☢ test - Í

Childs v. State, 287 Ga. 488, 696 S.E.2d 670 (July 5, 2010). Defendant’s conviction for selling cocaine affirmed; no merit to defendant’s challenging the constitutionality of OCGA § 24-9-84.1(a)(2), regarding use of prior criminal convictions to impeach a defendant who testifies. “Childs moved the trial court to rule the statute unconstitutional on the ground it unconstitutionally burdened his right to testify and therefore violated his due process rights. See Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 51-53 (107 S.Ct. 2704, 97 L.Ed.2d 37) (1987).” Supreme Court disagrees, citing “ Ohler v. United States, 529 U.S. 753, 759-760 (120 S.Ct. 1851, 146 L.Ed.2d 826) (2000): “‘“It is not thought overly harsh in such situations to require that the determination whether to waive the privilege take into account the matters which may be brought out on cross- examination. It is also generally recognized that a defendant who takes the stand in his own behalf may be impeached by proof of prior convictions or the like.... Again, it is not thought inconsistent with the enlightened administration of criminal justice to require the defendant to weigh such pros and cons in deciding whether to testify,”’ Ohler, 529 U.S. at 759, quoting McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 215, (91 S.Ct. 1454, 28 L.Ed.2d 711) (1971). Woods v. State, 304 Ga.App. 403, 696 S.E.2d 411 (June 11, 2010). Defendant’s convictions for aggravated child molestation and related offenses affirmed; no abuse of discretion where trial court held that witness’s felony offenses 10- 20 years earlier were more prejudicial than probative. Accord, Crowder (August 23, 2010), above. Love v. State, 302 Ga.App. 106, 690 S.E.2d 246 (January 25, 2010). Defendant’s conviction for burglary and criminal trespass affirmed; trial court properly admitted defendant’s prior burglary convictions for impeachment. 1. “[G]iven that Love's defense to the current charges was that he believed he had permission to remove the television and DVD player from the apartment, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the two prior convictions, which indicated a probable lack of veracity by Love. See Newsome v. State, 289 Ga.App. 590, 592-593(2) (657 S.E.2d 540) (2008) (prior convictions were properly admitted to impeach defendant's credibility when evidence amounted to a swearing contest between defendant and victim); Tate v. State, 289 Ga.App. 479, 480-481 (657 S.E.2d 531) (2008) (prior conviction was properly admitted to impeach defendant's credibility when prior conviction indicated a probable lack of defendant's veracity).” 2. Trial court properly allowed State to explore details of prior convictions where defendant attempted to explain them. “‘[W]ith regard to impeachment by prior convictions, the specific facts underlying the crime are irrelevant unless the witness attempts to rehabilitate himself by explaining the circumstances of his conviction.’ (Punctuation omitted.) Brown v. State, 276 Ga. 192, 193(3) (576 S.E.2d 870) (2003). See Vincent v. State, 264 Ga. 234, 235 (442 S.E.2d 748) (1994). Indeed, one cannot bolster his impeachment of a witness with facts underlying the witness's prior convictions if the witness has not attempted to rehabilitate his character. Robinson v. State, 246 Ga.App. 576, 580(3) (541 S.E.2d 660) (2000). Here, as previously noted, Love discussed his prior convictions of burglary and attempted burglary during his direct examination. However, in addition to introducing those convictions into evidence, Love further testified he had not actually committed the crime of attempted burglary but only pled guilty in order to quickly resolve the case. Thus, when the State prosecutor asked Love on cross-examination where the attempted burglary had allegedly occurred, the question was permissible given Love's attempt to rehabilitate his character by claiming that he had not committed the offense. See Vincent, supra, 264 Ga. at 235. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in overruling Love's objection to the cross-examination regarding his prior convictions.” Rayshad v. State, 295 Ga.App. 29, 670 S.E.2d 849 (December 1, 2008). Defendant received ineffective assistance where counsel failed to object to use of his first offender plea as impeachment. Lee v. State, 294 Ga.App. 796, 670 S.E.2d 488 (November 24, 2008). Trial court erred in allowing impeachment of defendant with prior first offender plea. “As a rule, ‘unless there is an adjudication of guilt, a witness may not be impeached on general credibility grounds by evidence of a first offender record.’ Matthews v. State, 268 Ga. 798, 802(4) (493 S.E.2d 136) (1997). The State argues that Lee opened the door to the admission of his first offender record because during his opening statement Lee's counsel told the jury that Lee would testify and admit to having previously pled guilty to a crime in Cobb County, and because Lee introduced evidence of his good character through the testimony of his father. Pretermitting whether in view of the foregoing the prosecutor was allowed to present evidence of Lee's prior bad acts, See Donaldson v. State, 279 Ga.App. 407(1) (631 S.E.2d 443) (2006) (if defendant intentionally elects to place his good character in issue, “the prosecutor may respond with evidence of the defendant's bad character in the form of prior bad acts or other testimony”). Compare, e. g., Lindsey v. State, 282 Ga. 447, 449(2), n. 5 (651 S.E.2d 66) (2007) (defense counsel's opening statements were not evidence and were insufficient to put defendant's good character in issue). Lee did not open the door to the admission into evidence of the certified records of a first offender plea for which there was no adjudication of guilt. See, e. g., Davis v. State, 269 Ga. 276, 279(2) (496 S.E.2d 699) (1998) (even where evidence of a prior act was admissible, ‘[s]ince the first offender statutory scheme was devised to prevent a first offender who had not