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(534 S.E.2d 480) (2000), quoting Farley v. State, 225 Ga.App. 687, 690 (484 S.E.2d 711) (1997) (physical precedent only). A mere ‘“generalized attitude”’ towards a party – here, Arnold's supposed grudge against the police – could not rise to the level of a self-interested motive specific to the case. Id.” Jones v. State, 289 Ga.App. 767, 658 S.E.2d 386 (February 26, 2008). Trial court properly granted motion in limine to prohibit impeachment of officer based on prior charge of falsifying information, where that charge resulted in no conviction. “‘[S]pecific instances of misconduct may not be used to impeach a witness’s character or credibility, unless the misconduct has resulted in conviction of such a crime. A mere indictment or a charge or an arrest or a trial and acquittal are not legal methods of impeachment.’ Bell v. State, 265 Ga.App. 407, 408 (593 S.E.2d 935) (2004).” Accord, Martinez v. State , 284 Ga. 138, 663 S.E.2d 675 (July 7, 2008). Shelnutt v. State, 289 Ga.App. 528, 657 S.E.2d 611 (February 7, 2008). “ Woods v. State, 210 Ga.App. 172 (435 S.E.2d 464) (1993), recognized that instances of specific misconduct can ‘not be used to impeach a witness’ character or veracity unless the misconduct has resulted in the conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, and the proper method of proving such a conviction is by the introduction of a certified copy thereof.’ [fn: Id. at 173(1) (citations and punctuation omitted). The term ‘moral turpitude’ encompasses all felonies. Hall v. Hall, 261 Ga. 188 (402 S.E.2d 726) (1991). With the 2005 enactment of OCGA § 24-9-84.1(a)(1) and (2), evidence that a witness or defendant has been convicted of a felony shall be admitted if the court determines that the probative value of admitting the evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect. ] ” Accord, Palmer v. State , 299 Ga.App. 192, 682 S.E.2d 323 (July 15, 2009). Reese v. State, 241 Ga.App. 350, 526 S.E.2d 867 (December 8, 1999). Defendant’s convictions for armed robbery, kidnapping, and related offenses affirmed; trial court properly refused to allow defendant “to introduce evidence of the victim's disciplinary history from her position as a police officer with the City of Conyers. He says her employment history ‘had the potential of showing’ she falsified police reports or committed a ‘similar act of moral turpitude,’ and could have been used to impeach her credibility. This argument is without merit. Instances of specific misconduct may not be used to impeach a witness' veracity unless the misconduct has resulted in the conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. Dunton v. State, 216 Ga.App. 191, 453 S.E.2d 800 (1995). Since no such conviction was shown to exist in this case, the trial court did not err in limiting Reese's cross-examination of the victim.” Houston v. State, 237 Ga.App. 878, 517 S.E.2d 357 (May 4, 1999). “Contrary to Houston’s enumerated error, the court correctly ruled that Houston could not impeach a witness by showing only that she had been arrested without showing a certified copy of conviction. ‘A witness may be impeached by showing a conviction of a crime of moral turpitude. Specific instances of misconduct may not be used to impeach a witness’s character or credibility, unless the misconduct has resulted in conviction of such a crime. A mere indictment or a charge or an arrest or a trial and acquittal are not legal methods of impeachment. The proper method of proving the conviction is by introducing a certified copy.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Smith v. State, 222 Ga.App. 366, 369-370(4), 474 S.E.2d 272 (1996).” 21. PRIOR STATEMENTS See new OCGA § 24-6-613 Taylor v. State, 327 Ga.App. 882, 761 S.E.2d 426 (July 7, 2014). Aggravated assault and related convictions affirmed; trial court properly ruled that defendant couldn’t impeach State’s witnesses with prior statement of someone else, not present to testify at trial. Edwards v. State, 293 Ga. 612, 748 S.E.2d 870 (September 23, 2013). Murder and related convictions affirmed; no error in allowing State to impeach its own witness with her prior inconsistent statement. “‘Any party, including the party calling the witness may attach the credibility of a witness,’ former OCGA § 24-9-81 [new 24-6-607], and ‘[a] witness may be impeached by contradictory statements made by [her] as to matters relevant to [her] testimony and to the case.’ Former OCGA § 24-9-83 [new 24-6-613(b)]. Williams v. State, 292 Ga. 844, 742 S.E.2d 445 (April 29, 2013). Murder and related convictions affirmed; admission of prior consistent statement of State’s witness was proper where “his veracity was affirmatively attacked by these questions eliciting inconsistencies between his testimony at trial and his previous statement. See Hall v. State, 287 Ga. 755, 758(3) (699 S.E.2d 321) (2010). The ‘cross-examination of [witness Black] strongly implied that [his] direct testimony constituted a recent fabrication. Additionally, it is undisputed that [his] statement to the [detective] predated [his]