☢ test - Í

Wright v. State, 319 Ga.App. 723, 738 S.E.2d 310 (February 11, 2013). Armed robbery and related convictions affirmed. Trial court properly allowed leading questions on direct “examination of Wright's then 15–year–old cousin, [who] was occasionally non-responsive; the girl's demeanor caused the prosecutor to ask her whether she ‘need[ed] a minute’; and she revealed that she had been scared when she saw Wright put a gun to the man's head and was upset to be in court testifying against him. OCGA § 24–9–63 authorizes a court to allow leading questions ‘when, from the conduct of the witness or other reason, justice shall require it.’ [Cit.] ‘Based on this statute, the courts have traditionally accorded a great deal of latitude in the examination of young or timid or otherwise disadvantaged witnesses.’ Bell v. State, 294 Ga.App. 779, 781(3), 670 S.E.2d 476 (2008) (citation and footnote omitted) (finding no abuse of discretion in allowing a prosecutor to ask leading questions of the 14–year–old witness, who was often non-responsive, spoke very softly, and exhibited signs of timidity and fear); Cherry v. State, 199 Ga.App. 879, 879–880(1), 406 S.E.2d 531 (1991) (finding no abuse of discretion in allowing a prosecutor to ask leading questions of the 14–year–old reticent victim). We discern no abuse of discretion here, based upon the cited question posed to this witness. See Hayes, supra; Bell, supra; Cherry, supra.” Gober v. State, 300 Ga.App. 202, 684 S.E.2d 675 (September 23, 2009). No abuse of discretion where trial court allowed State to treat defendant’s former co-defendants/gunmen, who had previously pled guilty, as hostile witnesses. “Here, both gunmen refused to answer any questions on Fifth Amendment grounds, even though the trial court clearly instructed them that they were not entitled to that privilege in that they had both pled guilty to the subject crimes and had not appealed. See Culler v. State, 277 Ga. 717, 721 (5) (594 S.E.2d 631) (2004).” Distinguishing Lingerfelt v. State , 235 Ga. 139, 140-141 (218 S.E.2d 752) (1975): “[I]n Cates v. State , 245 Ga. 30, 32-33 (1) (262 S.E.2d 796) (1980), the Georgia Supreme Court carved out an exception to the Lingerfelt doctrine, holding that the trial court could allow a prosecutor to ask such leading questions of a witness who refused to testify where (i) the trial court had properly found that the witness had no right to claim a Fifth Amendment privilege (because he had already been convicted for his participation in the same crime and no appeal had been pursued), and (ii) defense counsel had available to him or her the witness's version of the crime and therefore could also ask leading questions that showed inconsistencies or tended to exculpate the appellant. ‘We see no error in allowing the prosecuting attorney to ask leading questions of [the witness] in view of the fact that appellant was afforded the same opportunity.’ Cates, supra, 245 Ga. at 33 (1) .” “[W]e note that after the testimony of each of these gunmen witnesses, the court gave a detailed instruction to the jury that the questions of counsel were not evidence, and that the jury could make no inferences from the witness's refusal to answer questions from the prosecutor or from either of the defendants.” Lopez v. State, 291 Ga.App. 210, 661 S.E.2d 618 (April 17, 2008). “Lopez argues that the trial court erred in permitting the state to ask leading questions during its examination of the child victim. ‘The courts have traditionally accorded a great deal of latitude in the examination of young or timid or otherwise disadvantaged witnesses. Hayslip v. State, 154 Ga.App. 835 (270 S.E.2d 61) (1980); Hanson v. State, 86 Ga.App. 313 (71 S.E.2d 720) (1952). In Hanson, this [C]ourt specifically noted that the nature of the offense was sexual and held that in such a case, when the victim was of tender years, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting repetitive and even leading questions. We find the same considerations to obtain here, and therefore find [Lopez’s] enumeration without merit.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Stine v. State, 199 Ga.App. 898, 900(3) (406 S.E.2d 292) (1991).” Dumas v. State, 283 Ga.App. 279, 641 S.E.2d 271 (January 16, 2007). No abuse of discretion where trial court allowed prosecutor to lead his own witness; as defense counsel acknowledged, “there’s a language barrier with [the witness].” “‘Although leading questions are generally allowed only on cross-examination, the trial court has discretion to allow leading questions on direct examination where the witness is nervous, ignorant or hostile. OCGA § 24-9-63; Fugate v. State, 263 Ga. 260, 265 (431 S.E.2d 104) (1993). “ It would be a rare case in which the trial court’s exercise of discretion on this issue would warrant reversal.” Id.’ Smith v. State, 243 Ga.App. 331, 332(1) (533 S.E.2d 431) (2000). The same rationale applies to allowing leading questions where there is a language barrier.” Accord, Thomas v. State , 293 Ga. 829, 750 S.E.2d 297 (October 21, 2013). Q. NARRATIVE TESTIMONY Alexander v. State, 319 Ga.App. 199, 734 S.E.2d 432 (November 16, 2012). Convictions for battery and related offenses affirmed; no ineffective assistance based on failure to object to victim’s narrative testimony. “[W]e note that our courts have approved of true narrative testimony, particularly in cases involving youthful victims of sex or violent crimes: ‘It is not error to allow a witness to deliver his testimony in narrative form, without the aid of questions from counsel, when counsel so request, provided the witness is not permitted to state anything which is inadmissible as evidence. This practice