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of moral turpitude. Sapp v. State , 271 Ga. 446, 448(2) (520 S.E.2d 462) (1999). Under that rule, theft and shoplifting were considered crimes of moral turpitude. Id. Instead of expressly codifying the existing law, the legislature adopted the language of the federal rule, thus using ‘dishonesty or false statement’ instead of ‘moral turpitude.’ Had the legislature intended for the new law to be applied in the same manner as the existing law, it seems logical that it would have used the same language. We are persuaded by the reasoning of the Eleventh Circuit, other federal circuit courts and many state courts that, for impeachment purposes, crimes of ‘dishonesty’ are limited to those crimes that bear upon a witness’s propensity to testify truthfully. While we are not bound by decisions of the federal circuit courts, they are persuasive. McKeen v. FDIC , 274 Ga. 46, 48 n. 1 (549 S.E.2d 104) (2001); see Hinton [ v. State , 280 Ga. 811, 819 (631 S.E.2d 365) (2006)].” “Accordingly, we conclude that Adams’s prior conviction for misdemeanor theft by receiving stolen property is not a crime involving dishonesty within the meaning of OCGA § 24-9-84.1(a)(3). The trial court therefore erred by admitting it.” Harmless error, however. Smith concurs specially, would hold that theft is a crime involving dishonesty based on dictionary definition of dishonesty, without regard to federal precedent. Distinguished, Whitaker v. State , 283 Ga. 521, 661 S.E.2d 557 (May 19, 2008) ( Adams doesn’t apply to impeachment under OCGA § 24-9-84.1(a)(2), relating to impeachment with prior felonies); Wilkes v. State , 293 Ga.App. 724, 667 S.E.2d 705 (September 26, 2008) (same as Whitaker ). Cited with approval, Jacobs (July 24, 2009), above. Hinton v. State, 280 Ga. 811, 631 S.E.2d 365 (June 12, 2006). OCGA § 24-9-84.1, authorizing use of criminal convictions more than 10 years old for impeachment, but only in court’s discretion, does not interfere with defendant’s right to cross-examine witnesses. Hill v. State, 279 Ga.App. 402, 631 S.E.2d 446 (May 15, 2006). “[G]enerally, an adjudication of delinquency is not a conviction of a crime and may not be used to impeach a witness,” citing Baynes v. State, 218 Ga.App. 687, 690-691(4) (463 S.E.2d 144) (1995). Marks v. State, 280 Ga. 70, 623 S.E.2d 504 (December 1, 2005). “The trial court properly refused to allow Marks to impeach a State’s witness with a first offender conviction. ‘[U]nless there is an adjudication of guilt, a witness may not be impeached on general credibility grounds by evidence of a first offender record.’ Matthews v. State, 268 Ga. 798, 802(4) (493 S.E.2d 136) (1997).” Accord, Davis v. State , 287 Ga.App. 478, 651 S.E.2d 750 (August 15, 2007). Payne v. State, 273 Ga.App. 483, 615 S.E.2d 564 (May 31, 2005). Defendant sought to impeach victim with certified copy of conviction involving moral turpitude. Victim, however, testified under oath that he was not the individual named in the conviction. Defendant offered no further proof that victim was, in fact, the person named in the conviction. Held, trial court properly excluded the conviction. “‘While proper proof that a witness has been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude may be considered in determining his credibility, [Cit.] and while identity of names is presumptive evidence of identity of persons, [Cit.] this presumption is not conclusive [Cit.]; and where, as here, a certified copy of an indictment, verdict of guilty, and sentence of the court in a case involving moral turpitude, which contained the same name as that of the witness sought to be impeached, is offered for the purpose of impeaching the witness, and the witness testifies positively and unequivocally under oath that he was never indicted, tried, convicted, or sentenced for the offense therein charged in the county from which the certified record comes, the presumption arising solely from the identity of names is overcome, and the burden is shifted to the one offering the record to show that the person therein named and the witness sought to be impeached is one and the same person before such certified record would be admissible.’ Robinson v. State, 209 Ga. 650, 651(4) (75 S.E.2d 9) (1953).” McClure v. State, 278 Ga. 411, 603 S.E.2d 224 (September 27, 2004). “The trial court did not abuse its discretion by limiting [defendant’s] cross-examination of Youngker, a State’s witness, to exclude questioning about whether he committed a felony several months before the victim’s murder. [Defendant] was permitted to cross-examine Youngker regarding his previous felony convictions and instances where he had violated probation. [Defendant] was also allowed to ask Youngker about a warrant for his arrest – issued in the state of Florida – that was outstanding at the time of the murder. The trial court, however, did not permit [defendant] to cross-examine Youngker about whether he actually committed the particular felony alleged in the Florida warrant. This ruling was correct. A witness cannot be impeached by instances of specific misconduct unless that misconduct has resulted in the conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. [Cit.]” Bravo v. State, 269 Ga.App. 242, 603 S.E.2d 669 (August 6, 2004). “[A]s a juvenile crime on which she had completed her sentence, the shoplifting charge was not admissible” to impeach victim.