☢ test - Í

Walker v. State, 260 Ga.App. 241, 581 S.E.2d 295 (March 13, 2003). “The State, in response to Walker's testimony that he had never been in trouble, offered into evidence Walker’s previous third degree assault conviction. The trial court allowed the conviction into evidence over Walker’s objection. Walker claims the trial court erred because the conviction improperly placed his character into issue.... [A] reference to a defendant’s having been in trouble does not place his character in issue, since it is unclear what is meant by such a remark.” However, evidence of defendant’s prior conviction was admissible, not as character evidence, but as impeachment of defendant’s representations, both in his testimony and counsel’s opening statement, that he had ‘never been in trouble.’ Marshall v. State, 275 Ga. 740, 571 S.E.2d 761 (October 28, 2002). “[Defendant]’s testimony was obviously meant to imply that his only previous contact with guns had been merely incidental, and that he had not previously possessed or had substantial contact with guns. Given this clear import of [defendant]’s testimony, … we conclude that [defendant]’s prior conviction for possession and attempting to sell a stolen gun was properly admitted for impeachment purposes.” Leary v. State, 256 Ga.App. 639, 569 S.E.2d 593 (July 22, 2002). Defendant, an apartment manager, was accused of stealing rent payments. On direct examination, he testified that he had previously worked for the apartment owner in another capacity, but took the apartment manager’s job to keep his boss from hiring someone untrustworthy. On cross, the state sought to impeach defendant by proving a prior conviction for theft by taking. Held, the trial court properly allowed this impeachment: “[Defendant]’s testimony left the jury with the impression that he would never steal, entitling the State to rebut this testimony – and the false impression – with evidence of his prior theft conviction.” Scott v. State , 243 Ga.App. 334, 533 S.E.2d 428 (March 31, 2000). Cocaine possession conviction affirmed; defendant’s “testimony that his record contained only a disorderly conduct charge authorized the State to cross-examine him with regard to the numerous charges contained in his record.” Accord, Holloman v. State , 291 Ga. 338, 729 S.E.2d 344 (July 2, 2012). Fortson v. State, 242 Ga.App. 304, 529 S.E.2d 429 (February 9, 2000). Burglary conviction affirmed; trial court properly admitted evidence of another offense without similar transaction notice to impeach defendant’s testimony. Defendant testified that he only committed the burglary, and forged a check taken from the victim, because his co-defendant forced him to do those things at gunpoint. “Over objection, the State was allowed to impeach Fortson by showing that about six days after the robbery, without coercion, he forged an endorsement on another check taken from [victim]. … We find no error. The procedural requirements of USCR 31.1 and 31.3 do not apply either to impeachment evidence or to evidence of similar transactions or occurrences which are immediately related in time and place to the charge being tried so as to be part of a single, continuous transaction. USCR 31.3(E). Evidence that Fortson had forged the check at issue without coercion was admissible to impeach his testimony that he had committed the earlier forgery only because he was coerced into doing so. A witness may be impeached by proving that statements made by him in his testimony are not the truth. Middle Ga. &c. R. Co. v. Barnett, 104 Ga. 582, 584(1), 30 S.E. 771 (1898). Moreover, Fortson's forgery of a check taken in the robbery several days after its occurrence was sufficiently connected in time and event to the robbery so that both offenses were part of a single transaction. See Baird v. State, 207 Ga.App. 44, 45(2), 427 S.E.2d 37 (1993); Branam v. State, 204 Ga.App. 205, 208(5), 419 S.E.2d 86 (1992).” Mann v. State, 240 Ga.App. 809, 524 S.E.2d 763 (November 5, 1999). Defendant’s conviction for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute affirmed; prosecutor was properly allowed, in her closing argument, to use similar transaction evidence previously admitted to impeach defendant who had subsequently testified. “It is quite true that, at the time defendant's prior cocaine conviction was tendered, it was admissible only as a similar transaction. But thereafter, Mann elected to testify in his own behalf. Since defendant took the stand, he was subject to impeachment for his prior conviction for possessing cocaine with intent to distribute because that conviction represented both a felony and a crime involving moral turpitude. Lewis v. State, 243 Ga. 443, 446, 254 S.E.2d 830 (1979). Accord Kyler v. State, 270 Ga. 81, 84(10), 508 S.E.2d 152 (1998). The State's attorney was entirely within her rights to comment on that prior conviction for purposes of impeachment in her closing argument.” Porter v. State, 240 Ga.App. 554, 524 S.E.2d 259 (October 28, 1999). Defendant’s conviction for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute affirmed; trial court properly admitted defendant’s prior drug convictions to impeach defendant’s testimony. “Here, Porter's testimony that ‘I don't carry no drugs’ clearly implied that he was neither in possession of drugs at the time in question nor on other occasions. His prior convictions involving possession of cocaine were properly admitted as impeachment evidence. See Lucas v. State, [234 Ga.App. 534, 507 S.E.2d 253 (1998)] (defendant opened the