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is rather to be commended than condemned.’ (Punctuation omitted.) Burroughs v. State, 186 Ga.App. 40, 44(7), 366 S.E.2d 378 (1988), quoting Horton v. State, 123 Ga. 145(1), 51 S.E. 287 (1905).” R. OATHS Bennett v. State, 334 Ga.App. 381, 779 S.E.2d 420 (November 10, 2015). Methamphetamine trafficking and related convictions affirmed; defendant waived objection to co-conspirator’s unsworn testimony by failing to object at trial. Co- conspirator Pogue refused to be sworn “because he did not want to ‘get stabbed’ in prison.” After he twice refused to take the oath, “the prosecutor requested to proceed with unsworn testimony. The trial court granted the request without objection from Bennett’s counsel. And trial counsel later cross-examined Pogue, eliciting further unsworn testimony. Georgia law provides that ‘[b]efore testifying, every witness shall be required to declare that he or she will testify truthfully by oath or affirmation administered in a form calculated to awaken the witness’s conscience and impress the witness’s mind with the duty to do so.’ OCGA § 24–6–603(a). However, it is well settled that the failure to object to unsworn testimony waives the issue for appeal. See Brown v. State, 290 Ga. 321, 322(4), 720 S.E.2d 617 (2012); Chapman v. State, 257 Ga. 19, 20(3), 354 S.E.2d 149 (1987); Sweeting v. State, 291 Ga.App. 693, 694, 662 S.E.2d 785 (2008); Hilson v. State, 204 Ga.App. 200, 203(1), 418 S.E.2d 784 (1992).” Hubert v. State, 297 Ga.App. 71, 676 S.E.2d 436 (March 26, 2009). No error where trial court rebuked defense counsel for attempting “to dictate the manner in which a state's witness would be sworn. The trial court has broad discretion, however, to prescribe the manner in which the court's business will be conducted and to regulate the conduct of the parties, counsel and witnesses during the course of a trial. See OCGA § 15-1-3(4), (5); Johnson v. State, 254 Ga. 591, 599(11) (331 S.E.2d 578) (1985); Phillips v. State, 278 Ga.App. 439, 443(2)(b) (629 S.E.2d 130) (2006). The trial judge did not exhibit undue bias against the defense by reminding Hubert's counsel that the swearing of witnesses fell within the dominion of the court. See id.” S. OPINION TESTIMONY See also subheading EXPERTS, above See new OCGA § 24-701 et seq. 1. GENERALLY Rai v. State, 297 Ga. 472, 775 S.E.2d 129 (July 6, 2015). Murder and related convictions affirmed; no error in allowing witness Green to testify to whether “Rai appeared to know what Green was talking about when he referred to ‘the murder in Atlanta.’ We disagree, insofar as ‘[a] lay witness may relate his or her opinion as to ... any fact so long as the opinion is based upon the person's own experiences and observations.’ Harris v. State, 279 Ga. 304, 306(1), 612 S.E.2d 789 (2005). Here, Green was merely asked to assess Rai's understanding of the topic of their conversation based on Green's own observations of Rai's behavior and demeanor at the time.” Foster v. State, 294 Ga. 383, 754 S.E.2d 33 (January 21, 2014). Malice murder and aggravated assault convictions affirmed; witness was properly allowed to testify to her understanding of a letter she received from defendant. “Foster contends that the trial court erred by allowing Johnson to testify that the phrase ‘hold it down’ contained in the letter to her from Foster meant ‘keep quiet.’ We disagree. ‘A lay witness may relate his or her opinion as to the existence of any fact so long as the opinion is based upon the person's own experiences and observations, and so long as the matter referred to is within the scope of the average juror's knowledge.’ (Citation omitted.) Harris v. State, 279 Ga. 304, 306(1) (612 S.E.2d 789) (2005). At the time she was being questioned about the letter, Johnson indicated that she had heard the phrase before and that, in her experience, it meant to stay quiet about a matter. There was no error.” Clement v. State, 324 Ga.App. 39, 749 S.E.2d 41 (September 26, 2013). Physical precedent only; evidence supported conviction for criminal trespass, but not criminal damage to property due to lack of evidence of amount of damages. Defendant here took and cut telephone cable. Phone company manager “testified that AT & T had incurred a total of $384 in costs for replacement materials and $1,929 in labor expenses.” Labor figure was not actual cost incurred, but was an opinion based on “the loaded labor rate … set out in a chart created and provided to him by the AT & T asset protection department, and he simply applied the rates laid out in the chart to arrive at the labor expenses associated with each AT & T technician involved in the repair work. The loaded labor rate chart developed by the asset protection department and relied upon by the manager to calculate the labor expenses was not introduced into evidence at trial, and no one from the asset protection department was called as a witness.” Manager’s testimony about labor costs was inadmissible hearsay. “[I]f a witness serves as a mere conduit for someone else's opinion, the witness's testimony constitutes inadmissible hearsay. See Nash v. Compass Bank, 296 Ga.App. 874, 876(a), 676 S.E.2d 28 (2009); Cantrell