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fact so long as the opinion is based upon the person's own experiences and observations, and so long as the matter referred to is within the scope of the average juror's knowledge.’ Harris v. State, 279 Ga. 304, 305-306(1) (612 S.E.2d 789) (2005). See also Weston v. State, 276 Ga. 680, 682(3) (580 S.E.2d 204) (2003).” Officer was thus properly allowed to testify that defendant’s behavior “made him suspicious of wrongdoing or that he found odd or puzzling.” Griffin v. State, 295 Ga.App. 472, 672 S.E.2d 453 (January 8, 2009). Defendant’s conviction for selling cigarettes to minors affirmed; age of minors was adequately supported by officer’s testimony estimating their age based on officer’s observations. “Based on his physical observations of the young man, [Officer] Johnson testified that the juvenile ‘appeared to me to be less than 18.’ As to the younger juvenile, Johnson testified that he was ‘definitely less than 18.’ ‘Hearsay evidence is that which does not derive its value solely from the credit of the witness but rests mainly on the veracity and competency of other persons.’ (Punctuation and footnote omitted.) Gilbert v. State, 265 Ga.App. 76, 77- 78(2), 593 S.E.2d 25 (2003). The officer's testimony about his own observations of the juveniles was not hearsay because its value did not rest on the veracity or competency of the juveniles. Id at 78, 593 S.E.2d 25. Rather, the officer's testimony was a conclusion or opinion based upon his personal observations of the juveniles' characteristics. ‘Description of one's physical observations and opinions logically flowing therefrom have long been admissible in this state.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Holton v. State, 280 Ga. 843, 845(3), 632 S.E.2d 90 (2006) (no error in admitting officer's opinion testimony that minor scratches on defendant's face did not likely result from a scuffle). Accordingly, the trial court did not err in overruling Davis's hearsay objections to the officer's testimony regarding the juveniles' ages. It follows that the evidence was sufficient to sustain Griffin's conviction. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).” Rogers v. State, 294 Ga.App. 195, 670 S.E.2d 106 (October 22, 2008). Error in allowing officer to identify defendant on videotape was harmless where defendant admitted on cross-examination that he was the person shown. Miller v. State, 292 Ga.App. 641, 666 S.E.2d 35 (June 24, 2008). Trial court properly allowed lay opinion testimony that victim’s cut appeared to be caused by a sharp instrument. “In this case, the plastic surgeon based his opinion that the cut was consistent with a sharp instrument on his own observations that the cut had clean edges and was not surrounded by bruising. We agree with the trial court that whether or not a cut is consistent with having been made by a sharp instrument is within the ken of the average juror. The trial court thus did not err in admitting the doctor’s lay opinion.” Bly v. State, 283 Ga. 453, 660 S.E.2d 713 (April 21, 2008). Reversing 286 Ga.App. 43, 648 S.E.2d 446 (2007). In defendant’s trial for obstruction, trial court erred in allowing GBI agent to express opinion that another officer was acting “appropriately as a police officer in the line of duty” in his encounter with defendant – where agent didn’t personally observe the actions. Distinguishing “ McMichen v. Moattar, 221 Ga.App. 230(2) (470 S.E.2d 800) (1996) and In re: Smith, 143 Ga.App. 358(2) (238 S.E.2d 725) (1977), [holding] that when the subject matter of an inquiry ‘“relates to numerous facts perceived by the senses ”’ that cannot be adequately described and presented to the jury, ‘“the witness may state his impressions drawn from, and opinions based upon, the facts and circumstances observed by him or the effect which they produced upon his mind.”’ (Emphasis supplied.) McMichen, supra, at 232(2). However, as both McMichen and Smith clearly reflect, this rule applies to witnesses who personally observed the events to which they are testifying and, essentially, authorizes such eyewitnesses to present a ‘shorthand’ impression of those events in situations where language fails to adequately convey their observations to the jury with the ‘“same force and clearness as they appeared to the witness.”’ Id.” Testimony also was not admissible as expert opinion: “whether or not [officer], according to his version of events, ‘acted appropriately as a police officer in the line of duty,’ as [agent] was asked, was a matter regarding which the jurors could have made ‘an equally intelligent judgment of their own, independently of the opinion of [agent],” quoting Fordham v. State, 254 Ga. 59 (325 S.E.2d 755) (1985). Phillips v. State, 280 Ga. 728, 632 S.E.2d 131 (July 6, 2006). Emergency room physician who admitted victim to hospital was competent to testify to cause of death even though he was not the doctor who pronounced victim dead. “[T]he testimony of the final attending physician, or that of the person who conducted the autopsy, is not a legal necessity for a conviction, See Curtis v. State, 224 Ga. 870(1) (165 S.E.2d 150) (1968) (even without an autopsy, testimony of a physician as to the life-threatening nature of visible wounds was sufficient evidence to establish the cause of death and to support a guilty verdict.).” State v. A 24 Bail Bonding, 280 Ga.App. 463, 634 S.E.2d 99 (June 28, 2006). At bond forfeiture hearing, trial court erred in admitting investigators’ “expert opinion” testimony of (missing) defendant’s true name. “Determination of the principal’s true name did not require the drawing of a conclusion beyond the ken of the average layman. Under the