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door to evidence of prior DUI convictions by testifying that he would not disobey by driving under the influence); compare Williams v. State, 197 Ga.App. 299, 398 S.E.2d 285 (1990) (defendant did not open the door to evidence of arrests in one county by testifying that he had not had any dealings with the sheriff in another county); Williams v. State, [187 Ga.App. 564, 566, 370 S.E.2d 821 (1988)] (defendant did not open the door to admission of evidence of prior burglary and theft convictions by denying that he had ever obstructed an officer).” Accord, Thrasher v. State, 243 Ga.App. 702, 534 S.E.2d 439 (April 25, 2000). 20. PRIOR MISCONDUCT – SPECIFIC ACTS, NO CONVICTION Adams v. State, 327 Ga.App. 299, 758 S.E.2d 831 (May 13, 2014). Armed robbery conviction affirmed. Trial court properly limited defendant’s impeachment of witness based on bad acts evidence. Defendant sought to present evidence that store manager was let go for taking and eating snacks without paying for them “as a form of protest” over his low wages. “Adams argues that the trial court was required to allow him to cross-examine the employee about his admitted theft under former OCGA § 24–9–84.1(a)(3).[fn] That section provided, however, that ‘[e]vidence that any witness ... has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if it involved dishonesty or making a false statement, regardless of the punishment that could be imposed for such offense.’ Adams did not submit proof that the employee was convicted of, much less charged with, a crime for failing to pay for the snacks. See Woods v. State, 269 Ga. 60, 63(4) (495 S.E.2d 282) (1998) (a witness is successfully impeached with a prior conviction by tendering into evidence certified copies of the witness's prior convictions). Consequently, the testimony regarding such specific bad acts was not admissible for impeachment purposes. See Wetta v. State, 217 Ga.App. 128, 130(3) (456 S.E.2d 696) (1995) (proffered testimony not admissible because it related solely to a specific bad act).” Boothe v. State, 293 Ga. 285, 745 S.E.2d 594 (July 1, 2013). Malice murder and related convictions affirmed; trial court properly prohibited defendant from cross-examining State’s witness about her past drug use. Defense was allowed to question witness about whether she was under the influence at the time of the incident or at the time of her testimony. “To the extent that Appellant wished to question [witness] Gertsch about drug use in general, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that such inquiries were irrelevant and improper. See, e.g., Garcia v. State, 240 Ga. 796, 801, 242 S.E.2d 588 (1978) (holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in limiting the cross- examination of a State witness's use of drugs to the time of the crime, as opposed to his general abuse of drugs); Lancette v. State, 151 Ga.App. 740(4), 261 S.E.2d 405 (1979) (holding that the trial court properly sustained an objection to the defendant's asking a witness on cross-examination, ‘Now, do you use marijuana?,’ because that issue was irrelevant and the defendant could not, ‘under the guise of attacking the witness' credibility, ask questions suggesting illegal or immoral conduct in areas other than that before the court’); former OCGA § 24–9–62 (‘It shall be the right of a witness to be examined only as to relevant matter and to be protected from improper questions....’).” Accord, Shelton v. State , 323 Ga.App. 798, 748 S.E.2d 278 (September 5, 2013) (trial court properly sustained State’s objection to question, “To your knowledge, is [State’s witness] a drug dealer?” as a general attack on witness’s character “by specific instances of prior misconduct”). Wise v. State, 321 Ga.App. 39, 740 S.E.2d 850 (March 28, 2013). Physical precedent only on this point. Conviction for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute affirmed; trial court properly excluded evidence of alleged prior bad acts by arresting officer. “ Wise revealed that he wanted to ask the officer about a 1996 incident in which the officer had allegedly kicked in the door to Wise's mother's house to serve a criminal trespass warrant, and that depending on how he answered the question, Wise's mother was available to testify about the incident. Wise contended that the incident six years earlier was relevant to the 2002 arrest because it demonstrated that the officer had been ‘after him’ for a while. … The alleged 1996 incident was, at best, ‘related solely to specific bad acts and not to the general bad character of the [witness].’ Heaton v. State, 214 Ga.App. 460, 461(2), 448 S.E.2d 49 (1994). Testimony regarding such specific bad acts was not admissible for impeachment purposes. Wetta v. State, 217 Ga.App. 128, 130(3), 456 S.E.2d 696 (1995).” Noellien v. State, 298 Ga.App. 47, 679 S.E.2d 75 (May 19, 2009). Impeachment of defense witness was improper: State attempted to show that witness had antipathy to local police department due to prior encounters, including pending charges for driving on suspended license. “‘A witness cannot be impeached by instances of specific misconduct unless that misconduct has resulted in the conviction of a crime....’ McClure v. State, 278 Ga. 411, 413 (603 S.E.2d 224) (2004); see also OCGA § 24-9-84.1(a)(1), (3) (authorizing impeachment of a witness with evidence of any crime involving dishonesty or false statement, or a felony); Quiroz v. State, 291 Ga.App. 423, 427-428(4) (662 S.E.2d 235) (2008). Likewise, bias ‘“must be specific to the case, arising from a self-interest or self-preservation motive that could be reasonably inferred to cause testimony to be shaded or distorted.”’ Johnson v. State, 244 Ga.App. 128, 131(1)