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witness or read it in his or her hearing; the attorney need not introduce the prior written statement into evidence before using it to impeach the witness.” Trial court therefore erred in requiring certified transcript of victim’s grand jury testimony before allowing counsel to use it to impeach her; however, error is harmless in light of overwhelming evidence of defendant’s guilt. Based on Duckworth v. State , 268 Ga. 566, 492 S.E.2d 201 (1997), OCGA § 24-9-83. Phyfer v. State, 259 Ga.App. 356, 577 S.E.2d 56 (January 29, 2003). “Where a witness merely states that [she] does not remember, [she] cannot be impeached by the showing of former statements with respect to the facts which [she] claims not to remember. This is true regardless of whether the witness’ failure to ‘remember’ is real or contrived[.]” Kilpatrick v. State, 276 Ga. 151, 575 S.E.2d 478 (January 13, 2003). Murder and related convictions affirmed. Witness’s prior consistent statement to police became admissible when defense counsel “urged at trial that [witness] recently fabricated his statement that [defendant] committed the shooting.” Buckalew v. State, 249 Ga.App. 134, 547 S.E.2d 355 (March 23, 2001). “A witness’s prior consistent out-of-court statement is admissible over a hearsay objection where ‘(1) the veracity of a witness’s trial testimony has been placed in issue at trial; (2) the witness is present at trial; and (3) the witness is available for cross-examination.’ [ quoting Woodard v. State, 269 Ga. 317, 320, 496 S.E.2d 896 (1998)] A witness’s ‘veracity’ is placed in issue ‘if affirmative charges of recent fabrication, improper influence, or improper motive are raised during cross-examination.’ [Cit.]” “The trial court admitted a redacted version of the [officer’s] report after finding that [his] veracity had been called into question …. [when] defense counsel used the report to establish that trial testimony given by [the officer] was incorrect. ” The trial court did not abuse its discretion in doing so. Accord, Wesley v. State , 286 Ga. 355, 689 S.E.2d 280 (January 25, 2010) (witness’s prior consistent statements properly admitted where recent fabrication alleged). Randolph v. State, 246 Ga.App. 141, 538 S.E.2d 139 (August 8, 2000). Co-defendant testified at trial differently from his statement to police at the scene. The statement given at the scene was thereupon placed into evidence. The trial court refused to charge the jury on prior inconsistent statements, saying that the statement given at the scene was not an official statement. Held, it was harmless error to fail to charge the jury on prior inconsistent statements; a statement does NOT have to be “official” to warrant this charge. Booker v. State, 242 Ga.App. 80, 528 S.E.2d 849 (January 26, 2000). Burglary, aggravated assault, and related convictions reversed. Trial court erred by allowing State to bolster credibility of accomplice (testifying for State) by presenting evidence of accurate pretrial statements made by accomplice regarding unrelated murders, and by showing “that the information McCoy provided had led to the entry of guilty pleas by all identified culprits except Booker.” “Booker also complains of the prosecuting attorney's references to these other crimes in closing argument.” State presented this evidence purportedly for impeachment, after accomplice testified at trial contrary to his prior statements, claiming that defendant hadn’t been involved in the crimes. “The purported impeachment of the witness in this manner amounted to an improper attempt to bolster his credibility by showing his veracity in matters irrelevant to the issues being tried in this case. [fn: [Accomplice] McCoy was, however, subject to impeachment through the State's showing his prior inconsistent statements concerning Booker's involvement in the crimes in this case, as well as the fact that McCoy was motivated to recant these statements because he had not received a prison transfer. ] These matters involved independent offenses, consisting of five homicides, which do not satisfy the requirements for admissibility at Booker's trial. See Williams v. State, 261 Ga. 640, 642(2)(b), 409 S.E.2d 649 (1991); Stephens v. State, 261 Ga. 467, 468- 469(6), 405 S.E.2d 483 (1991). And evidence of these crimes harmed Booker by showing his association with individuals who had committed infamous crimes. The court thus committed prejudicial error by admitting this evidence. It follows that the prosecutor's closing argument was improper.” Lathan v. State, 241 Ga.App. 750, 526 S.E.2d 350 (December 3, 1999). Defendant’s conviction for arson affirmed; when defendant’s wife testified denying that she had previously made a certain relevant statement (that “she would not have known if her husband had gotten up during the night in question”), trial court properly allowed testimony from GBI Agent that she had, in fact said it. “[T]he witness's out-of-court statement to [Agent] Attaway was admissible as a prior statement inconsistent with her trial testimony. See, e.g., Berry v. State, 268 Ga. 437, 438(1), 490 S.E.2d 389 (1997).” Hardy v. State, 240 Ga.App. 115, 522 S.E.2d 704 (September 21, 1999). Trial court properly allowed prosecutor to use defendant’s testimony from Jackson-Denno hearing to impeach his trial testimony.