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the evidence substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect to the defendant.” “Our research reveals no case interpreting OCGA § 24-9-84.1(a)(2). The Code section tracks the language of Federal Rules of Evidence (‘FRE’) Rule 609(a)(1), except that the General Assembly added the word “substantially” before the word “outweighs.” Rejects defense contention that the Georgia provision is meant to adopt the “far more rigorous standard” included in FRE Rule 609(b), which excludes convictions more than 10 years old “unless the court determines, in the interests of justice, that the probative value of the conviction supported by specific facts and circumstances substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect.” “[P]erhaps the addition of a more rigorous standard for admissibility than under FRE 609(a)(1) – requiring the judge to find that the probative value of admitting the evidence substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect to the defendant – is intended to remedy the lack of the pretrial notice and hearing granted to defendants by Uniform Superior Court Rule 31.3 [for admission of similar transaction evidence generally].” Trial court could find here that prior convictions’ probative value substantially outweighed prejudicial effect: “Ms. Newsome was the only witness to the shooting and the only person who could identify her assailant. Newsome testified and denied committing the crimes. Newsome’s prior crimes had crucial probative value.” 19. PRIOR MISCONDUCT – REBUTTING DEFENDANT’S TESTIMONY Ridley v. State, 290 Ga. 798, 725 S.E.2d 223 (March 5, 2012). Murder and related convictions affirmed; when defendant testified “that he did not beat women with whom he argued,” trial court properly allowed prosecutor “to confront Ridley with evidence that he beat his wife after an argument.” Scruggs v. State, 309 Ga.App. 569, 711 S.E.2d 86 (May 13, 2011). Convictions for armed robbery and related offenses affirmed; trial court properly admitted evidence of defendant’s prior convictions as impeachment where he was asked on direct, “have you ever been in trouble before?” Accord, Robinson v. State , 312 Ga.App. 110, 717 S.E.2d 694 (October 18, 2011) (in burglary prosecution, prior convictions for criminal trespass and possession of tools for commission of crime properly admitted where defendant testified, “I never had no charge like this before.... I've never been charged like this before.”). Newton v. State, 296 Ga.App. 332, 674 S.E.2d 379 (February 27, 2009). Similar transaction properly admitted without notice where defense character witness testified “that she had never heard of any inappropriate behavior by Newton with the victim or other children.” Leeks v. State, 281 Ga.App. 274, 635 S.E.2d 878 (August 24, 2006). Trial court properly excluded certified copy of witness’s first offender plea, offered as impeachment. “In Matthews [ v. State,268 Ga. 798, 493 S.E.2d 136 (1997) ] , the Supreme Court held that a witness cannot be impeached on general credibility grounds with a first offender record. Id. A party can, however, cross-examine a witness to show that bias might result from her first offender status. See Melson v. State , 263 Ga.App. 647, 648(2), 588 S.E.2d 822 (2003). But, even when cross-examination to show bias is permissible, certified copies of court documents relating to the witness’s first offender treatment are not admissible. See Smith v. State , 276 Ga. 263, 265 (2), 577 S.E.2d 548 (2003). The only circumstance in which documents pertaining to a First Offender record might be admissible for purposes of impeachment is ‘to disprove or contradict the testimony of the witness.’ Matthews, supra, 268 Ga. At 802, n. 2, 493 S.E.2d 136. See also Hernandez v. State , 244 Ga.App. 874, 877 (1)(c), 537 S.E.2d 149 (2000). Leeks did not argue below that this was the purpose for which she sought admission of the first offender document and she makes no such argument on appeal.” Emberson v. State, 271 Ga.App. 773, 611 S.E.2d 83 (February 24, 2005). “Emberson contends … that the trial court erred by allowing the State, over his objection, to … impeach him pursuant to OCGA § 24-9-82 with evidence that he had previously been adjudicated delinquent in juvenile court. We agree. Because an adjudication of delinquency is not a conviction of a crime, these matters did not tend to impeach Emberson by disproving his testimony about criminal matters. Smith v. State, 154 Ga.App. 190, 192 (267 S.E.2d 826) (1980); compare Williams v. State, 171 Ga.App. 927, 928 (321 S.E.2d 423) (1984) (evidence of prior juvenile arrests admissible for impeachment pursuant to OCGA § 24-9-82 after the defendant testified that he had never before been in any kind of trouble).” Harmless error, however, because other felony convictions were admitted for the same purpose – “refuting Emberson’s testimony that he was not familiar with criminal cases.” Jones v. State, 260 Ga.App. 487, 580 S.E.2d 278 (March 21, 2003). “During his trial testimony, Jones denied that he smoked crack cocaine and asserted that he did not ‘do drugs.’ Given Jones’ testimony, the State was authorized to impeach him with evidence of his prior conviction for possessing cocaine. Thus, the trial court did not err in admitting this impeachment evidence.”