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v. Northeast Ga. Med. Center, 235 Ga.App. 365, 379–370(4), 508 S.E.2d 716 (1998). A witness acts as a mere conduit and does not provide ‘an independent expression of opinion’ if his or her testimony is ‘derived purely from a mechanical application of a formula’ found in a document prepared by another. See Dept. of Transp. v. Brand, 149 Ga.App. 547, 547–548(1), 254 S.E.2d 873 (1979), overruled in part on other grounds by Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth. v. Dendy, 250 Ga. 538, 541–542(1)(a), 299 S.E.2d 876 (1983). See also Dept. of Transp. v. Fitzpatrick, 184 Ga.App. 249, 250(2), 361 S.E.2d 241 (1987) (testimony of witness ‘who, in effect, merely testified from ... documents rather than from personal knowledge’ was inadmissible hearsay). Applying these principles to the case-at-hand, we conclude that the network manager's opinion testimony regarding the $1,929 in labor expenses incurred by AT & T constituted inadmissible hearsay and was wholly without probative value. The record reflects that the manager did not have personal knowledge of the labor expenses that were incurred, but rather calculated the expenses by mechanically applying the ‘loaded labor rate’ contained in a chart prepared by others that was not introduced into evidence. Under these circumstances, the manager was merely a conduit for the opinion of others, namely the AT & T assets protection department, which created the chart used by AT & T for calculating labor expenses associated with its technicians performing repair work. Consequently, the manager's testimony regarding the $1,929 in labor expenses was not competent evidence and could not be considered in determining the costs of the repair to the telephone line.” Williams v. State, 319 Ga.App. 888, 739 S.E.2d 4 (February 25, 2013). Child molestation and related convictions affirmed; counsel not ineffective in failing to object to polygraph examiner’s testimony about the credibility of defendant’s expressed concern for the victim’s hygiene, in light of defendant’s own poor hygiene. “‘Although an expert witness may not testify as to his opinion of the other witnesses' truthfulness, the expert witness may express an opinion as to whether medical or other objective evidence in the case is consistent with the other witnesses' story.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Cade v. State, 289 Ga. 805, 809(5), 716 S.E.2d 196 (2011). Here, Hagan did not opine as to whether Williams was telling the truth about his interaction with the victim. He merely stated that Williams's claimed concern regarding the victim's hygiene appeared to be inconsistent with the state of his own hygiene.” Anderson v. State, 311 Ga.App. 732, 716 S.E.2d 813 (September 20, 2011). Armed robbery and related convictions affirmed; no improper bolstering where officer was allowed to testify “as to his own observations regarding the video” from the robbed store. Officer testified to the color of the handgun used in the robbery, and stated that the robber’s shirt was the same as the one placed in evidence. Baghose v. State, 309 Ga.App. 599, 711 S.E.2d 110 (May 17, 2011). Theft and forgery convictions affirmed; trial court properly admitted testimony from president of corporate victim as to value of company’s losses. “[President] Umberton was authorized to testify as to the total amount of damages based on the foundation she laid for her testimony. Opinion evidence as to the value of an item has probative value and may be admitted if a foundation is laid showing that the witness has some knowledge, experience or familiarity with the value of the property or similar property and if the witness gives reasons for the value assessed and has had an opportunity for forming a correct opinion. Wilkerson v. State, 246 Ga.App. 621, 622, 540 S.E.2d 303 (2000). See also Barnes v. State, 239 Ga.App. 495, 498(1), 521 S.E.2d 425 (1999) (‘It is not objectionable that [an] opinion as to value might, in some cases, be based on hearsay.’). At the sentencing hearing, Umberson testified that she instigated the two audits; that she was present for each of the two audits ‘during the entire time’; that the auditors determined that Baghose generated fraudulent, unauthorized checks and cashed them; that she obtained copies of the checks from the bank; that she obtained affidavits from every person listed as a payee on the checks showing that they did not receive the money; that the auditors determined the exact amount of the fraudulent checks; that she herself confirmed the amount of each check; that the auditors prepared the list of fraudulent checks based on the same information; and that she reviewed the checks with the auditors and determined that the exact amount of fraudulent checks was $653,735.63. Because Umberson laid a foundation for her opinion regarding the damages suffered by [victim corporation], her testimony as to that value was properly allowed.” West v. State, 300 Ga.App. 583, 685 S.E.2d 486 (October 23, 2009). In defendant’s DUI prosecution, trial court properly allowed officer to express his opinion, based on his operation of the intox machine and the inspection certificates, that the machine was “in good working condition.” “This evidence belies West's contention that the officer's testimony concerning the machine being in good working order was speculative.” Singleton v. State, 297 Ga.App. 452, 677 S.E.2d 348 (March 23, 2009). Trial court properly “allowed [officer] to give his opinion about what [defendant’s] behavior meant in terms of suspecting criminal activity or deception.” “‘[Officer] merely testified about what he observed regarding [Singleton's and the other occupants'] appearance and behavior and the assumptions he made based upon such observations. A lay witness may relate his or her opinion as to the existence of any