☢ test - Í

circumstances present here, A 24 was attempting to use the expert opinion as nothing more than a conduit for admission of the hearsay on which the opinion was based. That is not permissible. Cf. Hall County v. Merritt, 233 Ga.App. 526, 528(2), 504 S.E.2d 754 (1998).” Accord, Mitchell (February 6, 2007), above. Zepp v. State, 276 Ga.App. 466, 623 S.E.2d 569 (November 18, 2005). “The State’s expert in pediatric forensics testified regarding her review of the physical examination of the daughter and commented that the findings were consistent with the allegation that the daughter’s ‘father had put his penis in her vagina.’ Zepp complains that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to this comment because it improperly reflected the expert’s opinion that she believed the daughter’s allegation. We do not agree. The testimony of experts that certain medical or scientific tests resulted in findings consistent with molestation does not violate OCGA § 24-9-80; it is admissible and proper. See Gosnell v. State, 247 Ga.App. 508, 510(2)(b) (544 S.E.2d 477) (2001).” Brown v. State, 275 Ga.App. 99, 619 S.E.2d 789 (August 12, 2005). “The prosecutor did not ask the victim for his opinion on the ultimate issue of whether Brown committed the indicted acts with the criminal intent required to authorize the jury to convict. Rather, the State’s question sought to elicit testimony regarding whether it appeared to this eyewitness that the movement of Brown’s arm which propelled the point of the sword he held through the victim’s body was within Brown’s control. We find no authority supporting the position that whether observed physical behavior was within the actor’s control, or whether it was involuntary, is the sort of opinion testimony which is inadmissible under OCGA § 24-9- 65.” Harris v. State, 279 Ga. 304, 612 S.E.2d 789 (May 9, 2005). “A lay witness may relate his or her opinion as to the existence of any fact so long as the opinion is based upon the person’s own experiences and observations, and so long as the matter referred to is within the scope of the average juror’s knowledge. Weston v. State, 276 Ga. 680, 682(3), 580 S.E.2d 204 (2003).” Accord, Foster (January 16, 2014), above. Flanders v. State, 279 Ga. 35, 609 S.E.2d 346 (February 21, 2005). “During opening statement, defense counsel opined that the lead detective did not believe that Flanders ‘knew how to handle that particular gun, much less pull the trigger. So I think when you hear the evidence, the State’s own detective ... believed that it was an accident.’ During the State’s direct examination of the detective, the prosecutor asked, ‘Did you ever in your own mind feel like this was – was there any way that this was an accident?’ The trial court allowed the question, over objection, because it was raised in opening statement by the defense. Clearly, Flanders’ counsel opened the door to testimony to the subject by suggesting during opening statement that the detective believed the shooting to be accidental. See generally Whitt v. State, 257 Ga. 8(2)(a), 354 S.E.2d 116 (1987).” Hunt v. State, 268 Ga.App. 568, 602 S.E.2d 312 (July 16, 2004). No mistrial required where curative instruction given after expert witness’s reference to “[victim] and … other children who have been abused.” Hames v. State, 278 Ga. 182, 598 S.E.2d 459 (June 7, 2004). “The trial court did not err in refusing to allow a defense expert to express a favorable opinion as to the credibility of Hames’ pre-trial statement. The excluded testimony would have invaded the province of the jury. Patterson v. State, 233 Ga.App. 776, 777(2), 505 S.E.2d 518 (1998).” Lopez v. State, 267 Ga.App. 178, 598 S.E.2d 898 (April 23, 2004). “‘[T]he expression of the opinion of a witness amounting to a conclusion is harmless where there is ample evidence to support the inference.’ Jones v. State, 75 Ga.App. 610, 614 (44 S.E.2d 174) (1947).” Lanwehr v. State, 265 Ga.App. 359, 593 S.E.2d 897 (January 30, 2004). Trial court properly allowed prosecutor to ask officer “if two beers would make someone’s skin red. Lanwehr’s lawyer then raised the following objection: ‘Judge, I’m going to object. I mean how’s he supposed to know? He’s not a doctor in any way. You know, he never observed any – ’…. At the time of Lanwehr’s trial, the arresting officer had over four years of law enforcement experience, had been trained in DUI detection and field sobriety testing, and had been involved in over a hundred DUI arrests. Based on his training and experience, the officer was qualified to testify about the effects of alcohol consumption on the body. [Cit.]” McDaniel v. State, 263 Ga.App. 625, 588 S.E.2d 812 (October 15, 2003). “[E]ven if a police officer is not formally tendered as an expert, he may give opinion testimony if an adequate foundation is laid with respect to his experience and training. (Cit.) Thus, once a proper foundation is laid, an officer may testify about elements of a crime with which he is familiar based upon his experience, and this Court has previously allowed such testimony on the issue of drug