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that she did not disclose the crimes immediately for fear Dozier would hurt her.” Held, while “OCGA § 24–9–84.1(a)(2) establishes a stricter standard for weighing the admissibility of a conviction less than ten years old when it is offered to impeach a defendant instead of an ordinary witness, … [u]nder OCGA § 24–9–84.1(b), however, if more than ten years has passed since the conviction or the release from confinement imposed for that conviction, the standard used to balance the probative value of evidence against its prejudicial effect is the same for defendants and witnesses. In either case, the court must find that the probative value of the conviction ‘supported by specific facts and circumstances substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect.’ OCGA § 24–9–84.1(b); Quiroz [ v. State, 291 Ga.App. 423, 429(4), 662 S.E.2d 235 (2008)].” Chandler v. State, 311 Ga.App. 86, 714 S.E.2d 597 (June 14, 2011). Felony forgery conviction affirmed; trial court properly admitted defendant’s prior felony for impeachment purposes, “finding that evidence of the prior conviction was ‘substantially probative’ and ‘more probative than prejudicial.’ Chandler argues that the trial court used a more liberal standard than that required by OCGA § 24–9–84.1(a)(2). We disagree. Even though the trial court did not use the exact language of OCGA § 24–9–84.1(a)(2), it correctly applied the standard set forth in that Code section and made the express finding required under Quiroz that the probative value of the prior conviction substantially outweighed the prejudicial effect. Compare Lawrence v. State, 305 Ga.App. 199, 202–203(3) (699 S.E.2d 406) (2010) (trial court applied a too liberal standard where no express finding that evidence of prior conviction was substantially more probative than prejudicial).” Carter v. State, 289 Ga. 51, 709 S.E.2d 223 (March 18, 2011). Conviction for malice murder and related offenses affirmed; trial court properly only allowed “into evidence the certified convictions of State’s witness Williams, and not allowing the indictments associated with those convictions to be admitted into evidence as well. However, Carter is incorrect in his assertion that the indictments should have been admitted into evidence along with Williams’ convictions, as it is only ‘[e]vidence that a witness has been convicted of a crime [that] shall be admitted if the crime was punishable by death or imprisonment of one year or more under the law under which the witness was convicted if the court determines that the probative value of admitting the evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the witness.’ (Emphasis supplied.) OCGA § 24-9-84.1(a)(1). See also OCGA § 24-9-84.1(a)(3) (‘Evidence that any witness . . . has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if it involved dishonesty or making a false statement, regardless of the punishment that could be imposed for such offense’) (emphasis supplied). An indictment represents only accusations against a defendant, and is not in itself a conviction.” Johnson v. State, 307 Ga.App. 791, 706 S.E.2d 150 (February 10, 2011). Aggravated assault conviction affirmed; trial court used wrong standard in determining admission of defendant’s prior convictions for impeachment – finding that “the probative value … outweighs the prejudicial value” instead of whether it “substantially outweighed” the prejudice – but harmless in light of overwhelming evidence of guilt. Robertson v. State, 306 Ga.App. 721, 703 S.E.2d 343 (November 5, 2010). Convictions for various cocaine and marijuana-related offenses affirmed; requirements of OCGA § 24-9-84.1(a)(2) don’t apply to prior offenses admitted as similar transactions, not for impeachment. Crowder v. State, 305 Ga.App. 647, 700 S.E.2d 642 (August 23, 2010). Defendant’s conviction for aggravated assault affirmed; no abuse of discretion where trial court excluded defendant’s proffer of victim’s 1993 VGCSA conviction for impeachment. “Here, Crowder's counsel served the State with the notice of intent to introduce the victim's conviction the day after the jury had been selected but before the presentation of evidence to the jury.” “OCGA § 24-9-84.1(b) provides that evidence of a conviction more than ten years old [calculated from date of conviction or date of release from confinement, whichever is later] ‘is not admissible unless the proponent gives to the adverse party sufficient advance written notice of intent to use such evidence to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to contest the use of such evidence.’ (Emphasis supplied).” “Under the circumstances, which included very little, if any, ‘advance’ notification and the State's claim that it did not have time to prepare, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding the notice was not sufficient. The trial court also found on the record by the order denying the motion for new trial, irrespective of the timeliness of the notice, ‘the prejudicial effect of the victim's prior conviction for Violation of the Georgia Controlled Substances Act outweighed any probative value,’ and that the evidence of the conviction was therefore inadmissible. See Carter v. State, 303 Ga.App. 142, 146(2) (692 S.E.2d 753) (2010) (express findings balancing the probity of a prior felony conviction against its prejudicial effect may be made in an order on a motion for new trial). Given the lack of any facts and circumstances, absent speculation, that illegal drugs were involved in the altercation at issue, we find no abuse of discretion in this determination.”