☢ test - Í

Aldridge v. State, 237 Ga.App. 209, 515 S.E.2d 397 (February 2, 1999). “ Before a witness may be impeached with a prior inconsistent statement, the statement must be ‘called to his mind with as much certainty as possible.’ OCGA § 24-9-83. The purpose behind what at common law was known as ‘Queen Caroline’s Rule’ is to allow the witness an opportunity to admit, explain, or deny the inconsistency before testimonial or documentary proof is offered regarding the statement. Horne v. State, 204 Ga.App. 81, 418 S.E.2d 441 (1992); Queen Caroline’s Case, 2 Brod. & Bing. 284, 313 (1820). To satisfy the foundational requirement for impeaching a witness with a prior, written statement, the cross- examiner must show or read the witness his inconsistent statement and ask him if he recalls making it. OCGA § 24-9-83; Daniels v. State, 203 Ga.App. 873, 874(1), 418 S.E.2d 137 (1992). ‘[T]he statute does not require that the prior inconsistent statement be admitted into evidence before it is used for impeachment purposes.’ Duckworth v. State, 268 Ga. 566, 568(2), 492 S.E.2d 201 (1997); Whitehead v. State, 232 Ga.App. at 141(2), 499 S.E.2d 922. Of course, if the written statement is admissible, the defendant may choose to introduce it into evidence and then cross-examine the witness on its contents. See Eppinger v. State, 231 Ga.App. 614(1), 500 S.E.2d 383 (1998). However, a defendant does so at his own peril because by impeaching a witness in this manner, he introduces evidence and loses the right to open and conclude final arguments under OCGA § 17-8-71. Id.; Kennebrew v. State, 267 Ga. 400, 404(4), 480 S.E.2d 1 (1996). See also Warnock v. State, 195 Ga.App. 537, 538-539(2), 394 S.E.2d 382 (1990).” 22. REHABILITATION Fox v. State, 289 Ga. 34, 709 S.E.2d 202 (February 28, 2011). Malice murder conviction affirmed; where witness was asked if she had previously recanted an accusation against defendant, trial court properly ruled that State could elicit testimony that the recantation was result of other acts of domestic violence committed by defendant against witness. “The State, however, ‘is permitted to rehabilitate a witness whose credibility had been attacked.’ Nance v. State, 272 Ga. 217, 222 (526 S.E.2d 560) (2000). Here, if Fox had questioned Johnson about her recantation of the 2004 allegation, other incidents of domestic violence by Fox against her would have been relevant to explain her recantation. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in making this evidentiary ruling. See id.” M. INTERPRETERS See PROCEDURE – INTERPRETERS AND INTERPRETATION, above N. JUDGE, QUESTIONING BY See also JURIES AND JURORS – JUDICIAL COMMENT/OPINION, above Wilcox v. State, 236 Ga.App. 235, 511 S.E.2d 597 (February 4, 1999). No error in court’s questioning of defendant and counsel during hearing on motion to withdraw guilty plea. “‘It has long been part of Georgia jurisprudence that a trial judge may propound questions to any witness for the purpose of developing fully the truth of the case, and the extent of such an examination is a matter for the trial court’s discretion. [Cit.]’ Mullins v. State, 269 Ga. 157, 158-159(3), 496 S.E.2d 252 (1998). ‘The only limitation upon this right is not to express an opinion or intimate to the jury what has or has not been proven.’ (Emphasis added.) Grayer v. State, 181 Ga.App. 845, 846(3), 354 S.E.2d 191 (1987). See also OCGA § 17-8-57. As the Supreme Court explained, the purpose of the limitation ‘is to prevent the jury from being influenced, not to keep the judge from making up his own mind. [Cit.]’ Jones v. State, 250 Ga. 498, 499-500(4), 299 S.E.2d 549 (1983). Thus, even if the court’s questions were argumentative or revealed the judge’s opinion about a witness’s credibility, this limitation, clearly, does not apply because the court’s questions were posed in a motion hearing, and not before a jury . See Grayer v. State, 181 Ga.App. at 846, 354 S.E.2d 191.” Accord, Copeland v. State , 325 Ga.App. 668, 754 S.E.2d 636 (February 6, 2014) (trial judge may propound questions to witnesses at pretrial motion to suppress hearing). O. JURY, QUESTIONING BY See JURIES AND JURORS – QUESTIONING WITNESSES, above P. LEADING QUESTIONS ON DIRECT Burden v. State, 332 Ga.App. 811, 775 S.E.2d 183 (July 7, 2015). Aggravated assault conviction affirmed; under pre-2013 Evidence Code, trial court properly denied objection to question which was not leading. Prosecutor asked victim, “Was any money demanded of you?” “‘A question is leading when it is so framed as to suggest to the witness the answer which is desired; on the other hand, a question not suggesting the desired answer is not leading where it inquires only into a single fact.’ Milner v. State, 258 Ga.App. 425, 429(1), 574 S.E.2d 457 (2002) (citations and punctuation omitted). Thus, ‘a question is not open to the objection that it is leading when it does not suggest the answer desired. [Cits.]’ Ealey v. State, 139 Ga.App. 110, 111, 227 S.E.2d 902 (1976). Because the question here inquired only into a single fact and did not suggest an answer, the trial court properly overruled Burden's objection. See Riley v. State, 268 Ga. 640, 642(2)(d), 491 S.E.2d 802 (1997) (question not leading where it asked for a ‘yes or no’ response); Milner, supra (no improper leading where ‘state propounded a yes-or-no question’).”