ga.App. 133, 663 S.E.2d 370 (May 12, 2008). Proof of prior convictions, offered in impeachment of defendant to disprove his testimony claiming innocence of the offenses charged, could also be used for impeachment by crimes involving moral turpitude. Habersham v. State, 289 Ga.App. 718, 658 S.E.2d 253 (February 22, 2008). “OCGA § 24-9-84.1 does not require the trial court to balance the probative value of [prior conviction impeachment] evidence against any prejudicial effect.” Shelnutt v. State, 289 Ga.App. 528, 657 S.E.2d 611 (February 7, 2008). “ Woods v. State, 210 Ga.App. 172 (435 S.E.2d 464) (1993), recognized that instances of specific misconduct can ‘not be used to impeach a witness’ character or veracity unless the misconduct has resulted in the conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, and the proper method of proving such a conviction is by the introduction of a certified copy thereof.’ [fn: Id. at 173(1) (citations and punctuation omitted). The term ‘moral turpitude’ encompasses all felonies. Hall v. Hall, 261 Ga. 188 (402 S.E.2d 726) (1991). With the 2005 enactment of OCGA § 24-9-84.1(a)(1) and (2), evidence that a witness or defendant has been convicted of a felony shall be admitted if the court determines that the probative value of admitting the evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect. ] ” Accord, Palmer v. State , 299 Ga.App. 192, 682 S.E.2d 323 (July 15, 2009). Tate v. State, 289 Ga.App. 479, 657 S.E.2d 531 (January 8, 2008). In defendant’s prosecution for interference with government property (kicking window out of police car), defendant’s prior conviction for damaging government property (damaging metal bed and partition in jail cell) was properly admitted to impeach his version of the prior events, although prior incident occurred more than 10 years earlier. “Generally, evidence of prior convictions may be used to attack the credibility of a witness or the defendant if such evidence is of a crime punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year and ‘the court determines that the probative value of admitting the evidence substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect to the defendant.’ OCGA § 24-9-84.1(a)(2). Evidence of a prior conviction under this rule is not admissible, however, if ‘more than ten years has elapsed since the date of the conviction or of the release of the witness or the defendant from the confinement imposed for that conviction, whichever is the later date, unless the court determines, in the interest of justice, that the probative value of the conviction supported by specific facts and circumstances substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect.’ OCGA § 24-9-84.1(b); Hinton v. State, 280 Ga. 811, 819(7) (631 S.E.2d 365) (2006). Here, in evaluating the admissibility of the 1993 conviction at an out-of-court hearing, the trial court observed that Tate was being tried for the same offense of which he had earlier been convicted and that he had committed such prior offense without claiming that he did so only as a result of his inability to breathe. In addressing itself to the question of admissibility, the trial court thus properly focused on whether, in light of his 1993 guilty plea, Tate’s previous conviction indicated a probable lack of veracity rather than a propensity to commit the crime of which he was charged. See U.S. v. Chilcote, 724 F.2d 1498, 1503(III) (11th Cir., 1984) (holding that when a prior conviction is introduced to impeach the credibility of a witness ‘care must be taken to ensure that the evidence admitted is used only to impeach the witness and not as substantive evidence against the defendant. [Cit .]’) Given the foregoing, the trial court admitted Tate’s prior conviction, finding that its probative value as to Tate’s credibility substantially outweighed its prejudicial effect.” Ruffin v. State, 289 Ga. 87, 656 S.E.2d 140 (January 8, 2008). “ While dying declarations are subject to impeachment, e.g., Washington v. State, 137 Ga. 218(5), 73 S.E. 512 (1911) (dying declarant’s inconsistent statements may be used for impeachment), evidence that the victim in this case had prior felony convictions was not relevant for that purpose. See Green v. State, 195 Ga. 759(6), 25 S.E.2d 502 (1943) (evidence that deceased brought witness some liquor on day of killing did not serve to impeach dying declaration).” Adams v. State, 284 Ga.App. 534, 644 S.E.2d 426 (March 27, 2007). Under OCGA § 24-9-84.1(a)(3), a prior misdemeanor theft conviction is not automatically a crime involving “dishonesty” which is admissible to impeach a witness or defendant. Following a majority of federal circuit courts’ interpretation of Federal Rules of Evidence Rule 609(a)(2), upon which the 2005 Georgia statute is based. “In Georgia, prior to the enactment of OCGA § 24-9-84.1, a witness could be impeached by proof of general bad character or by proof that the witness had been convicted of a crime