☢ test - Í

allegedly fabricated trial testimony.’ Mims v. State, 314 Ga.App. 170, 173(1) (723 S.E.2d 486) (2012) (footnotes omitted).” Accord, Byrd v. State , 325 Ga.App. 24, 752 S.E.2d 84 (November 20, 2013). Slaughter v. State, 292 Ga. 573, 740 S.E.2d 119 (March 18, 2013). Murder and related convictions affirmed, trial court properly excluded evidence of witness’s prior statement “on the ground that [witness] Birdette had not been asked during her testimony earlier in the trial whether she made such a statement.” “See Hall v. Lewis, 286 Ga. 767, 779, 692 S.E.2d 580 (2010) (holding that former OCGA § 24–9–83 required that the witness be confronted with the substance of the alleged prior inconsistent statement before she could be impeached with it).” Bryant v. State, 288 Ga. 876, 708 S.E.2d 362 (March 18, 2011). Capital murder conviction affirmed (but sentence reversed); prior inconsistent statement was properly introduced to impeach witness. “Bryant complains that certain testimony was erroneously admitted into evidence under OCGA § 24-9-83. That statute provides that, before a witness may be impeached by his prior inconsistent statement, ‘the time, place, person, and circumstances attending the former statements shall be called to his mind with as much certainty as possible.’ … alleges that Investigator Ferguson was improperly allowed to testify to two of [defendant’s sister] Ms. Bryant's prior statements without Ms. Bryant's having been confronted with the substance of those statements, and thus that the trial court erred in allowing Investigator Ferguson's testimony that Ms. Bryant told him during the interview that (1) Ms. Bryant told her mother that she thought Bryant was going to steal from Kilgore and (2) that she believed that her brother had robbed Kilgore. However, based on Ms. Bryant's consistent refusal during her testimony to admit to the substance of any damaging statements about her brother that she made to police (despite having twice reviewed her own videotaped statement), we conclude ‘that in these circumstances the requirements of the Code section were met sufficiently to permit the state to impeach its witness by proof of prior contradictory statements.’ Meschino v. State, 259 Ga. 611, 615(2)(c) (385 S.E.2d 281) (1989) (proper foundation was laid for the use of prior inconsistent statements where the witness, who was the defendant's wife, acknowledged that she could ‘vaguely remember’ having made ‘some kind of statement’ to law enforcement after the crime). See also Cummings v. State, 280 Ga. 831, 832-833(2), (3) (632 S.E.2d 152) (2006) (‘[T]estimony that a witness does not recall certain details which have previously been included in a prior statement is inconsistent with the prior statement about those details ... [and][t]here is no ... “denial” requirement [relating to a witness’ testimony about prior statements] under [OCGA § 24-9-83]’).” “Indeed, by denying that she had spoken with Bryant at all by phone, Ms. Bryant was also denying that she could have relayed any statements that Bryant allegedly made to her during the course of any such phone call. See Holiday v. State, 272 Ga. 779, 781(2) (534 S.E.2d 411) (2000) (prior inconsistent statements were admissible for impeachment purposes and as substantive evidence where witnesses denied or could not remember specific details of their statements). See also Meschino, supra; Cummings, supra.” Martinez v. State, 306 Ga.App. 512, 702 S.E.2d 747 (October 19, 2010). Defense could impeach State’s witness with their grand jury testimony (but didn’t here). Citing Robinson v. State, 265 Ga.App. 481, 482(1), 594 S.E.2d 696 (February 9, 2004, below); Askew v. State, 254 Ga.App. 137, 138(1), 564 S.E.2d 720 (2002). Mubarak v. State, 305 Ga.App. 419, 699 S.E.2d 788 (July 29, 2010). Defendant’s convictions for aggravated assault and related offenses affirmed; trial court properly disallowed use of witnesses’ prior statements for impeachment. “‘In the case sub judice, the witness[es] never denied making a contradictory statement; thus, the door to impeachment was never opened.’ (Citations omitted.) Jackson v. State, 173 Ga.App. 851, 855(5), 328 S.E.2d 741 (1985).” Johnson v. State, 297 Ga.App. 823, 678 S.E.2d 531 (May 13, 2009). At defendant’s drug trial, no ineffective assistance “for having failed to cross-examine [witness] regarding the fact that, upon being questioned initially by counsel, she denied having any criminal history whatsoever. … [T]here appears no reasonable probability that this would have changed the outcome of the case. And pursuit of this line of questioning would have put defense counsel in the posture of eliciting truthful testimony that he expected the witness to give and then impeaching it with an admittedly false prior inconsistent statement. There was no assurance that the trial court would not have found the prior inconsistent statement irrelevant under these circumstances. ‘[A] previous statement in regard to irrelevant, collateral or immaterial matter would not be admissible for impeachment, regardless of how contradictory it might be.’ Garrett v. State, 169 Ga.App. 327, 328 (312 S.E.2d 621) (1983) (citations and punctuation omitted).” Soto v. State, 285 Ga. 367, 677 S.E.2d 95 (May 4, 2009). Co-defendant Wiedeman began testifying for State after pleading guilty. At first, co-defendant’s testimony exonerated defendant of participation in the murder. “Suddenly, in the midst of further questioning by the State, Wiedeman announced that he would not answer any questions. He also refused to answer questions posed by the defense. He continued to refuse to answer questions even after the trial court ordered