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had an adjudication of guilt entered being treated as if the offender had been convicted, the first offender's record should not be used if there is no adjudication of guilt’); Davis v. State, 287 Ga.App. 478, 479(2) (651 S.E.2d 750) (2007) (while it was permissible to allow prosecutor to ask defendant's character witness ‘did you know that the defendant had committed a burglary?’, it was error to allow the witness to be further impeached by the defendant's first offender record for burglary). Accordingly, we conclude that the records of the plea were offered for the impermissible purpose of impeaching Lee's credibility. See Matthews, supra. Furthermore, even if the records of Lee's guilty plea were otherwise admissible, these particular records contained the GCIC memorandum indicating that Lee had been convicted of the prior offenses, although he had not been shown to be so convicted, and referenced his conviction of an unspecified crime. Accordingly, the trial court erred in admitting the records over objection.” Harmless error in light of overwhelming evidence of guilt, however. McNabb v. State, 292 Ga.App. 395, 664 S.E.2d 800 (July 2, 2008). At defendant’s trial for reckless driving, eluding an officer, and obstruction, trial court properly admitted defendant’s convictions for felony vehicular homicide for impeachment, although more than 10 years old, where defendant “testified extensively about how police mistreated him when he was being arrested. He also testified that he had cut his hair and donated it to the Cancer Foundation, and that the organization gave him a plaque thanking him for the contribution.” “McNabb’s testimony regarding his ‘laudatory activities ... resulted in placing his character in issue under the circumstances.’ Language v. State, 169 Ga.App. 649, 650(1) (314 S.E.2d 485). Thus, the trial court did not err in admitting evidence of McNabb’s prior convictions.” Thomas v. State, 291 Ga.App. 795, 662 S.E.2d 849 (June 4, 2008). Where witness (other than defendant) was impeached with prior felony conviction under OCGA § 24-9-84.1(a)(1), with no objection from defendant, trial court was not required to sua sponte determine “that the probative value of admitting the evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the witness.” Accord as to defendant, too, Collier v. State , 288 Ga. 756, 707 S.E.2d 102 (March 7, 2011). Quiroz v. State, 291 Ga.App. 423, 662 S.E.2d 235 (May 6, 2008). Case of first impression: before admitting evidence of a defendant’s prior felony convictions (other than crimes involving dishonesty) for impeachment under OCGA § 24-9- 84.1(a)(2), trial court must find on the record “that the probative value of admitting the evidence substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect to the defendant.” Based on Eleventh Circuit precedent under FRE 609, United States v. Preston, 608 F.2d 626 (5 th Cir., 1979). “As the record in this case demonstrates, the mere fact that a trial court has allowed the defendant to be impeached with a felony conviction does not establish that it has engaged in the required balancing of probity against prejudice. … To give a ‘sensible and intelligent effect,’ Houston v. Lowes of Savannah, 235 Ga. 201, 203 (219 S.E.2d 115) (1975), to that part of OCGA § 24-9-84.1(a)(2) requiring the trial court to balance the probity of a prior felony conviction against its prejudicial effect, we now require that such findings be made expressly. Factors to be considered include the kind of felony involved, the date of the conviction, and the importance of the witness’s credibility. See Preston, supra at 639 n. 17.” Accord, Abercrombie v. State , 297 Ga.App. 522, 677 S.E.2d 719 (April 16, 2009) (Defendant’s conviction for possession of methamphetamine reversed; trial court erred in admitting defendant’s prior conviction for entering an automobile without weighing these factors on the record, merely stating the evidence “does have probative value.”); Miller v. State , 298 Ga.App. 792, 681 S.E.2d 225 (July 8, 2009); Carter v. State , 303 Ga.App. 142, 692 S.E.2d 753 (March 25, 2010) (findings may be made in order on motion for new trial); Rucker v. State , 304 Ga.App. 184, 695 S.E.2d 711 (May 25, 2010) (failure to make finding on record subject to harmless error analysis); Lawrence v. State , 305 Ga.App. 199, 699 S.E.2d 406 (July 13, 2010) (harmless error where trial court found evidence to be “more probative than prejudicial” instead of determining that “that the probative value of admitting the evidence substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect to the defendant;” but casts doubt on suggestion in Abercrombie, above, that the trial court must enumerate the factors it considered); Johnson (February 10, 2011) (same as Lawrence) . Note, crimes involving dishonesty are treated under OCGA § 24-9-84.1(a)(3); impeachment of witnesses other than the defendant by showing past crimes are treated under OCGA § 24-9-84.1(a)(1). See also Dozier (September 19, 2011), above (standard for using crimes more than 10 years old for impeachment is same for defendants and other witnesses under OCGA § 24–9–84.1(b), standard for using crimes less than 10 years old is higher for impeachment of defendants than other witnesses under OCGA § 24–9–84.1(a)(2).). Quiroz and Abercrombie overruled to the extent they require findings on the record under (a)(2). Newsome v. State, 289 Ga.App. 590, 657 S.E.2d 540 (January 23, 2008). Case of first impression: in defendant’s prosecution for aggravated assault in the shooting of his wife and infant child, trial court properly admitted defendant’s prior convictions for aggravated assault and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, not as prior difficulties or similar transactions, but as impeachment pursuant to OCGA § 24-9-84.1. The code section allows prior felonies generally to be admitted for impeachment “if the court determines that the probative value of admitting