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reasons for its ruling on the probity of the prior convictions under subsection (a)(2),” overruling Abercrombie v. State, 297 Ga.App. 522, 524(1) (677 S.E.2d 719) (2009) and Quiroz v. State, 291 Ga.App. 423, 428(4) (662 S.E.2d 235) (2008) “to the extent [they] hold otherwise.” Accord, Smith v. State , 331 Ga.App. 296, 771 S.E.2d 8 (March 19, 2015). 4. As to convictions more than ten years old, however, specific on-the-record findings are required under subsection (b). “[W]e hold that a trial court must make an on-the-record finding of the specific facts and circumstances upon which it relies in determining that the probative value of a prior conviction that is more than ten years old substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect before admitting evidence of the conviction for impeachment purposes under OCGA § 24–9–84.1(b). To the extent Treadwell v. State, 285 Ga. 736, 742–743(3) (684 S.E.2d 244) (2009) and Wilkes v. State, 293 Ga.App. 724, 726(2) (667 S.E.2d 705) (2008) can be interpreted to hold otherwise, they are overruled.” Accord, Waye v. State , 326 Ga.App. 202, 756 S.E.2d 287 (March 13, 2014); Peak v. State , 330 Ga.App. 528, 768 S.E.2d 275 (January 14, 2015) (voluntary manslaughter and related convictions vacated and remanded for consideration of Clay factors on the record); Robinson v. State , 332 Ga.App. 240, 771 S.E.2d 751 (April 17, 2015) (rape and related convictions vacated and remanded for consideration of Clay factors on the record); Frazier v. State , A15A2107, ___ Ga.App. ___, ___ S.E.2d ___, 2016 WL 1176723 (March 28, 2016). Contreras v. State, 314 Ga.App. 825, 726 S.E.2d 107 (March 15, 2012). Rape and related convictions affirmed; when defense admitted defendant’s prior convictions, to pre-empt State’s use of them as impeachment, defense waived any objection to the prior convictions’ admission as evidence. “[B]ecause he testified on direct examination about his prior convictions, he has waived any objection to the admission of those convictions. See Ohler v. United States, 529 U.S. 753, 760 (120 S.Ct. 1851, 146 L.Ed.2d 826) (2000) (‘[A] defendant who preemptively introduces evidence of a prior conviction on direct examination may not on appeal claim that the admission of such evidence was error.’); see also Scherr, GREEN'S GEORGIA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 14.54 (6 th ed., 2008) (‘Waivers also occur when a party introduces evidence of the same fact that he tries to keep out when offered by the opposing party....’); Bartow County School Dist. v. Weaver, 121 Ga.App. 733, 737(3) (175 S.E.2d 78) (1970) (same).” Accord, Merritt v. State , 329 Ga.App. 871, 766 S.E.2d 217 (November 20, 2014); Heard v. State , 334 Ga.App. 399, 779 S.E.2d 415 (November 10, 2015). Hogues v. State, 313 Ga.App. 717, 722 S.E.2d 430 (January 26, 2012). Theft by receiving conviction affirmed; no error in admitting defendant’s prior felony convictions for impeachment. Contrary to defendant’s argument, “OCGA § 24–9– 84.1(a)(2), which applies to prior felony convictions such as those at issue in this case, does not require that the crimes involve dishonesty or making a false statement. See Whitaker v. State, 283 Ga. 521, 522–523(2) (661 S.E.2d 557) (2008); Wilkes v. State, 293 Ga.App. 724, 725–726(2) (667 S.E.2d 705) (2008).” Distinguishing cases under OCGA § 24–9–84.1(a)(3), which provides for admission of prior convictions, felony or misdemeanor, “involved dishonesty or making a false statement, regardless of the punishment that could be imposed for such offense.” Robinson v. State, 312 Ga.App. 736, 719 S.E.2d 601 (November 21, 2011). Theft by receiving and conspiracy convictions remanded for consideration of whether defendant’s “1984 conviction for bail jumping” was properly admitted as impeachment. “Here, the trial court ruled that ‘given [Robinson's] testimony and given the facts of this case,’ his 1984 bail-jumping conviction was ‘something that the jury [could] consider.’ Although the trial court made a ruling that Robinson's prior conviction was admissible, it failed to make the required express findings under the proper standard. Although the trial court's error is subject to scrutiny for harmless error, the fact that Robinson's convictions were primarily based upon circumstantial evidence forecloses the conclusion that the overwhelming evidence established Robinson's guilt so as to make the admissibility of the prior conviction harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Miller [ v. State, 298 Ga.App. 792, 797(4), 681 S.E.2d 225 (2009)]. ‘Under these circumstances, we are unable to conclude whether a new trial is required at this time.’ Id. Instead, we must remand this case with direction to the trial court to enter express findings on the record as to whether, in interest of justice, the probative value of Robinson's 1981 bail-jumping conviction substantially outweighed its prejudicial effect, considering the factors set forth in Quiroz .” Dozier v. State, 311 Ga.App. 713, 716 S.E.2d 802 (September 19, 2011). Rape and related convictions affirmed; trial court properly admitted defendant’s 1993 aggravated assault convictions for impeachment. “The State argued that it should be allowed to impeach Dozier's veracity with evidence of the aggravated assault conviction because Dozier was initially untruthful to the police about the circumstances surrounding the fight and because he tried to hide the evidence. The trial court granted the State's request to admit the prior conviction for impeachment purposes. The court reasoned that, because the crimes for which Dozier was being tried were ‘crimes of credibility,’ with an alleged victim saying something happened and Dozier saying nothing happened, evidence of the prior conviction was probative enough on the issue of Dozier's veracity and credibility to outweigh the potential prejudicial effect of admitting evidence of the conviction. Additionally, the court noted, evidence Dozier committed a violent act was relevant to the victim's testimony