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Al-Amin v. State, 278 Ga. 74, 597 S.E.2d 332 (May 24, 2004). Malice murder and related convictions affirmed. Officer could not be impeached regarding a prior, unrelated shooting of a suspect where he was charged with no criminal offense. “Specific instances of prior misconduct may not be used to impeach the character or veracity of a witness ‘unless the misconduct has resulted in the conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude.’ (Punctuation omitted.) Allen v. State, 275 Ga. 64, 68(3), 561 S.E.2d 397 (2002). See also OCGA § 24-9-84.” Pitmon v. State, 265 Ga.App. 655, 595 S.E.2d 360 (February 18, 2004). Unanimous full-court opinion holds that a witness may not be impeached “with evidence of her two nolo contendere pleas to shoplifting charges,” as OCGA § 17-7-95(c) expressly provides that ‘a plea of nolo contendere shall not be used against the defendant in any court … for any purpose ’” (emphasis in Court of Appeals opinion). Overrules Tilley v. Page , 181 Ga.App. 98, 351 S.E.2d 464 (1986). Accord, Hooper v. State , 284 Ga. 824, 672 S.E.2d 638 (January 26, 2009). Armour v. State, 265 Ga.App. 569, 594 S.E.2d 765 (February 12, 2004). “[C]riminal trespass is a misdemeanor and not a crime of moral turpitude; it cannot be used for impeachment purposes.” Also, plea of nolo contendere cannot be used for impeachment purposes. Harwell v. State, 270 Ga. 765, 512 S.E.2d 892 (February 27, 2003). “[I]n the absence of an objection, the testimony of a witness admitting a prior conviction for a crime of moral turpitude is sufficient evidence of the fact to authorize a charge on impeachment by conviction. McIntyre v. State, 266 Ga. 7(4), 463 S.E.2d 476 (1995).” Disapproving Drake v. State, 245 Ga. 798(7), 267 S.E.2d 237 (1980), “[t]o the extent Drake holds that admission of an authenticated copy is the exclusive means by which a party may prove that a witness has been convicted of a crime of moral turpitude and thereby be entitled to a jury instruction on impeachment by conviction.” No error in refusing to give charge here, however, absent written request to charge. Accord, Speed v. State , 270 Ga. 688, 512 S.E.2d 896 (March 1, 1999). Mann v. State, 273 Ga. 366, 541 S.E.2d 645 (Jan. 22, 2001). Criminal defendant’s prior convictions for crimes of moral turpitude are admissible on cross-examination only if Defendant places his character in issue or says something on direct that can be rebutted with evidence of the prior conviction. However, marijuana possession is not a crime of moral turpitude and therefore is barred from admissibility upon cross-examination. See Lastinger v. Mill and Mach. Co. , 236 Ga.App. 430, 512 S.E.2d 327 (Feb. 11, 1999). Simpson v. State, 241 Ga.App. 316, 527 S.E.2d 23 (December 6, 1999). Defendant’s burglary convictions affirmed; trial court properly ruled that defense witness’s prior conviction for making false report of a crime was admissible for impeachment as a crime of moral turpitude , citing “ In re: Holland, 253 Ga. 428, 321 S.E.2d 338 (1984) (false swearing is crime of moral turpitude); Ramsey v. Powell, 244 Ga. 745, 262 S.E.2d 61 (1979) (false swearing is ‘“crime involving moral turpitude,” since it involves dishonesty’).” Sapp v. State, 271 Ga. 446, 520 S.E.2d 462 (September 13, 1999). “In order to discredit a witness on the basis of a conviction for a crime of moral turpitude, a certified copy of the record of conviction must be introduced into evidence; absent a waiver of the ‘best evidence rule,’ no other showing will suffice. [Cit.] When a witness is impeached by proper evidence of a conviction involving moral turpitude, a trial court errs when it refuses to give a requested charge on impeachment. [Cits.] Theft, shoplifting, the making of terroristic threats, and the giving of a false name to a police officer all are crimes of moral turpitude.” Conviction reversed due to trial court’s refusal to charge jury on impeachment where defendant presented evidence of prior convictions of state’s main witness. Accord, Castleberry v. State , 274 Ga. 290, 553 S.E.2d 606 (October 1, 2001); Napier v. State , 276 Ga. 769, 583 S.E.2d 825 (June 2, 2003). 16. PRIOR MISCONDUCT – FIRST OFFENDER DISCHARGE Hall v. State, 335 Ga.App. 895, 783 S.E.2d 400 (March 2, 2016). Armed robbery and related convictions affirmed. Under pre-2013 Evidence Code, trial court properly allowed “the State to impeach [defendant’s] girlfriend using her first- offender plea. At the time of trial, Hall’s girlfriend was still serving first-offender probation and had not been adjudicated guilty of that crime. … Here, the State did not use Hall’s girlfriend’s guilty plea to impeach her general credibility, but instead used it to show bias through evidence that Hall had previously attempted to accept responsibility for her criminal conduct in a different matter. … The trial court acted well within its discretion in allowing the State to explore whether Hall’s previous attempt to accept responsibility for his girlfriend’s criminal conduct may have influenced her trial testimony. See OCGA § 24–9–68 (‘The state of a witness’s feelings toward the parties and his relationship to them may always be proved for the consideration of the jury.’) [FN2: This provision in substantially the same form is now contained in the new Evidence Code at OCGA § 24–6–622. ] ; Melson v. State, 263 Ga.App. 647, 648(2), 588 S.E.2d 822 (2003)