☢ test - Í

Smith v. State, 319 Ga.App. 164, 735 S.E.2d 153 (November 30, 2012). Homicide by vehicle and related convictions affirmed; 1. no abuse of discretion in prohibiting impeachment of State’s witness with 1995 drug conviction. “In doing so, the trial court noted that it did not believe that a drug conviction was relevant to Lottie's testimony in his capacity as an eyewitness to an automobile accident. [fn] Further, the importance of Lottie's credibility was minimized by the fact that his testimony merely corroborated other overwhelming evidence regarding how the accident occurred.” 2. Failure to allow impeachment with felony conviction, less than ten years old, also wasn’t error. Conviction was from 1998, but “was not outside the ten-year time limitation because [witness] Lottie had been released from prison seven years before Smith's trial. OCGA § 24–9–84.1(b).” Accord, Crosby v. State , 319 Ga.App. 459, 735 S.E.2d 588 (December 17, 2012) (Physical precedent only; age of prior felony offered for impeachment calculated from date of witness’s release from prison). Jones v. State, 318 Ga.App. 105, 733 S.E.2d 407 (October 19, 2012). Firearms convictions affirmed; 1. trial court properly allowed State to impeach defendant with his prior aggravated assault convictions. “Here, after hearing extensive argument from the parties, the trial court expressly found that the probative value of evidence of the prior aggravated assault, a crime punishable by imprisonment of more than a year, substantially outweighed any prejudice to Jones. Jones' credibility was obviously open to attack by the state since he claimed that he was justified in the shooting death of [victim] Simmons. And his claim that he was unfairly prejudiced because his prior conviction was too similar to the murder and aggravated assault charges for which he was tried is unpersuasive since he was acquitted of those charges.” 2. Defendant couldn’t avoid admission of the prior felony by stipulating to his status as a convicted felon. Distinguishing Ross v. State , 279 Ga. 365, 614 S.E.2d 31 (May 23, 2005) (announcing “the limited rule that when (1) a defendant’s prior conviction is of the nature likely to inflame the passions of the jury and raise the risk of a conviction based on improper considerations, and (2) the purpose of the evidence is solely to prove the defendant’s status as a convicted felon, then it is an abuse of discretion for the trial court to spurn the defendant’s offer to stipulate to his prior conviction and admit the evidence to the jury.” Accord, Robinson (April 5, 2016), above. Clay v. State, 290 Ga. 822, 725 S.E.2d 260 (March 19, 2012). Interim review of capital murder prosecution. 1. Trial court properly ruled that determination of whether prior convictions are more or less than ten years old is calculated from the date of the witness’s testimony, as opposed to the date of the offense on trial. “Clearly, the purpose of OCGA § 24–9–84.1 is to properly balance the probativeness against the prejudicial effect of a witness' prior conviction on the issue of that witness' credibility. Therefore, in selecting an end date, ‘“the time of testimony is most appropriate since the jury must determine credibility at that moment. ”’ Trindle v. Sonat Marine, 697 F.Supp. 879, 882 (E.D.Pa., 1988) (quoting 3 J. Weinstein, Weinstein's Evidence, Para. 609, at 112 (1987)). Accord Whiteside [ v. Indiana, 853 N.E.2d 1021, 1028(I) (Ind.Ct.App., 2006)]. See United States v. Cathey, 591 F.2d 268, 274(III) n. 13 (5 th Cir., 1979) (noting that the concern is the witness' credibility when he testifies and, thus, that the correct end point may be that date, which in protracted cases could be considerably later than the trial commencement date previously adopted by that court).” This is especially true considering that the subsection applies to all witnesses, not just the defendant on trial. “[W]e adopt the date the witness testifies or the evidence of the prior conviction is introduced as the end point for determining whether a conviction falls within the ten-year limit prescribed by OCGA § 24–9–84.1(b).” 2. Factors to weigh in admitting prior offenses for impeachment. “[L]ooking to federal courts and our sister state courts for guidance, we note that most courts utilize a five-factor analysis for weighing a prior conviction's probity regarding the accused's veracity against the prejudice to the accused under Federal Rule 609(b) or an analogous state evidentiary rule. This analysis includes the following factors: (1) the nature, i.e., impeachment value of the crime; (2) the time of the conviction and the defendant's subsequent history; (3) the similarity between the past crime and the charged crime, so that admitting the prior conviction does not create an unacceptable risk that the jury will consider it as evidence that the defendant committed the crime for which he is on trial; (4) the importance of the defendant's testimony; and (5) the centrality of the credibility issue. See United States v. Pritchard, 973 F.2d 905, 908–909 (11 th Cir., 1992); Jeffrey Bellin, Circumventing Congress: How the Federal Courts Opened the Door to Impeaching Criminal Defendants with Prior Convictions, 42 U.C. Davis L.Rev. 289, 317 n. 110 (2008) (stating that this ‘five-factor framework, or a close variant,’ governs review of impeachment rulings in 10 of the 12 federal circuits that consider criminal appeals and many state jurisdictions that are governed by evidentiary rules that are analogous to Federal Rule 609). [fn] While this list is not exhaustive and we recognize that a trial court has the discretion to consider other factors as it may deem appropriate in a particular case, we find that these five factors outline the basic concerns relevant to the required balancing. See 6 Weinstein's Federal Evidence § 609.04(2)(a). Accordingly, we adopt the application of these five factors in conducting the balancing required under OCGA § 24–9–84.1(b).” 3. A trial court is not “required to give specific